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SUMMARY (in Dutch). 233
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.
1. Scope of the book.
The principal aim of this thesis is to refine the description of the
links between the optimal production, finance and investment policy of
the firm by introducing activity analysis into the dynamic theory of the
firm. Up to now, production in dynamic models, dealing with the produc-
tion policy of the firm, was described by means of a continuous produc-
tion function, implying an infinite number of productibn possibilities.
Activity analysis however, assumes, as distinct from a continuous pro-
duction function, that the firm can choose among only a limited number
of production possibilities.  This more realistic assumption will be
shown to improve the role of depth investments in the firm's life cycle.
Thus, it will be concluded that substituting activity analysis for a
continuous production function implies  the change from a firm that
continuously adapts its way of production to a firm for which depth
investments are intermediate stages in its life cycle, succeeded by
growth stages or other stationary stages. Further, by introducing activ-
ity analysis we can analyse influences on the production policy of the
firm more precisely, and in concordance with managerial behaviour. For
this reason,  this thesis provides some grounds for bridging the gap
between the theory of the firm and its practical implications for decis-
ion making.
A second purpose of the thesis is to extend the description of gover-
nmental influences on the firm's policy by introducing investment grants
beside  corporation  profit  tax.  Whereas  corporation profit  tax will
always  slow down corporate growth,  investment grants,  intending to
stimulate employment, will increase corporate activity, but may lead to
decreases in employment.
The third purpose of the thesis is to expand the analysis of the dynamic
theory of the firm by comparing the findings with well known results of
the static models, and by deriving three general laws of motion (the so-
called: optimal decision rules) underlying all the resulting expansion
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patterns of the firm and, finally, by doing comparative dynamic analysis
(or:  sensitivity analysis)  tracing the influence of government, fi-
nancial states and wage demands on the firm's policy.
The perspective of this thesis is imbedded in the realm of optimal
control models dealing with the dynamic theory of the firm. To provide
the reader with past and traditional research in this field, we discuss
the approaches that other authors have used in structuring and explai-
ning the firm's agents such as: employees, shareholders and government.
A more technical contribution of this thesis is our design of an iterat-
ive procedure to construct optimal solutions of optimal control models            I
containing state and control constraints. This result is more general
than current procedures.
2. Outline of the book.
The remaining sections of this chapter will be devoted to some observa-
tions about dynamic and analytical aspects of the theory of the firm.
In chapter 2 we shall demonstrate how several authors have modelled
different aspects of the dynamics of the firm. These aspects are organi-
zed on the basis of different sets of agents that are connected to the
firm, such as shareholders, employees, competitors and government. In
this way, the reader may get an overview of the main themes studied in
dynamic theories of the firm as well as of the ingenuity by which the
relevant authors have succeeded in formulating different relationships
inside the firm and between the firm and its environment and make it
manageable in a dynamic analysis.
After some familiarization with the quantitative formulations in chapter
2, we study optimal solutions in chapter 3. This is done on the basis of
four dynamic models of the firm that are presented in great detail
(together  with  the  relevant  optimal  solutions).  We  selected  those
models, as they can be conceived as predecessors of the main model of
the  thesis,  presented  in chapter  4.  Further,  each of  these models
contains some new features  that are important in understanding the
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analysis in the following chapters.
In order to facilitate the reading of chapter 3, we have presented the
mathematical derivations in appendices  1 and 2.  In appendix  1,  the
reader is introduced into the realm of the Maximum Principle.  This
Principle yields conditions for optimal solutions of dynamic models.
Much attention is paid to a careful description of the effects of
control and state constraints. These constraints are inevitable in
dynamic models of the firm, as they deal with the pervasive problems of
scarcity. They complicate the optimality conditions and the search for
an optimal solution, however. For this kind of models, the formulation
of the Maximum Principle as presented by Russak, 1970, is suitable. On
the basis of this formulation we have designed an iterative solution
procedure in appendix  2.  Up  to now,  such a procedure has not been
published elsewhere.  This procedure has been applied to the relevant
models of chapter 3 in order to produce the optimal solutions dealt with
in that chapter.
After this more mathematical excursion, the reader returns to chapter 4,
in which we present an extended dynamic model of the firm. In this model
we have incorporated financing, production,  investment and the firm's
dividend policy. The production process is described by means of activ-
ity analysis which, although well known,  is newly incorporated in a
dynamic model of the firm. Activity analysis is closely related to the
way in which management often solves production planning problems in
reality. A second advantage of this formulation over, say, a continuous
production function, will be outlined in our study of depth investments
in chapter 5. Another new and important feature of our study is the
twofold influence of government on the firm's policy. Both corporation
profit taxes and investment grants are incorporated.  Since our model
contains production as well as financing,  we can also study how the
direct impact of investment grants on the financial position of the firm
will indirectly influence the employment policy of that firm. This is of
course essential to investigate the way in which investment grants may
raise employment. Links between well known financial records and the
model presented are also discussed.
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In appendix 3, we describe how the optimal solution of the above
model
can be found with the help of the new procedure as presented in appendix
2.
Chapters 5 and 6 contain a description and further analysis of this
optimal solution. By properly handling constraints on the parameters, we
get four different sets of optimal solutions (chapter 5). Each of them
can be represented by a "master trajectory" of the firm that holds under
given constraints on the parameters. Moreover,  the sequence in the
presentation  is  such  that  each . new master trajectory contains  new
features, compared with the previous master trajectories. We will dis-
cuss features such as: stationary and growth stages, initial conditions
on the state of the firm, depth investments and consolidation. The links
with traditlonal static theory of the firm are pointed out as well.
Finally, in chapter 6, we discuss in more detail the sensitivity of the
optimal solution to the parameters of the model. For that purpose, three
optimal policy rules are derived,  concerning production,  finance and
investment. For each policy rule, the impact of the relevant parameters
is studied. Further, six different ways of influencing the optimal
solution are derived, for example dealing with the rate of growth and
with several threshold values of output. For each such way we will also
discuss the impact of the relevant parameters. Finally, we will study
the global influence of three distinct sets of parameters (governmental,
financial and social) on the master trajectories. A sensitivity analysis
as presented in chapter 6, is not commonly used in the literature and
clearly shows its importance for a better understanding of the model and
its solution and therefore for the understanding of the firm.
3. Relevance of dynamic theories of the firm.
The dynamic theory of the firm is motivated by three issues: the need
for policies, the contribution of deductive analysis and the need to
incorporate time. The need to study policies of firms hardly needs any
explanation, because firms are an important group of economic agents
having much influence on society.
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We can distinguish between two ways of studying the firm:  inductive
studies, deriving laws from inquiries and statistical data, and deduc-
tive studies, deriving laws from a set of assumptions (mostly through
constructing models  and analysing solutions).  This book follows  the
latter method in trying to build "sounder methodological bridges"
(Vickers, 1968) from micro economics to business economics. This kind of
bridges   is an indispensable instrument to improve management' s under-
standing of favorable policies,  to enable government to assess the
impact of its policy on the firm and to provide academic teachers with
an instrument to outline the essentials of the firm (Lesourne & Leban,
1981).
Finally, the effects of time and the interrelatedness of economic states
are useful in the theory of the firm. Wildsmith, for example, while
quoting a statement of Hicks, argued:
In mechanics,  statics is concerned with rest,  dynamics with
motion, but no economic system is ever at rest in anything like
the mechanical sense (Wildsmith, 1973, 31).
Furthermore, Tapiero stated:
Managers typically reach decisions in a perspective of time and
in the light of temporal criteria (Tapiero, 1978).
So, time is obviously essential to the policy of the firm and introduc-
tion of time increases our understanding of the firm. Further it can
lead to insights that may not be obtained through other methods such as
static analysis.
4. Origins of dynamic theories of the firm.
In the last two decades, new insights regarding the theory of the firm
have  been gained, due to new instruments, including  the  Maximum
Principle (Pontryagin   e.a.,   1962) and Dynamic Programming (Bellman,
1957).  Prior to these innovations, the theory of the firm dealt with
time by means of comparative statics and so-called equilibrium growth
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models (Baumol,    1962) or steady state growth models (Marris,   1963).
These theories may be styled as theories of mechanical growth processes
(Albach, 1976).
The new mathematical instruments, mentioned above, enabled economists to
describe the growth of a firm in a more satisfactory way, as a stimulus
originating from a decisionmaking process within the firm (Ludwig, 1978,
14).  This stimulus is constrained by the structure of the firm (for
example: its production frontiers) and by the environment in which the
firm operates (for example: governmental regulations and capital ration-
ing).
Recent surveys and text books, such as: Tapiero, 1977, Sethi & Thompson,
1981, and Kamien & Schwartz,  1981, show the great progress of dynamic
analysis in the theory of the firm during the past two decades.
5. Nature of the theory of the firm and of this book.
In the dynamic theory of the firm, the emphasis lays on general laws of
motion on an aggregate level which, in spite of their general nature,
leave room for differences between single firms. These differences are
told to stem from the different circumstances with which each firm has
to cope, apart from general principles that hold for all of them. The
same underlying process may thus lead to different types of growth.
As a consequence of this preference for general laws, the economists are
required to keep models as simple as possible so that analytical solu-
tions can be derived. This raises the question of which aspects should
be incorporated in the model and which not. Publications in the dynamic
theory of the firm are usually dealing with a few aspects of the firm's
policy. For example, there is some research in financing (e.g.: Ludwig,
1978, Sethi, 1978, Verheyen, 1981, Van Loon, 1981), advertising (Sethi,
1977,   Tapiero, 1978), employment policy (Leban, 1982), research   and
development (Feichtinger, 1982), inflation (Lesourne & Leban, 1977) and
interaction between competitors (Levine & Th&pot, 1982). We will discuss
these themes in greater detail in the next chapter. Based on the solu-
tion procedure discussed in appendix 2, we can deal with more complex
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models, so we are able to increase the number of aspects of the firm's
policy put into a single model. Beside this extension of the "span of
control" of the theory of the firm, we will lower the level of aggrega-
tion as far as production is concerned by introducing activity analysis.
In this way, we take a step forward on Vicker's bridge from the theory
of the firm towards business economics.
We will finish this section by presenting some ways of describing growth
and the policy of the firm in reality, so that the reader will have a
fair idea of the complexity of dynamics of the firm in reality. For, in
the theory of the firm, which we will enter in the next chapter, the
growth process will be described in only one or two dimensions.  In
reality, growth and the dynamic policy of the firm are much more complex
phenomena. Ludwig, for example, mentioned the following alternative ways
of describing growth (and contraction) processes (Ludwig, 1978, 23):
Strategy : expansion, diversification, contraction.
Market structure : market  penetration,  market development,
product  development,  reduction  of  the
range of products.
Direction of growth  : horizontal, vertical.
Kind of growth : internal, external.
Instruments : own initiatives, cartels, licences,
buying, merging.
Further, the complexity of the dynamic policy of the firm in the range
of financial growth patterns has been described by Huret,  who uses
annual reports of 522 French firms (Huret, 1975):
Industrial  expansion: considerable  expansion of  fixed assets
financed by long term debt.
Commercial expansion : decreasing portion of fixed assets, com-
pensated  by  increasing  liquid  assets,
considerable expansion  of  short-term
creditors.
External expansion : growth of interests in associated compan-
ies equals growth of fixed assets.
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Equilibrium growth : conserving an invariable structure of the
balance.
Defensive strategy : increase of current liabilities without a
corresponding change of the structure of
assets.
Decline : stagnating  level  of  liabilities  and  a
decreasing level of fixed assets.
The last example shows a classification of growth processes based on
strategic policies (Kieser, e.a., ,1977):
Market penetration : price policy and sales stimula-
ting activities  under constant
demand.
Market expansion : unlocking  new  markets  through
variations of the product mix or
regional expansion.
Vertical diversification : extending the product range
through products (and/or servic-
es) upward or downward situated
in the production column.
Horizontal diversification : extending the product range
through products allied to the
present range.
Concentrical diversification : extending the product range
through products that are only
weakly  related  to  the present
range in a technical or commer-
cial sense.
Conglomerate or
portfolio diversification : extending the product range
through products which are not
related  to  the present  range,
neither in a technical nor in a
commercial sense.
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As contrasted with these less aggregated descriptions, in the dynamic
theory of the firm, growth is mostly measured in terms of an increase
(or decrease) of money capital, assets and/or employment.
6.    Stinima ry.
This chapter is meant as an introduction to dynamic analysis in general
and to growth in particular. Apart from the intentions of the author and
an outline of the book, the contribution has been discussed of a dynam-
ic, analytical and theoretical treatment of the policy of the firm.
Optimal control theory appears to enable research in this way but, like
every instrument for economic analysis, it has its limitations, mainly
in the area of the complexity of the models considered. After dealing
with the nature of the theory of the firm, this chapter ends with the
presentation of some descriptive studies in order to give an idea of the
complexity of growth processes of the firm in reality.
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CHAPTER 2. A SURVEY OF DYNAMIC THEORIES OF THE FIRM.
1. Introduction.
In section 5 of the introduction chapter we have pointed out several
aspects of the dynamics of the firm that have been studied. Each aspect
has its own merits and it seems useful to consider the whole area
briefly,  before concentrating on the subject-matter of this research:
the relation between investment, financing and production policies.
We owe much to earlier surveys such as: Ludwig, 1978, Nickell, 1978,
J0rgensen, 1980, Lesourne & Leban, 1982 and: Ekman, 1978. Our viewpoint,
however,  is different from all of them: we will present the subjects
covered by research in the field of dynamics of the firm mainly in the
light of the parties concerned. The interactions between these interest
groups are the origin of the dynamics of the firm. The behaviour of each
such group can be put into a dynamic model of the firm in different
ways:  in the goal function,  or as a constraint put upon the firm's
policy or as a (dynamic) relationship between some entities that are
important to the firm's position.  In figure 2.1 on the next page we
present the subjects that we will discuss with the section numbers to
match.
The following is no attempt to cover all material published, because we
only intend to show examples of dealing with the different aspects of
the theory of the firm.
2. Shareholders.
In the part of the theory of the firm concerned with financial problems
of the firm, shareholders often act as dominant goal setters. In this
case the firm is supposed to act as if it maximizes its value as concei-
ved by its  shareholders.  The  firm's value is mostly defined as the
capital value of the dividend flow (Lesourne, 1976) or the capital value
of the cash flow (Jorgenson, 1973) over an infinite period of time. When
a finite planning horizon is introduced,  the discounted value of the
firm at the end of the planning horizon stands for all future returns to
l 2
suppliers of labour- share- lenders of
assets market holders debt money
(2.8) (2.7)
<4)       (L 1»
government FIRM: management competitors







Figure 2.1. Scheme used for surveying research into the dynamics
of the firm.
equity. This salvage value may be a function of the value of final
equity (Krouse & Lee,  1973, Sethi, 1978), or, more specific, the dis-
counted value of final equity (Ludwig, 1978):
maximize: V(0) =J o e   D(T) dT +
e X(Z)
,Z -iT -iz
in which: D(T): dividend
V(0) : value of the firm (for the shareholders)
X(T) : equity
T    : time,OSTSz
i    : time preference rate of the shareholders
z    : planning horizon
Furthermore there are publications concerning changes in the group of
shareholders.  In  these  publications,  the  objective  of  the firm  is
defined as: maximizing the value of the firm as conceived by the present
shareholders. Issuing new shares may be free of charge (Elton & Gruber,
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1977) or subject to floatation costs (Senchack,  1975).  In the latter
case, the value of the firm is formulated as follows:
-iT
maximize: V(0) = fz e    {D(T) - (1-n)M(T)} dT
in which: V(0) : value of the firm for shareholders present
a t T=0
M(T) : new equity issued
n    : floatation costs per unit new equity
Note that the value is maximized over an infinite time period.
3. Management.
Managers are generally supposed to pursue power, prestige, income etc.
If they are the dominant party within the firm, and supposed that they
are not the owners, the firm will try to maximize growth, mostly in
terms of discounted sales. This objective, however, mostly appears in
combination with a restriction on the minimal amount of dividends to be
paid out, or on the minimal profit level per unit equity to be maintain-
ed (Leland, 1972):
00
maximize V(0) = f e-i'T R(T) dT
0
subject to:' R(T) - wL(T) - pmin K(T) 2 0
in which: L(T) : labour
K(T) : stock of capital goods
R(T) : return on sales
i'   : time preference rate of management
Pmin : minimum revenue per unit capital invested
w    : wage rate
The reason for this is, that managers must safeguard the flow of profits
to finance further growth. Moreover, maintaining a certain market value
is important to avoid take-overs,  possibly ending the realm of the
present management in the firm.
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Another way of formulating the tension between management and sharehol-
ders is the introduction of an utility function which contains (dis-
counted) sales and flow of profits as arguments (Ekman, 1982).
Also in studies of profit maximizing firms we may find a role played by
the management. In this case it concerns the limited capacity of the
staff to plan and execute expansion investments. This limited span of
control may be formulated in several ways, for example, as an upperbound
level of the growth of assets (Krouse & Lee, 1973):
  S w, in which:  1  E     and w is constant.
Note that w,is independent of the level of assets, which is in confor-
mity with Gibrat's law of proportionate effect. Another formulation has
been given in: SBderstrBm, 1977, in terms of the division of labour in
the firm (conceived as a "production team") between production and team
formation. The task of the "team formation department" is to supply
sufficient new labour forces, in order to catch the decrease of labour
and labour productivity:
Q(T) - Q(L(T) - Lf(T))
L    =a L (T) -a L(T)l f       2
in which: L(T) : stock of labour
Lf(T) : labour assigned to the team formation depart-
ment
Q(T) : level of production
al    : production  intensity  of  the  team  formation
department
a2    : productivity decay and quit rate.
Jorgenson gives a similar formulation in terms of the division of capi-
tal good services between production of output and installation of
investment goods (Jorgenson, 1973).
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Finally,  the restricted management capacity has been formulated as a
decrease  of  production  capacity  through  internal  adjustment  costs
(Treadway, 1970):
Q(T) = Q(K,L, ) with: 12 < O
3K
in which: Q(T): production capacity
The idea behind this formulation is that growth demands planning capa-
city, which is drawn from the production planning capacity of the staff.
Note that the above production functions are no longer production fune-
tions in the sense of the technical relationship between output and
input of production factors. At the firm's level, production capacity
appears to be determined not only by technical relations but also by the
organisation  structure  that  enables  production.  So,  the  production
function of a firm is a behavioural relationship (Jones, 1973, 183).
4. Employees.
Employees are staged in two different roles in the relevant literature:
as one of the input factors and/or as the dominant participating party
in the firm's decisions. When labour is represented as a separate input
factor (most publications suppose output, or revenue, to be a function
of assets only) the production technology of the firm is described by a
neo classical production function (Wong, 1975) or by activity analysis
(Van Loon,  1982).  In both cases,  labour is perfectly adaptable while
changes in the amount of capital goods are restricted for technical
(depreciation) and financial reasons. Lesourne & Leban introduced labour
as an input factor of the quasi-fixed type, due to a restriction on the
firing rate (Lesourne & Leban, 1978):
L 2 - nL, in which: n =maximal quit rate, based for example on
an agreement with the unions.
Many authors have studied the other way of including labour: as the
ruling party in so called "labour managed" firms. In this type of firms,
"labour receives  the residual revenue after the other input factors,
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including  capital,  have  received  their  predetermined  renumeration"
(Ekman, 1980).  In this kind of models,  the firm maximizes income per
employee (Jbrgensen, 1982):
maximize:     V(0)  =J o  e-i"T   I SCT)I.('1;K(T)]dT
in which:  V(0) : value of the firm for employees
i"   : time preference rate of employees
a    : fixed renumeration of capital
If one allows for changes in the group of employees, working in the firm
during the period under consideration, the same problems arise as in the
case of the shareholders-managed firm.
5. Labour market.
Most publications postulate a perfect labour market, which implies a
constant wage rate and perfect adaptability:
w = p  1 , where w     : wage
rate (constant)
p    : selling price
Q(L) : output (= sales volume)
Imperfections in labour markets were mostly explored by French scholars.
Beside imperfections due to a restriction on a firing policy, mentioned
in the previous section, Leban has studied, for instance, the employment
policy of the firm in the tradition of Salop (Salop, 1973). There, the
supply of labour and the natural quit rate of employees out of the firm
are supposed to depend on the wage rate. This wage rate may be exoge-
neously given or it may be a policy variable of the firm (Leban, 1982):
L = { Z(T)  - E(T)  - N(W)} L(T)
Z(T) S U(W)
in which: E(T) : firing rate
3NN(W)  : natural quit rate, with aw< O
17
U(W) : applying rate of labour,
2
with 3-U > 0 and L-U S O3W BW
W(T) : wage rate
Z(T) : recruiting rate
In this model, Leban further supposes a linear firing cost function and
a linear hiring cost function.
6. Output market.
The descriptions of the output market can be divided into two categor-
ies.  To the first category belong publications describing the output
market as behaving in accordance with a fixed supply-price function. The
firm offers a certain amount of output and receives a price that comes
about through the price setting mechanism. The market may be a perfect
one,  i.e. the price does not change when the amount of output of the
firm varies (Takayama, 1974, 685) or an imperfect one, having a decreas-
ing price-sales function (Nickell, 1974).
Publications in the second category focus on the influence of the mar-
keting instruments of the firm on the demand for the firm's output. In
marketing as well as in economics, there is a long tradition of studies
concerning such subjects as advertising, pricing, product policy, dis-
tribution, sales force etc. (see Horsky & Sen, 1980). Optimal Control
models of the firm's marketing policy mostly unite these instruments by
introducing the notion of advertising expenses, "including sales promo-
tion, product improvement, product quality, or, in general, most of the
firm's internal expenses that shift the demand curve of the firm" (Ek-
man, 1980). We shall briefly instance advertising models. In the class
of so called sales-response,  or diffusion models,  these advertising
expenses work in a direct way on the volume of sales (given a constant
selling price).  The first publication in this tradition is Vidale &
Wolfe, 1957:
S= alACT) {1-  Il}- a2SCT)
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in which: A(T): advertising expenses
S(T): sales (volume)
al  : response parameter
82  : decay parameter
d   : total demand of the market
The above formulation implies a saturation effect: when the firm ap-
proaches a market share of 100% (so S(T) approaches d), the effective-
ness of advertising expenses falls down. The decay parameter a2 reflects
the decreasing effectiveness of an advertising expenditure in course of
time. Luptacik and Feichtinger solved a sales response model in which
the firm has two marketing instruments: advertising expenses and selling
price (related to the average price on the market): Luptacik, 1980, and:
Feichtinger, 1980.
The second way of describing the influence of advertising expenses on
demand uses a carry over effect through the increase of goodwill. These
models are called: advertising capital models. The first model in this
tradition is: Nerlove & Arrow, 1962:
B = A(T) - a3B(T)
S - S(P(T), B(T)) or: P = P(Q(T), B(T))
in which: B(T) : goodwill of the firm
a3   : decay parameter of goodwill
In this model, the firm also has two instruments to influence demand:
advertising  expenses  and  selling  price.  Advertising  expenses  raise
goodwill and so,  ceteris paribus,  sales.  But through a3 an opposite
effect is built in, based on forgetting by consumers. Tapiero has intro-
duced  probabilistic  aspects  of  advertising and  forgetting  into  the
Nerlove & Arrow model (Tapiero, 1977). The attitude of the firm towards
risk becomes a new element in determining the optimal policies of the
firm.
A third group of publications to be mentioned here, deals with (uncer-
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tainty in)  the changing demand expectations due to business fluctua-
tions.  They study its impact on the policies of the firm concerning
investments  (Nickell,  1978,  Thipot,  1980)  and  employment  (Leban  &
Lesourne, 1980). It is worth while to consider one of the conclusions of
the last study mentioned,  in which optimal anticipation policies are
described to realize the importance of dynamical analysis: "an (optimal)
anticipation of a recession may be sufficient to generate a recession",
indeed, a striking conclusion.
7. Competitors.
In this section we will deal with models that describe competitors,
reacting through their own marketing policies and instruments. We do not
consider competitive behaviour through price-supply functions, which we
have already discussed in the first part of the previous section. In
optimal control models of the firm, more detailed descriptions of com-
petitor's behaviour are introduced by extending marketing models. The
idea behind this is,  that the effectiveness of the advertising and
pricing policy of the firm is affected by the advertising and pricing
policy of its competitors. Although, for example, Tapiero, 1979, dealt
with a multi-firm situation, most models  still deal with a duopoly
situation: two firms operate on the same market. The eldest formulation
stems from Kimball and is in the tradition of the sales response models
(Kimball, 1957):
Sl = al.Al(T).S2(T) - 82.A2(T).Sl(T)
S2 = 82.A2(T).Sl(T) - al.A2(T).S2(T)
Sl(T) + S2(T) = d
in which: A (T) : advertising expenses of firm jj
S (T) : sales of firm jj
a       : interaction parameters, a  > 0j
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d       : maximum sales potential
The first term of the dynamic sales equations explains that sales will
increase when advertising expenses are increased and that the effective-
ness is greater according as the market share of the opponent is great-
er. The second term states that it is hard to keep up sales level if one
has already attained a high market share (decay component) and if the
competitor is advertising in an intensive way (competitive pressure).
The third equation deals with the limit of total market demand and so
introduces diminishing returns to advertising.
A formulation of the above problem in the tradition of advertising
capital models may be found in Th6pot, 1981.
Besides differences in describing the influence of advertising expenses
on sales, we should mention differences in reacting to the activities of
competitors. We can distinguish between open- and closed-loop reaction
patterns and between cooperative and non-cooperative situations.
In an open-loop situation, both firms are completely informed about each
other. The question is to find the optimal policy, given the policy of
the competitor over the whole period, for instance:
4   -   6 (T)
*
in which: A  : optimal advertising policy of firm j
There  are  publications  that  deal with open-loop  solutions of non-
cooperative  situations  (Sethi,  1975)  and  of  cooperative  situations
(Leitmann, 1974).
In a closed-loop situation, competitors know each others present posit-
ion and have to make their decisions based on this partial information:
**
A  = A (S (T), Si(T), pj(T), Pi(T)),   i#j
One can imagine that this description does not fit cooperative situa-
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tions,  in which exchange of information is supposed. An example of a
solution of  the  non-cooperative,  closed-loop  type  is given by Case
(Case, 1979, 198).
Levine & Th&pot studied open-loop as well as closed-loop solutions in a
joint investment policy and price setting model (Levine & Th&pot, 1982).
Finally, Tapiero has presented an example of uncertainty introduced in a
competitive advertising model (Tapiero, 1979).
All the above publications deal with firms competing on the output
market. J6rgensen deals with a situation where two firms compete in the
labour market by offering different ways of paying for labour: a profit
maximizing firm offers a fixed reward to labour while a labour managed
firm offers a reward based on profit per unit labour after payment of a
fixed price to capital services (J rgensen, 1982).
So far, we have dealt with equilibrium patterns or movements towards an
equilibrium, that rarely imply the exit of one of both firms. Feich-
tinger has dealt with a kill or cure situation in which both competitors
are developing the same new product (Feichtinger, 1982). The firm that
enters the market first, will carry off the loot. Which firm will be
successful, depends on its intensity of research efforts, in relation to
the competitor's intensity.
8. Lenders of debt money.
Lenders of debt money do not participate actively in the management of
the firm. They plead their interests by making conditions on loans in
such a way as to minimize risk or by claiming rewards proportional to
their risk bearing. These two formulations turn up in publications where
borrowing is treated as a means of financing the activities of the firm.
The former formulation mostly yields a fixed interest charge and an
upperbound to the amount  of debt money available to the firm.  This
upperbound may be on new debt as a function of the cash flow (Lesourne,
1973,  222)  or  of the investment expenditures (Ludwig,   1978,  92),  or  it
may be formulated as an upperbound to the total amount of debt as a
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(linear)  function of equity,  implying a maximum leverage  (Lesourne,
1973, 206).
In the models mentioned above,  the firm is not allowed to exceed this
upperbound and so to pass into another risk class (that is: a subset of
firms having the same  risk as judged by investors with its related
(higher) interest rate). In the second formulation, the firm is allowed
to invest in such a way that its risk profile changes. Authors dealing
with this assumption formulate the demanded interest rate as a function
of the leverage (Senchak, 1975) or as a function of the total amount of
debt (Hochman e.a., 1973).
9. Suppliers of assets.
In this seotion we will restrict ourselves to the market of fixed as-
sets. Most authors suppose a perfect market of capital goods, where the
firm can buy its assets at fixed prices. To facilitate the analysis the
value of a capital good is fixed on one unit of money. If one further
supposes absence of inflation and of  technical progress and if one
equalizes technical deterioration rate and depreciation rate, then the
value of the amount of capital goods in the firm equals the number of
capital goods. This simplifies the joining of investments and production
capacity (Treadway, 1970).
Several authors have studied the case of an imperfect market of capital
goods in the framework of so called adjustment cost models. Each firm is
supposed to have an optimal size, but a firm does not immediately adopt
that size because of costs inherent to the adjustment process. These
costs are divided into external adjustment costs (investment expenditur-
es) and internal adjustment costs (seize on available productive inputs)
(S8derstim,  1976):
W(T) = p.Q(K(T),L(T),I(T)) - w.L(T) - C(I(T))
I(T) =K- a.K(T)
with:  22 < O (internal adjustment costs)
3I
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i c>o; 1.-£20 (external adjustment costs)3I 2<
3I
in which: W(T): cash flow
I(T): gross investments (capital goods)
C(T): cost of investment
a   : depreciation rate
2     2If  C"  (E  3  C/3 I ) equals zero, we are on a perfect market of capital
goods. A positive C" (the case of so-called "convex adjustment costs")
applies to a monopsonistic market of capital goods: if the firm wants to
increase its rate of growth it will be confronted with increasing prices
on the market because of its increased demand of capital goods (Intrili-
gator,  1971,  202). A negative C" may represent  the case of a low invest-
ment level. Then, "economies of growth" (Penrose, 1959, 99) may appear
when buying more (or bigger) capital goods.
Another important aspect of the supply of capital goods is technical
progress. In economics a distinction is made between embodied and disem-
bodied technical progress. Disembodied progress "applies equally and
alike to all resources of men and machines in current use" (Allen, 1968,
236). Embodied technical progress "applies...   only to certain tranches
of capital equipment, usually machines produced and installed currently,
together  with the associated labour crews" ( Ibidem).
In the theory of the firm embodied technical progress has mostly been
introduced in the framework of maintenance models, concerning optimal
maintenance and scrapping of capital goods (Bensoussan e.a., 1974, 107).
In Nickell, 1978, 127, output is related to investment and maintenance
policy under embodied technical progress. Variable (more specifically:
increasing) labour productivity is dealt with by Virmany who left main-
tenance costs out of consideration but combined embodied and disembodied
technical progress in the following way (Virmany, 1976):
V(0)  =  .6  e-iT  PQ(T)   -  wL(T)  -  cI(T)}   dT
Q = H((I(T),Z(T),T) - (x.al - a4)Q(T)
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L = Z(T) - a L(T)
1
in which: H(I,Z,T) : plant-choice function
Z(T) : recruitment of labour
x        : degree of homogeneity of H
a        : depreciation rate = rate of technical decay
1
a        : disembodied technical progress
4
c        : price of a capital good
The plant-choice function represents the range of techniques and sizes
of plants from which the firm can choose at a given point of time.
Through the argument T, embodied technical progress is incorporated in
the production function. Once the techniques have been chosen and incor-
porated into a plant of the firm, they remain fixed for the life of the
plant (a so--called putty-clay model (Nickell, 1978, 247)). Disembodied
technical progress is assumed to manifest itself as an increase of
output over time at a constant exponential rate a4' so:
a -a -a
QJ(T) = e 5.H{I(J)e 6,Z(J)e 6,4
in which:  a5 = a4(T-J)
a  = a (T-J)
6     1
from which the above Q-formula may be derived. Note that the use of a
certain vintage decreases over time due to the obsolescence of machines
(a1)  and labour productivity increases due to the disembodied technical
progress  (a4)' which may contain a learning-effect.
10. Government.
The influence of government on the policy of the firm is mostly studied
through analysing the influence of corporation profit taxes. Emphasis is
frequently laid on the "neutrality" of the tax systems: is there a
change in the (supposed efficient) allocation of factor inputs if the
government  introduces  a  certain corporation profit tax system.  Or,
within the context of dynamic models of the firm: does a certain corpo-
ration profit tax system influence the capital accumulation process and
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the relative inputs of labour and capital?
The relevant features of tax systems are: the level of the corporation
profit tax rate, tax treatment of depreciation and interest payments,
and investment incentives (including investment allowances as well as
initial  allowances  as  a  special kind of accelerated  depreciation).
Boadway has studied them for the input factor capital in the optimum
equilibrium state of the firm (Boadway, 1980). Muzondo also studied the
influence on the policy of the firm towards that equilibrium and on the
input of labour (Muzondo,  1979).  In his model,  adjqstment costs are
introduced, thus reflecting the quasi-fixedness of capital goods in the
short run:
maximize: V(0) - G e-iTW(T) dT
with:  W(T)  =  (1-f) { pQ(T)-wL(T)  }-c{I(T)  -  fa'K'(T)}  + frY(T)
I(T) - K'(T) + a'K'(T) - K(T) + aK(T)
Q(T) - Q(K(T),L(T),K)
in which: I(T) : investments (capital goods)
K( T) : economic  level  of  capital  stock  (capital
goods)
K'(T) : accounting level of capital stock (capital
goods)
W(T) : cash flow after tax
a        : economic depreciation rate
a'        : depreciation rate permitted by the tax law
(accounting depreciation rate)
f        : corporation profit tax rate
p, w, c : given functions of T
In stead of taxing the profit of a firm, the government may tax the cash
flow of a firm. This tax system "has been widely recommended as a form
of taxing corporate income which is neutral with respect to investment
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decisions" (Sandmo,   1979). This author points  out  that  this  is  the  case
only if the tax rate is constant over time.
Finally, we should mention of research regarding the influence of perso-
nal tax systems on the value of the firm as conceived by the sharehol-
ders. The relevant value, neglecting differences in corporate tax rates
on retained earnings and on distributed profits, may be formulated as
follows (Yla-Liedenpohja, 1978):






k     .=--1-a3
in  which: a : rate of credit for shareholders under the
1
imputation system
a2  : marginal income tax rate
a3  : effective  tax  rate  for  capital  gains  on an
accrual basis
84  : marginal tax rate of personal wealth
i'  : discount rate of the "shareholders-managed" firm
i   : shareholders discount rate (after taxes)
Under the imputation system, shareholders are taxed for the amount
(1+al)D(T). But the amount alD(T) is considered to have been paid by the
firm,  thus  the  shareholders  pay  a  tax  of a2(1-al)D(T) - alD(T), so
dividends, net of tax, amount to (1+al)(1-a2)D(T).
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above formula's are, that
parameters which determine the degree of double taxation of dividends
(al and a2) do not influence the optimal policy of the firm and, that if
the firm takes into account the personal taxes imposed on its share-
holders, it will raise its discount rate.
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11. Macro-economic data.
Two kinds of macro-economic data have been discussed in previous see-
tions. In section 2.5 we have mentioned the influence of business fluc-
tuations in the framework of studies on the output market of the firm.
In section 2.9 we have reviewed research on tax systems.
In addition we can mention sensitivity analysis on parameters such as
the discount rate (Oniki, 1973).
The influence of inflation has been studied by several authors. Infla-
tion brings up the problem of the valuation of stocks and the deprecia-
tion policy. Lesourne & Leban have incorporated inflation in the next
way (Lesourne & Leban, 1977):
X = (1-f) {P(T) Q(K'(T)) - aK(T) - rY(T) + alS(T)} - D(T)
with:  P(T) = ealT . p
S(T) . ealT .p. (a2K'(T))
K + aK(T) = (K' + aK')ealT
K(0) = p C(0)
in which: K(T) : accounting value of capital
K'(T) : capital stock (units of capital good)
S( T) : value of stocks
a     : inflation rate
1
a2    : assumed  fixed  proportion  between  production
capacity and stocks.
The authors assume depreciation allowances to be based upon historical
costs and full taxation of inflationary gains on stocks. So, the tax
collector's  office  does not  support  the  ideas of replacement value
theory. Boadway further studied the impact of replacement cost deprecia-
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tion and features of neutral tax systems in the case of inflation (Boad-
way, 1980).
Finally, we mention Lesourne's publication, dealing with a growing en-
vironment (Lesourne, 1976). His assumptions were: decreasing returns to
investment in a stagnant economy and the appearance of new investment
possibilities with the growth of the economy:
3 W'
W(T) = W'(I').I(T), with:-< 0
3 I'
I'(T) = e-alT . I(T)
in which: W'(I') : average cash flow per unit net investment
I(T) : investments of the firm
I'(T) : relative investments of the firm (relative to
the macro-economic growth rate)
al     : macro-economic growth rate of investments
So, in the case of a constant I, thus decreasing I' due to the fact that
the firm's investments fall behind the macro growth rate al' marginal
cash flow increases over time.
12. Summary.
In this chapter we surveyed aspects of firm's policy that have been
studied within the field of the dynamic theory of the firm. The angle of
incidence was: the behaviour of the parties that have an interest in the
firm. Inside the firm we discussed the management and the employees.
Outside the firm we dwelled upon the suppliers of assets, labour, equi-
ty, debt and public services,  upon colleagues of the firm and upon
buyers  of  the  firm' s output. Finally,  we have touched upon macro-econo-
mic data that influence the policy of the firm. The descriptions of the
behaviour of the relevant parties are expressed through the formulation
of the maximand as well as of the restrictions and technical relations
of the models concerned.
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CHAPTER 3. SOME PREDECESSORS.
1. Introduction.
In this chapter we will deal in greater d
etail with some models that
have be considered by others authors and 
that will expanded in the next
chapters.  This may  familiarize  the  re
ader with alternative ways of
modelling the salient features of the fir
m and with their impact on the
optimal trajectories.
We shall first outline the classical mode
l of Jorgenson, 1967, and then
we will present a model of Leland, 1972, 
who included first aspects of
production as well as of financing.  Furt
hermore we will present the
models of Ludwig, 1978, and Lesourne & Leban, 1978,
as examples of the
more sophisticated models, published rec
ently.
Emphasis in this chapter is put on modell
ing and on the model's impact
on optimal solutions, and not on a detail
ed economic analysis of the
optimal solution. This approach is common
 to most publications within
the relevant field of research. We will l
eave that tradition when we
deal with our own model.
We suggest for the reader unfamiliar with Optimal Control
Theory, to
read first appendix  1.  In this appendix
, conditions for the type of
problems with which we will deal in the r
est of this book, are described
in a narrative way. In appendix 2, the re
ader can find in greater detail
how the following models can be solved by
 means of an iterative proce-
dure that we have designed,  based on the
 Maximum Principle. We have
separated this part from the main text in
 order to bother as little as
possible those readers who are not intere
sted in the mathematical foun-
dations of the economic theories present
ed here.
2. Investments and depreciation (Jorgens
on).
In fact, investment policies can only be 
described realistically in a
dynamic way. It is the process of sacrify
ing purchasing power now to
revenues later on ("breeding effect"). Jorgenson (in: Jorgenson,   1963
,
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and 1967) was among the first economists to present this problem in a
dynamic framework. He describes a firm, maximizing its revenue over an
infinite period of time. To compare revenue flows of different intervals
within the planning period, they are discounted at a rate i, represen-
ting the time preference rate of the owners of the firm.
The firm produces one kind of product and sells it on a perfect market,
so the selling price is constant. Further, the firm uses two kinds of
inputs: labour and capital goods. Both are obtained on perfect markets,
so the wage rate and price of capital goods are fixed, too. This results
in the next formulation (we drop obvious arguments):
00
, -iT
(1)maxtmize :J e R(K, I,L) dT
I, L     0
in which : R() = pQ(K,L) - wL(T) - cI(T) = revenue flow
Q() : output = sales volume
I(T): (gross) investments
K(T): stock of capital goods
L(T): employment level
T   : time
c   : price of capital good
i   : discount rate of the shareholders
p   : selling price of output
w   : wage rate
The impact of investments on the production structure is described by
the, now generally used, formulation of net investments:
K=I-a K (2)
in which:a: depreciation rate.
The assumption that current depreciation requirements depend only on the
current level of the stock of capital goods in a proportional way holds,
for example, if the stock of capital goods is depreciating at an expo-
3I
nential rate and the stock of capital goods is constant or increases at
a constant rate (Jorgenson, 1967). Although most dynamic models of the
firm yield non-constant growth rates of the capital stock, formula (2)
is still used because of its simplicity.  But we will see,  that the
Jorgenson model results in a stationary level of the capital stock, so
the conditions for (2) are fulfilled, assuming that the firm depreciates
its capital goods at an exponential rate.
Jorgenson further assumes that the production is an increasing, concave
function, which implies decreasing returns to scale:
2
i.2  ,   O   ,  N  ,   0,  3.t'  <   0   ,  3    <   O  and  3.-   .  4  ,   [   Ll        (3)3K 3L 3K 3L
See, for example, Chiang, 1974 , page 351.
The last assumption to be stated here, is not mentioned explicity by
Jorgenson. It is quite obvious to assume that it must be profitable at
least  to start production,  so marginal revenue must exceed marginal
costs of both inputs used to produce the first unit of output:
p  · > c(i t a) and : p 5- > w when Q = K = L = 0 (4)30
The formulation of Jorgenson is now presented in (1) through (4). The
problem with this formulation is, that the resulting optimal solution
dictates an instantaneous adjustment of the stock of capital goods to
the level with maximum revenue (see appendix 2). This is presented in
figure 3.1 on the next page.
If the selling price is constant, this stationary level is fixed by:
*p w i c(i +a) when K=K (5)
From (5) can be concluded that the marginal revenue per capital good
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Figure 3.1. Optimal trajectory of the capital stock
in the model of Jorgenson.
The amount of labour appears to adapt itself perfectly all the time,
because it holds continuously that:
1.2 = w (6)
3 L  p
which can be interpreted (after multiplying both sides of (6) by the
selling price p) in the same way as (5): marginal revenue to labour
equals marginal costs of labour.
After the initial investment (or divestment) to reach the optimal level
fixed by (5),  the firm will keep the capital stock constant. Due to
depreciation, it thus has to replenish continuously and so, investments
remain on the replacement level:
* *
K=K+K=0+I=a K (7)
In order to get rid of the irrealistic immediate adjustment at T = 0,
two ways in particular have been proposed to amend the above model. The
first way is  the introduction of adjustment costs,  representing the
scarcity of inputs and/or the costs of productive capacity caused by the
adjustment process. We have discussed this already in sections 3 and 9
of chapter 2. There, we quoted Jones (1973), who stated that the intro-
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duction of adjustment costs implies the transformation of the production
function from a technical relationship into a behavioural relationship,
containing technical constraints as well as organizational and other
constraints.  This mixing together is a disadvantage if one aims at
describing the dynamics of the firm at the lowest level of aggregation
in order to link micro economics to business economics.
The second way of getting a smoothed adjustment pattern is the introduc-
tion of financing as another aspect governing the dynamics of the firm.
In fact, the revenue flow in the model of Jorgenson only serves as a
performance index. And so, for example, a beginning entrepreneur having
*
no equity may at once acquire an amount of K  of capital goods without
any financing problems: although the revenue flow at T=0 may have a
very large negative value due to the adjustment investments, it does not
harm the total performance, because this loss only holds for a neglec-
table small period of time.
In the static micro economic theory of the firm, Vickers, 1968, was the
first  to couple  the real aspects of production with the financial
aspects of the policy of the firm. As far as we know, Leland, 1972, was
the first author to couple production and finance in a real dynamic
model of the firm.
3. Production and finance I (Leland).
Leland assumes a managerial firm, maximizing total discounted sales over
a finite planning horizon plus the final amount of equity. As equity is
supposed to be the value of the stock of capital goods reduced by the
amount of debt money, Leland formulates the following goal function:
z
-i'T -i'Z
maximize:je p Q(K,L) dT + e S(K(z) - Y(z)) (8)
L, B     0
in which :Y= B(T) (9)
B(T) : inflow of debt
Y(T) : total amount·of debt
Q() : production function
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S() : weighting function of net terminal assets
i'   : time preference rate of the managers.
From (8) and (9) can be derived that in Leland's model, the management
runs the firm on the basis of an employment and borrowing policy. The
investment policy consists of two parts.  In the first place,  Leland
assumes that the firm retains a fixed portion of the cash flow ("profit"
in his terms) for reinvestments. In the second place, debt yields, at a
decreasing efficiency, new capital goods:
K=m G+ C(B) (10)
in which :G=Q-w L-r Y: cash flow
C(B) : relation between the borrowing inflow and the
investments in capital goods
m    : fixed portion of retained cash flow.
In this way, a behavioural relation is introduced, reflecting imperfec-
tions of the debt market.  In order to satisfy the shareholders, the
management is assumed to keep return (i.e.: cash flow) on net invested
capital on or above the time preference rate of the share holders (i):
Q- wL- rY * i (11)K-Y
r
Initial state conditions are omitted and finally the assumption is
introduced that:
r=i (12)
This  is based on Leland's assumption that stockholders may be in a
position to lend to the firm, too. In that case they would not accept a
return on their equity (i), less than the borrowing rate (r). But, the
weak point of the assumption is, that it is not a sufficient reason to
imply that the discount rate (i) exactly equals the borrowing rate.
There fore the coQcept of a perfect capital market has to be introduced.
And that concept is contrary to the decreasing efficiency of debt,
compared with constant efficiency of retained earnings, in (10).
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Another imperfection of the model is that it inevitably results in an
ever increasing K, due to the fixed retaining rate and the ever positive
cash flow, resulting from the constant selling price together with (11)
and (12):
Q - wL- rY ) i(K - Y) (13)
In spite of these remarks we discussed Leland's model, because it was
the first dynamic model that dealt with production and finance simulta-
neously.
A year after Leland's publication, J. Lesourne published a comprehensive
treatise on dynamic models of the firm, solved by means of the Calculus
of Variations (Lesourne, 1973). This book contains, among others, dis-
tinct models that deal with financial constraints in situations of self-
financing with and without issuing new shares, combined with situations
with and without borrowing.  Several relations in the relevant models
stem from financial records as used in practice and this means a real
step forward in describing financial constraints on the policy of the
firm.
In the same year,  Krouse and Lee also published a purely financial
dynamic model of the firm (Krouse & Lee, 1973) that, in spite of (or:
due to) its shortcomings (see: Sethi, 1978) stimulated many authors to
explore the field of dynamic theories of finance. From that flow of
publications, we chose Ludwig's dissertation (1978, in German language).
Ludwig improved and extended the often quoted, but incorrect dynamic
financing model presented in chapter 4 in: Bensoussan et al., 1974, and
his description of the solution procedure inspired the design of the
solution procedure in appendix 2 of this book.
4. Finance and the value of the firm (Ludwig).
Ludwig deals with a shareholders owned firm, and assumes a finite plan-
ning horizon. This results in the next goal function as discussed in
section (2.1):
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 -iT -izmaximize :J e D(T) dT + e X(Z) (14)
B, I     0
Furthermore, he uses the same state equation of capital goods as Jorgen-
son did:
K=I-a K (15)
and amends Leland's state equatian of debt by introducing a fixed re-
demption rate b:
Y=B-b Y (16)





Now, Ludwig assumes without any motivation, that:
a=b (19)
which results, together with (15), (16) and (18) into the state equation
of equity:
X=I-a X-B (20)
Earnings are used to issue dividend or to increase the value of equity
through retained earnings, so:
E=X+D= R(K) -a K-r Y (21)
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in which : E(T) : earnings
R(K) : return on sales
Note that corporate  tax  is not considered  in (21). Subsequently Ludwig
introduces the assumption that at least a certain portion of the ear-
nings will be issued to the shareholders and, moreover, that the firm
will only accept situations in which earnings are positive:
D 1   (1-m) E>O (22)
in which : m : maximum retaining rate
Together with (20) and (21) this results in:
I < mE + aX + B (23)
So, as contrasted with Leland's findings, investments now appear to be
limited, due to the introduction of the financial aspects of the firm's
policy.
Ludwig does not allow for divestments so, investments are "irrever-
sible":
I)0 (24)
From (15) can be concluded that still a decrease of the capital good
stock K is possible. Finally, the inflow of debt is limited by the total
amount of new investments:
0<B<h I (25)
in which: h: maximum borrowing rate, 0<h<1
On page 58 of his book,  Ludwig represents an interesting summary of
alternative ways to formulate the limits of borrowing, as presented in
literature. The above formulation is defined in terms of flows. Another
formulation, that will be used in the next section and in our model is
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in terms of stocks:
Y < kX (26)
in which: k : maximum debt-equity rate
Before describing the optimal solution, we will summarize the model of
Ludwig:
Z
maximize : f e iT(R(K) -,(atr)Y -I t B)dT + e-iz X(z) (27)
B, I       0
subject to :X=I-a X-B (28)
Y=B-a Y (29)
0< I< m(R(K) -a K- rY) +a X+B (30)
O<B<h I( +I A O) (31)
X(T) ) 0, Y(T) )  0, O C T<z (32)
40) = xl, Y(0) = y (33)
0<m<1,0<h<1 (34)
Ludwig derives two distinct optimal trajectories of the firm from the
optimality conditions (see appendix 2). Both patterns consist of several
paths, representing distinct stages of the development of the firm. The
main features of those paths are put into table 3.1 on the next page, in
which :
-*       3 R
K  =KY      i f  FiE  -a=(1-h) ithr (35)
K= x      if 18 -a=r (36)
-XY   3 K
K=K_ ifill-a=i (37)X          3 K
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path.
nr.   I   B   D  X Y   K
*
1 aK max
+  -      K       stationary stage whenY      -+
i>r
*                                     *
2
aK Y
max min   +  -      K y     consolidation
3 max max min + + K>0 maximum growth
*                                     *
4       a       0            +  -      KX      stationary stage when
i<r
5 max 0  min + - K>0 self-financed growth
6          0        0 +- K<0 contraction
Table 3.1. Characteristics of the feasible paths.
*
So, the stationary K -values are all characterized by a fixed value of
the marginal net revenue, given on the left hand side of the expres-
sions. The relevant values are the financing costs in the case of (from
the top downward) debt financing at a rate h, pure debt financing and:
pure self-financing.
Which of both trajectories is feasible, depends on whether the discount
rate i exceeds or is smaller than the interest rate on debt money, r.
The simplest pattern holds in the case of cheap debt money (see figure
3.2).
In combining table 3.1  and figure 3.2 we can get insight into this
pattern. In figure 3.2, the optimal patterns for three different sets of







path    1     K;     (b)             > \\- 3
t
path 3
i     
   (C)
I T
0                                Z
Figure 3.2. Optimal trajectories of the capital stock
when i > r.
(a) K(0) > KY
(b) K(0) = KY
(c) K(0) < KY
*
Each pattern has path 1 as final path. So K = K appears to be the state
of bliss.  This  is quite natural, because in that case marginal net
revenue equals the marginal cost of the cheapest way to finance capital
goods, i.e. of debt financing at a rate h. So, the profit flow is then
at its maximum and it enables the firm to reach the highest attainable
value of the firm.
Furthermore we can derive that, if the firm's capital stock is below the
*
desired level K , it borrows as much as possible and issues a minimum
dividend in order to grow at the highest speed. Ludwig also has derived
a value for the initial leverage below which the viability of the firm
is guaranteed (see appendix 2):
It21 < br + ha (38)
X(0) a(1-h)
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The maximum debt-equity rate, h, will be attained only some time after
entering the stationary state of path 1.
*
If the capital stock is above the desired level K in figure 3.2, the
firm cuts down this stock at the maximum rate that is allowed for, i.e.
at the depreciation rate a, for, due to the non negativity constraints
on investments, the firm cannot divest. All profits are paid out to the
shareholders.
Finally, the reader can imagine that a firm, having an initial stock
*
just on the optimal level K , will keep to that level 'during the whole
planning period by  investing at such a level as necessary only to
replace obsoleted capital goods. The remaining profit is issued to the
shareholders.
In the case of expensive debt money,  so i < r, we get the optimal
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Figure 3.3. Optimal K-trajectories when i < r.
*
The optimal level of the capital stock,now equals Kx. Due to the cheap-
ness of equity compared to debt, pure self-financing is the cheapest way
*
of financing the capital stock. On the level K  these financing costs
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equal marginal net revenue on capital goods and so the relevant level
yields the maximum profit flow.
Apart from the distinct financial structure, the trajectories starting
*
on or above K in figure 3.3 have the same meaning as in figure 3.2. The*                            *
trajectories starting at K X or between K X and K  can be conceived as
subtrajectories of the trajectory starting below K x ' differing only as
far as the initial state constraints are concerned. So, we may restrict
*
the discussion to the pattern, starting below K X in figure 3.3, having
the initial state constraint:
K(0)   <   KYX






In order to get a better idea of the relevant pattern, we take this
pattern from figure  3.3 and add the trajectory of the other state
variable, debt capital (Y):
K
A
K<  .                                           KX
K:Y -
K(0)                                        y
Y(0) 6 IT
0             '1,2  t;,5 5,4
Figure 3.4. Optimal K- and Y-trajectory when i<r and
K(0) < K x·
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One can derive from table 3.1  and figure 3.4 that it appears to be
profitable to start growing with maximum debt financing. This is because
it   enables   the   firm "to benefit   more by existing growth changes",   as
Ludwig stated quite vaguely (page 115 o.c.). We will describe this more
precisely in section 4 of chapter 5 with the help of our own model.
*As soon as the capital stock reaches the level K x' on which marginal
net revenue equals the interest rate on debt money, it is no longer
profitable to extend the amount of debt and the firm wants to get rid of
it. But, due to the large amount of debt, it still needs more new debt
to realise the plan of redemption:
m(R - aK - rY) < aY (40)
which can be derived from the optimality conditions holding on path 2.
*
The firm now keeps its capital stock on the level K x' its dividend pay-
out on the lower bound and spends all means to diminish the amount of
debt up to the level on which no more new debt is needed, so the maximum
redemption rate is attained:
Y = -ay (41)
This holds on path 5. On this path, the firm needs less and less money
to pay back debt capital at the maximum allowable rate a. It still pays
out only the minimum amount of dividend,  thus maximizing the rate of
*growth towards the state of bliss, Kxo Having reached that state, the
firm continues to pay back debt at the maximum rate and pays out all
earnings that remain after replacement investments to the shareholders.
Ludwig also analyses the case in which i = r. In that case, the results
concerning the stationary state are indifferent to the financial struc-
ture, as one may expect.
We will add one more remark to the way debt is dealt with in  Ludwig's
model. By (16) the firm is forced to keep a certain amount of debt all
the time, due to fixed redemption rate. To Ludwig, the continuous pre-
sence of debt money in the firm is a realistic aspect of his model. But
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we wonder, whether the origin of it, i.e. the infinite pay off period,
is such as realistic feature.
5. Production and finance II (Lesourne & Leban).
The last model that we wish to present here describes changes in the
financial structure as well as in the production structure of the firm.
The  relevant model,  Lesourne  &  Leban,  1978,  has  been published  in
French. The solution was based on the Calculus of Variations. In appen-
dix 2 we have solved the model by means of the Maximum Principle. This
results in different initial conditions to the optimal trajectories than
published by Lesourne & Leban. Lesourne & Leban define these conditions
in terms of different (exogeneous) values of the interest rate for a
given initial value of the capital good stock. We will formulate them in
the tradition of the former models as different values of the initial
capital good stock.
In the first place, Lesourne & Leban introduce the balance equation as
it was presented already in the model of Ludwig:
X+Y=K. (42)
The state equation of capital goods, too, fits well into this tradition:
K=I- aK. (43)
The extension is in the definition of earnings (see (21)). Lesourne &
Leban introduce corporation profit tax and the input of labour next to
the input of capital goods:
E=X+D= (1-f)(R(Q) -w L-a K- rY) (44)
in which:f: corporation profit tax rate.
In the second place, Lesourne & Leban introduce a fixed output level, Q,
above which capital and labour are substitutes and below which the
inputs are complementary in the optimal solution. Therefore they assume
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a special type of production function and introduce some assumptions
concerning R. The production function must belong to a specific class of
Cobb-Douglas type functions:
Q =I  Ll-a, a < 1 (45)
The relevant function is linearly homogeneous. This means that, if both
inputs change at a rate g, the resulting output will change at that rate
too:
4(gK, BL) - (gK)a (gL)1-01 - gif Ll'a = gQ(K, L) (46)
Furthermore the exponent of each input variable can be interpreted as
the  partial  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  that  input.  For
example, the partial elasticity of output with respect to capital goods
is:
12   af
= 1- K (47)
  Q K-    2.K   =   1     -a
KK
As far as the return function R(Q)  is concerned,  they introduce the
usual assumptions of strict concavity, twice differentiability, a strict
increasing function with decreasing marginal returns to scale.  Above
that, they assume   that the function Q  Q   has a
unique maximum  for
0<Q<o o.  Together   with    (45)    and the optimality conditions, these
assumptions on R will result in the above mentioned critical value Q
(see appendix 2).
The firm is of the owner-managed type, maximizing its dividend stream
over an infinite planning period. The control variables are: dividend
pay-out D, gross investments I and the level of employment L:
/0
maximize : f e-iT D(T) dT (49)
D,I,L     0
Dividends and debt are assumed to be non negative. Above that, the total
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amount of debt available is restricted by the amount of equity:
D) 0 (50)
0<Y<k X (51)
The above model results in nearly the same type of control trajectories
for capital goods K, equity X and debt Y as the model of Ludwig. Assumed
that
i 0 (1-f)r, (52)
two cases are to be distinguished: the case of cheap debt capital and
the case of cheap equity.
In the case of cheap debt capital, i.e. i > (1-f)r, the firm will expand
at the maximum rate (D = 0) with maximum debt financing (Y = kX), till
the stationary state is reached, defined by:
*    3 R     1      i
K=  i f   3-2 -a= -1+k (kr + -1-f) (53)
In order to be able to compare (53) with definition (35) of the model of
Ludwig, we must replace the maximum debt to equity rate k in (53) by the
maximum debt to capital rate h. Because of
k
172 =h, (54)
equation (53) changes into:
3 R          i
3-K-   a  =   (1-h) -1-f+hr (55)
The comparison between (55) and (35) reveals the increase of the cost of
equity  due  to  corporation profit  tax  if  the net marginal return on
equity remains i.
In the case of cheap equity, the firm starts growing with maximum debt
financing till the consolidation level is reached, defined by:
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K=K if ill- a= r (56)
-YX 3K
which is the same definition as given in (36) of Ludwig's model. But
now, the firm passes off all its debt and starts the second growth stage
with only equity financing till the stationary state is reached, defined
by:
*    3 R      i
K=K x i f   FK-a=-1-f (57)
which   is   the same definition   as   in   (37) of Ludwig' s model,   with   the
exception of the influence of the tax rate.
So, the main difference with the model of Ludwig, as far as the finan-
cial structure is concerned, is the absence of debt money in the second
stage of growth when equity is cheap.
The initial conditions of the distinct patterns can be formulated in the
same way as presented in the model of Ludwig by distinguishing cases in
which the value of the initial capital good stock is less than, equal to
or bigger then the relevant critical values as defined in (55) through
(57).
Furthermore, Lesourne & Leban extend Ludwig's results by introducing
labour as a second input into the production process and by analysing
the changes of employment in the firm in the course of time. Whether
employment  is strictly increasing or will start decreasing after a
certain point of time, depends on the value of Q, compared with the
*
relevant Q -values. For example, if i > (1-f)r, we may get the following
patterns of L as presented in figure 3.5 on the next page,
-                                 -
in which :L  : employment level when Q=Q
* *
L  : employment level when Q = QY.
Although Lesourne & Leban did some sensitivity analysis in their
article, they didn't explain what economic reasons could persuade the
firm to start depth investments and when such reasons do apply. They






1 IT , IT
0                   Z             0                    Z
Figure 3.5 . The optimal employment trajectories if i > (1-f)r and
* *
Q > QY (left) or Q < QY (right).
such a case of depth investments. In the presentation of our own model
we will say more about the economic aspects of depth investments.
6. Summary.
Some trend setters towards our own model have been reviewed in the above
sections. With the help of Jorgenson's model we dealt with the dynamic
nature of investments and the necessity to incorporate more aspects of
the limits of growth into the model in order to avoid immediate adjust-
ment of the firm to the state of bliss. Leland's model has been presen-
ted as a first attempt to incorporate financial aspects as limiting
forces. Ludwig concentrates fully on the financing problem of growth.
His model results in two distinct optimal trajectories, one on which the
firm always borrows at the maximum rate and the other one on which the
firm may start borrowing, but, having reached a certain size (measured
by its output level), it starts paying off debt. Finally, the model of
Lesourne & Leban combines the aspects of allocating labour and capital
with that of financing the growth of the firm. They find conditions
under which a decrease in the employment level of a growing firm may
occur.
49
CHAPTER 4. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF THE FIRM.
1. Introduction.
The model to be presented in this chapter analyses the dynamic relations
between  the  firm's  production,  financing  and  investment  policy and
studies the influence of changes in some important parameters, reflec-
ting governmental influence, social policy and the impact of financial
institutions on these dynamic relationships.
The model differs from the tradition of Jorgenson - Lesourne & Leban,
presented in the previous chapter.  First,  the allocation of capital
goods and labour is formulated in a different way so as to derive
meaningful economic notions from the distinct stages in the optimal
trajectories of the firm. We will achieve this by describing the produc-
tion process by means of activity analysis.
Second, we will render explicity the effects of governmental influence
on corporate policy. Beside corporation profit tax, we will introduce
investment grants. By this instrument the government intends to in-
fluence the investment policy of the firm. The aim is to raise the
national employment level indirectly  by stimulating investments.
Furthermore, in the Dutch case, the government gives additional grants
for specific investments, for example in less favourable regions.
In this chapter we will present the relevant model and we will show the
links with several areas of economic theory and practice. There after,
we will present the main features of the optimal solution. The solution
procedure itself is described in appendix 3.
2. Production
We assume that the firm produces a homogeneous output by means of two
homogeneous inputs: labour and capital goods. Most publications dealing
with the allocation of labour and capital in a dynamic theory of the
firm, assume a continuous production function. This implies the assum-
ption that the firm can choose at each moment in time between an in-
finite number of production possibilities. This does not seem a realis-
50
tic concept,  because,  in reality the management of the firm always
choose  between  a  limited  number  of  production  possibilities.  So,
although the continuous production function may be a useful relation on
an aggregated level, one may doubt its suitability for the case of a
single firm.
We therefore introduce activity analysis to describe the link between
the inputs of labour and capital and the output of the firm (e.g.:
Henderson & Quandt,  1971, 335). We assume that the firm can choose at
each moment in time between only a, limited number of (linear) production
activities, each representing a process by which output is produced by
the application of labour and capital goods in a fixed proportion.
Moreover, we will restrict ourselves to only two available production







Figure 4.1. The available production possibilities.
This restriction will not affect the quality of the model nor the tenor
of the solution, because adding more production activities appears not
to imply adding new features to the optimal allocation of labour and
capital.  If we further assume constant returns to scale and a fixed
5I
technology during the planning period, we can write:
QCT) = q1Kl(T) + q2K2(T) (1)
L(T)  =11Kl(T)  +1  K (T) (2)22
K(T) = Kl(T) + K2(T) (3)
in which :K  : amount of capital goods available to the firm
K  : amount of capital goods assigned to activity j
L  : employment level of the firm
Q  : output level of the firm
T   :time, 0<T<z
Z    :  labour
to capital ratio of activity  j
qj : productivity of capital goods assigned to activity j
z  : planning horizon
We have chosen the above formulation with Kj as explanatory variables to
the output Q and employment L, because these variables will belong to
the set of variables controlled by the firm such as to realise an op-
timal policy. Equation (3) states that there is no idle capacity within
the firm. Both activities are assumed to be efficient, which means that
none of them is inferior to the other. If we further conceive activity 1
as the capital-intensive one, then it follows that:
qi   q2
4 1     <    q 2 ;    i-l    12     2  1     <  2 2
(4)
3. Sales and operating income.
As far as the output market is concerned, output and sales are assumed
to equal each other, so the stock level of final products is constant
and independent of the output level. We further assume that the firm is
operating under decreasing returns to scale. This decrease may be caused
by an imperfect output market or, if we introduce other kinds of costs
apart from production costs, by increasing marginal costs of organizing






Figure 4.2. The sales-output function.
This leads to some well known concavity properties of the sales fun-
ction:
s(Q) = p(Q).Q
.di >O; i  <O; S(Q)>Owhen Q>0                         (5)
dQ
dQ
in which :S: sales (value)
P : (net) selling price
To facilitate analysis later on, we introduce the notion of operating
income 0. For this we need three more assumptions concerning labour
costs and capital costs. Wages are assumed to be proportional to the
amount of labour input L, depreciation is assumed to be proportional to
capital goods K (see formula (3.2)). Finally we assume that the price of
a capital good equals one unit of money value:
0(Kl,K2) = (qlp - wel)Kl   (q2P - w£2)K2 - aK (6)
in which :0: operating income
K : amount and book value of capital goods
a : depreciation rate
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w : wage rate
4. Financing and government.
First we will present  three relations that are based on well known
financial records of the firm: the balance sheet, the income statement
and the cash account. As far as the balance sheet is concerned, we
assume that the firm has only one type of assets: capital goods, and two
types of money capital: equity and debt , SO:
BALANCE SHEET
assets K(T)     X(T) equity
Y( T) debt
From the balance sheet we derive that:
K( T)   =  X( T)   +  Y( T) (7)
Together with (3) this enables us to construct a first link between the
mode of production and the financial structure of the firm:
K=K +K2=X+Y (8)
Second we assume that the firm can raise its equity not only by retained
earnings but also by acquiring investment grants. This is a new feature
in the dynamic theory of the firm. We further assume that investment
grants are proportional to the amount of gross investments:
X  =  E  +  gI( T) (9)
in which :I: gross investment
E : retained earnings
X : increase of equity
g : investment grant rate
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The amount of retained earnings can be derived from the income state-
ment. In order to construct this statement we introduce the following
assumptions:
- corporation profit tax is proportional to profit,
- no transaction costs are incurred when borrowing or paying off debt
capital,
- taxes are paid at once, grants are received immediately.
These assumptions result in the next income statement:
INCOME STATEMENT
sales S(Q) wL(T) wages
aK( T) depreciation
rY(T) interest on debt
F(Kl'K2,Y)  corporation profit tax
D(T) dividend pay-out
E           retained earnings
in which :F= f(S -w L-a K- rY)
f : corporation profit tax rate
Together with (6) and (9) the income statement results in the following
state equation of equity:
X= (1-f)(0-rY) -D+g I (10)
The third financial record to be presented here is the cash account. For
this we need no further assumptions:
CASH ACCOUNT
sales S(Q) wL(T) wages
investment grant gI(T) rY(T) interest on debt
increase of debt y I(T) gross investment
F(Kl,K2,Y)  corporation profit tax
D(T) dividend pay-out
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From (8) we derive that:
K=X+Y (11)
Together with (6)  and the cash account,  this results in the dynamic
equation of capital stock as discussed already in section 3.2.:
K=I-a K (12)
Finally, we introduce, in the tradition of Lesourne & Leban, an upper-
bound on debt in terms of a maximum debt to equity rate:
Y < kX (13)
in which:k: maximum debt to equity rate
We have already discussed this constraint in section 2.7. Together with
the interest rate r, (13) is a way to deal with uncertainty within the
framework of a deterministic model. Because the level of r is an indica-
tion of the risk-class to which the firm belongs, (13) may be conceived
as a condition on the financial structure of the firm that must be
fulfilled in order to stay in the relevant risk-class (see: Ludwig,
1978, 51).
5. Policy of the firm.
We further assume that the firm maximizes the shareholder's value of the
firm:
maximize  :J  e iT D dT te-iz{ X(z) - gK(z)} (14)
0
This hypothesis is not supposed to imply that the firm is really able to
and wants to maximize this value, but it results, in our opinion, in a
useful abstract representation of the regularities of the firm's policy
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(Jones, 1973, 2). Note that the final value of the firm equals the value
of equity minus investment grants to be paid back due to stopping cor-
porate activity.
As far as its dividend policy is concerned, we assume that the firm is
allowed to pay no dividend, so:
D>0 (15)
As we shall discuss in section 7 of chapter 5 this condition may be
replaced by a more restrictive one, requiring a certain positive divid-
end flow during the whole planning period, without affecting the tenor
of the conclusions that result from the optimal solution.
6. The model.
We have now discussed all the features of the model. In this section we
will present the model in its final form.
z  -iT
maximize        :      e          D  dT  +  e-iz{ X( z)   -  gK( z)}                          (16)
D,I,Kl'K2'Y
subject to :X= (1-f)(0 - rY) -D+g I (17)
K=I-a K (18)
K=K +K (19)
1        2
K=X+Y (20)
O<Y<k X (21)
D ) 0, Kl * 0, I<2 ) 0 (22)
in which :0= (qlp(Q) - wtl)Kl + Cq2P(Q) - 2£2)K2 -a K (23)
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(24)Q - q1K1 + q2K2
qi < q2, qi/11    2/12+ 11 <12 (25)
11§ > O- li  < O, S:=P(Q).Q, S>Owhen Q>O           (26)
dQ dQ
f, g, i, r : constant and between 0 and 1 (27)
k, 1  ,  qj,  w,  z : constant and non-negative (28)
Note that the non-negativeness of X is ensured by (21) and the fact that
K 2 0 by (19) and (22).
The state variables, as defined in appendix 1, are the amount of equity
X, and the capital good stock K. The values of these variables thus
represent the state of the firm at each moment of time. The firm will
try to realize its goal, as defined in (16), through the available
control variables: the amount of capital goods assigned to each of the
production activities Kl and K2' the size of debt Y, the investment
activities  I  and its  dividend policy D.  The  trajectories  of  these
variables during the planning period represent the firm's policy. The
restrictions on this policy and the effects of this policy on the state
of the firm and on its performance level are described in the relations
(16) through (22).
Here ends the description of the main features of the model. Before
introducing the reader to the properties of the optimal solution, we
will discuss briefly the assumptions on which the solution is based.
7. Further assumptions.
As we shall see later on, we will have to distinguish between different
cases, depending on the mode of production and the prevailing financial
structure. In each case, the unit cost of a product, including its part
of the cost of capital, can be calculated. Let us denote the relevant
unit cost by:
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cjN' j = 1, 2, 21; N = X, Y, YX
in which  : j : activity performed  by  the  firm  (j  = 21 means  that  both
activities are performed),
N : index of financial structure:
N=X  : self-financing case
N=Y  : maximum debt financing case
N = YX : intermediate debt financing case.
Due to later assumptions, j = 21 and N = YX cannot occur at the same
time. Moreover c will appear to equal c and therefore we will21X 21Y
write briefly: c21. So there remain seven unit cost levels to be dis-
tinguished. Their formulation in terms of the parameters of the model
will be presented in the next chapter.
Our first assumption states that the marginal revenue of the first
product to be sold exceeds each of these unit costs:
(Al) 13       > maximum {cjj   '
Q=0  j, N
j=1,2,21;N= X, Y, YX, 0; (j =21- N=/0)
The idea behind this assumption is, that the firm will consider only
those alternatives that are profitable from the start. On the basis of
this assumption we guarantee that the firm will start investing and
producing. On the basis of the following assumption, we will restrict
ourselves to cases in which the firm will not continue expanding far
beyond profitable limits:
(A2) 0(Kl,K2) > 0
The next assumption concerns the cost of equity and debt. Beside the
problem of the financial structure, we have introduced the problem of
the assignment of money-capital to production activities. Therefore, we
have to distinguish between the market of equity and the market of debt,
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for,  investors in equity or debt no longer differ only in their risk
bearing  preferences,  but also in their attitude towards management.
Investors of equity want to influence management directly (or are the
managers themselves) while investors in debt money are only interested
in influencing the policy of the firm as far as they will try to reduce
their risks. The two types of investors have really different intentions
and so, the markets of debt and equity are separated. It will therefore
be a corncidence when the prices of equity and debt (after corporate
tax) to be paid by the same firm, equal each other:
(A3) i # (1-f)r
The above introduction of the assignment aspect of money capital also
implies the acceptance of the possibility that equity is cheaper than
debt money for a single firm.  For, now we have a real multicriteria
situation in which an investor of equity may accept less financial
reward for his risk-bearing (compared with the reward of an investor in
debt money) due to the attainment of other goals such as being the (a)
boss of the firm.
Through the next assumption we will exclude all kinds of degenerated
cases in which the firm could choose from an infinite number of equal
alternatives:
(A4) C # N = X, Y, YX1N   c2N '
We assume further that the firm has a certain initial amount of own
capital:
(A5) X(0) 1 0
Finally we assume that the capital stock cannot be financed by debt
money and investment grants only, but that at least a certain amount of
equity is necessary:




In (6) we have assumed that the price of a capital good equals one unit
of money value, and in (13)  we have introduced the maximum debt to
equity rate k. So, k/(1+k) in (A6) iS the maximum amount of debt per
capital good. Because g is the investment grant rate, the left hand side
of the first expression of (A6) represents the maximum amounts of debt
and investment grants that can be attracted per capital good. The right
hand side represents the total amount of money capital needed to buy one
capital good.
8. Optimal solution.
In the sections 1 through 3 of appendix 3 the reader will find how we
derived the optimality conditions of the model (16)-(28), based on the
Maximum Principle as described in appendix 1. Just as in the preceding
models of chapter 3, the optimal trajectories of the firm can be divided
in several stages (called: paths). Each path can be characterized by the
boundaries that are active or inactive during the relevant period. In
the sections 4 and 5 of appendix 3, the reader will find how we have
derived the feasible paths and their relevant properties from the optim-
ality conditions and from the above assumptions. The optimal evolution
patterns of our model are built from 12 different paths, presented in
table 4.1 on the next page.
The first column of table 4.1 gives a number to each path: this number
will be used in the rest of our treatise.
The second column of table 4.1 indicates whether the firm is producing
in a capital-intensive way (activity 1) or a labour-intensive way (acti-
vity 2) on the relevant path. On paths 3 and 10, the firm is switching
from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production.
The third column states the financial structure in which the firm is
operating: self-financing (indicated   by "X"), maximum debt financing
(indicated by "Y") or switching from maximum debt financing to self-
financing by paying  back debt money (indicated  by  "YX").
The next column marks paths on which the production level is constant.
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path financial production
nr activity structure level    X K necessary conditions
1                 2                  Y                                     ++
*2 2 Y Q O O i > (1-f)r c >C2Y                         l Y    2Y
*
3        21        Y         Q       + + C    <C21 1YX 2YX
4           1           Y ++
c1YX < CZYX*
5         1         Y          QIY      0  0    i> (1-f)r  cly < c2Y
*
6        2        YX        Q        + 0 C    >C2YX 1YX 2YX
7           2            X ++
eIYX > C2YX*8  2   X   Q 00 i < (1-f)r c >C2X                         1 X    2X
*





10        21        X         Q       + + C    >C21 1YX 2YX
11        1         X                  + +
*
12        1         X         Q        0 0 i < (1-f)r c <C1X 1 X    2X
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the feasible paths.
These stationary values are fixed by the equality of marginal return and
the relevant marginal unit cost on that production (= sales) level:
*    dS
Q   -   Q jN  -   dq   -   c jN   '
j= 1, 2, 21 ;N= X, Y, YX, 0, (j =21- N= 8) (29)
The firm expands its output level on the four paths where the production
level is not constant.
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The fifth column describes the trajectories of equity X and of the
capital good stock K on the relevant paths. The reader can check that in
spite of a stationary value of output Q, equity and/or the capital good
stock may still be increasing on some paths.  On paths 3 and 10 the
increase of equity and capital goods is caused by the depth investment
process by which more capital goods are needed for the same output
level. On paths 6 and 9 equity is increasing while the output level and
the capital stock are constant due to the redemption policy of the firm
on those paths. Finally paths 2, 5, 8 and 12 remain which represent real
stationary stages. They will apptar to be the final stages of the four
different sets of optimal trajectories of the firm.
In the last column necessary conditions for several paths are described,
resulting from the optimality conditions and the assumptions made in the
above sections of this chapter.  The four final paths appear to have
mutually excluding necessary conditions, resulting in the above
mentioned four distinct sets of optimal trajectories of the firm. On the
remaining paths, the relation between c and c restricts the fea-1YX 2YX
sibility. This relation will appear to determine the sequence over time
of the different stages of the optimal trajectories.
In the sections 6 through 8 of appendix 3, the reader will find how to
construct the optimal trajectories of  the firm.  Based on different
necessary conditions of the four resulting final paths, these trajector-
ies can be classified in four different sets. Within each set each
optimal trajectory appears to be part of the "master trajectory" of the
relevant set. For example, if c <C and i > (1-f)r we get the fol-lY    2Y
lowing optimal strings:
trajectory 1 : path 5
trajectory 2 : path 4 + path 5
trajectory 3 : path 3 + path 4 + path 5
trajectory 4 :  path 1 + path 3 + path 4 + path 5 (= master-
trajectory)
The master trajectory 4 contains all stages of the strings 1 through 3.
Which of the above strings is the optimal trajectory depends upon the
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initial values of equity and of the capital good stock. In general: the
lower these initial values, the more stages have to be gone through
before the final stage is reached. The relevant conditions on the init-
ial values of the state variables are presented,  together with all
possible strings, in section 8 of appendix 3. In the next chapter we
will describe only the master trajectories, because they are the unions
of all the other strings in the relevant sets.
There is one exception. In the set of strings ending with path 12, there
appear to be two master patterns, having the same start. and, finish:
-„path 6 + path 7 + path 100,
path
1<
 a path 11 + path 12
1 path  3  +   path  4  +   path  9/
However, both patterns are very close to each other, also in the central
part, so that we will present one of them as a variant of the other and
not on its own.
9. Summary.
In this chaper we have presented a dynamic model of the firm. The firm
operates on an imperfect capital market. It finances its expansion by
debt and/or retained earnings but it does not issue new shares. The
availability of debt money depends on the amount of equity. Marginal
returns to scale are decreasing. Production is described by means of
activity analysis. The financial relations in the model are based upon
well known financial records. The government influences the policy of
the firm through the corporation profit tax rate and through investment
grants.
After a brief discussion of six more assumptions, the main characteris-
tics of the twelve distinct stages, consituting the optimal trajectories
of the firm, have been presented and the presentation of the four master
trajectories in chapter 5 has been introduced.
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CHAPTER 5. OPTIMAL TRAJECTORIES OF THE FIRM.
1. Introduction.
This chapter is devoted to a description of the four different trajec-
tories of the firm, resulting from the optimal solution of the model of
chapter 4. The sequence is such that the presentation of each trajectory
contains new elements as far as the firm's policy is concerned.
The  first  trajectory  gives  information about  growth and  stationary
stages and forces us at once to analyse the stationary state condition
for the most complex case. We will further discuss the meaning of con-
ditions on the initial values of equity and capital goods. The second
trajectory deals with depth investments: the switch from labour-inten-
sive to capital-intensive production. The third trajectory describes the
process of a firm starting with maximum debt financing and ending as a
self-financing producer. The necessary conditions for the last trajec-
tory are such that depth investments as well as consolidation occur in
the course of the firm's optimal trajectory.
We will also demonstrate several aspects of the solution procedure that
are worthwile from an economic point of view.
2. Basic trajectory.
We get the simplest master trajectory  when debt  money is cheap (i >
(1-f)r) and the unit cost of the labour-intensive activity is smaller
than the unit cost of the capital-intensive activity. The firm will
always prefer activity 2 and it will finance its investment by means of
as much debt money as is allowed for. See figure 5.1, in which:
K(z) = K Y, L(z) = 121(2Y and Y(z) = -l k K2Y0
Figure 5.1 shows that the relevant master trajectory consists of two
paths: the growth path 1 and the stationary state path 2. On T = tl 2
the firm stops growing and enters the stationary stage. This moment is
*
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Figure 5.1. Master trajectory if i > (1-f)r and c >ClY   2Y'
it is worthwhile to expand the output capacity because marginal revenue
exceeds marginal cost,  for,  due to diminishing returns to scale and
(4.29) it holds on path 1 that:
*    dS
Q < Q2y
+ -> C (1)
dQ    2Y
in which : c2Y -t {'*2 + (1 - *)a + .i  r + (1 -*- g) T ]
We will now discuss in more detail the above formulation of c The
2Yo
part in the main brackets is  the cost per capital good assigned to
activity 2. It is divided by the output per capital good, q2, in order
to get the unit cost of activity 2. The cost per capital good consists
of four parts:
wages : 4 2
depreciation : (1 - 1-) a
1-f
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interest on debt: -  r
cost of equity   : (-1 k - g) -1- f
Wages are simply the wage rate time the amount of labour assigned to
each capital good (see: (4.2)). Depreciation appears net from investment
grants. These subsidies may be considered as diminishing the price of
capital goods at a rate g, resulting in a decrease of depreciation of
(a.g) in the case of absence of corporation profit tax. When corporation
profit tax is introduced, we have to reckon with the fact that invest-
ment grants are free from corporation profit tax,  80 the relevant de-
crease of (a.g) is then after tax payments and this equals a decrease of
depreciation before taxes   of  ( f a). Interest   on  debt   per  unit   of
capital good consists    of    the    rate   of debt money   k/ (1+k), times    the
interest rate r. The cost of equity consists of two parts. First, the
time preference rate of the shareholders has been transformed into a
desired marginal rate of return to equity before tax payments of i/(1-
f).  Second,  this marginal rate has been corrected for the leverage
effect  (due to debt financing, the amount of equity needed to buy a
capital good is decreased by k/(1+k)) and for the investment grant
effect (each new capital good may be considered as financed at a rate g
by the government).
In this way, the unit cost formula of (1) includes the effect of profit
tax and of investment grants as well.
The fact that the marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost implies that
marginal return to equity exceeds the minimum level i. With the help of
the definition of operating income in (4.6), we can transform (1) into:
Q< Q Y +  1_     _g{ (1-f) (  - -1 kr) + ga}  >i     (2)
1+k
c                                    a                           b
We can distinguish three terms in the expression of marginal return to
equity of (2):
(a)  : "regular" marginal return to equity after corporation profit tax
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(apart  from investment  grants).  Note that we have implicitly
assumed that the price of a capital good equals one unit of money
value,  so marginal return to equity equals marginal return per
capital good in this case.
(b)   : cost reduction per capital  good  due to investment grants.  The
lower net purchase price (after investment grants) results in a
lower amount of depreciation.
(c)  : purchasing-power multiplier. This consists of the above described
effects of investments grants and the leverage factor, raising the
purchase power (in terms of ,capital goods) of equity.
So, from (2) results, that on path 1 marginal return to equity exceeds
the time preference rate of the shareholders. Therefore, the sharehol-
ders will 4ive up dividends and they will order the management to rein-
vest all earnings because elsewhere they would only get a rate of return
of i to their investment. Due to the decreasing marginal return to scale
*
as defined in (4.5) this process stops at Q = Q2y. At this level profit
is maximal. The relevant master trajectory is presented in figure 5.2 on
the next page, in which
C : total costs = c2Y,Q
A further increase of the capital good stock should yield less than i,





in which : q2*K2Y = Q2Y'
and pays out the remaining earnings to the shareholders. From (4.17, 20)
and (3) we get:
K=0 and Y=k X+ X=0+
* *
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Figure 5.2. Master trajectory of S(Q) if i > (1-f)r and c >C .
lY    2Y
Because earnings are growing on path 1, the rate of growth is increasing
in this stage of the trajectory. Later on, when dealing with trajector
ies consisting of several growth stages,  this will appear to be a
property of all growth stages in the model. This is in accordance, for
example, with results of Singh and Whittington, who found a positive
correlation between the sizes of firms and their rates of growth (Singh
& Whittington, 1975).
There is another interesting feature in the above basic trajectory. In
fact, the firm's policy is based on different (sub)goals during the two
stages. The first stage is governed by maximizing the growth rate: all
earnings are used for expansion investments, so, no dividend is paid
out. In this way, the "state of bliss" (Das, 1974) will be attained as
quickly as possible. In the final stage, profit is maximal and by re-
taining earnings only to keep the capital stock at its optimal level,
dividend pay-out is maximized. If we should replace the non-negativity
constraint on dividend (4.15) by a more restrictive one, requiring a
positive dividend outflow during the whole planning period, then the
growth to the final stage will be retarded, because part of the finan-
cial means can no longer be assigned to the growth of the firm. However,
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such a constraint will not alter the arrangements of paths of the master
trajectories to be discussed in this chapter. So, we have introduced the
simple non-negativity constraint in order to avoid needless intricacies.
Due to the properties of the model, the switch from the growth stage to
the stationary stage is rather abrupt.  But in essence it corresponds
with findings such as those of Grabowski & MUller, that mature firms
have low yields on retained earnings and that shareholders of mature
firms prefer dividend pay-out to retained earnings, while shareholders
of younger firms prefer the opposite (Grawbowski & Muller, 1975). From a
macro economic inductive point of view we get support from Albin and
Alcaly, who conclude to two disjunct equilibrium zones in an economy:
one containing major firms marked by low growth rates and maximizing
their profits, and the other containing relatively fast growing firms
showing managerial  behaviour  such as  striving  to high growth rates
(Albin & Alcaly, 1976).
As we have mentioned in chapter 4, the trajectory described in figure 1
is the "master trajectory"  of the relevant  set of optimal trajectories.
This means that the initial conditions are such that all paths which are
feasible in the relevant case are part of the trajectory:
*
X( O) <
q2(1+k) Q2Y                                         (5)
K(0) = (1+k)X(0) (6)
The initial amount of equity must be less than its stationary value and
the firm must start with maximum debt financing. If initial condition
(6) is not fulfilled, the firm will attract the missing amount of debt
immediately at the start of the pattern and it will invest this amount
in capital goods at once. After that, it starts its trajectory on path 1
(supposing condition (5) is still not binding). If the initial condition
(5)  is violated, the firm will sell the superfluous stock of capital
*
goods (i.e.  the stock above the level of Q  /q ) and will pay out the
2Y  2
resulting revenue to the shareholders at the start of the trajectory
too. In this way, the firm is in its optimal stationary state right at
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the beginning of the optimal trajectory and the optimal trajectory will
consist of path 2 only.
Due to these instantaneous adjustments at the start of a trajectory, the
firm seems to pass through only (parts of) the master trajectories. One
may  introduce time lasting adjustment trajectories from non-optimal
initial states to the relevant master trajectories by incorporating such
retarding features as adjustment costs or lower- and upperbounds on
dividend and investments (or divestments). Because we want to emphasize
features of the master trajectories themselves in this study, we have
not incorporated them for the sake of simplicity and we will further
assume that the firm is in such an initial state as to fulfill the
initial conditions of the relevant master trajectory.
We will finish this section by a cavaet concerning the interpretation of
figure 5.1 (and the figures of master trajectories to be presented later
on). Only the variables D, K and Y are measured in the same dimension
(money), Q is measured in units of output and L in units of labour. So,
the ranking of Q and L in this figure is arbitrary. The correct informa-
tion to be drawn from figure 5.1 is that part of the capital stock is
financed by debt money and that the relevant variables exhibit the same
proportional growth.
3. Depth investments.
Our firm needs two kinds of input, labour and capital goods, in order to
produce its output. It can produce this output in two different ways,
one using relatively more capital goods, the other using more labour.
Labour is a variable input in this model: the employment level of the
firm can be perfectly adapted to the needs of the firm.  But capital
goods are not freely obtainable, especially not at the start of a traj-
ectory, due to the fact that the firm needs money capital to buy capital
goods and money capital is scarce because the firm can get new equity
only from retained earnings and because debt capital is rationed.  In
this situation it may be profitable to start with the labour-intensive
activity, even if it results in a higher unit cost than the capital-
intensive activity. The reason is,  that the firm can attain a higher
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output level with a given capital good stock by means of the labour-
intensive activity than by means of the capital-intensive activity. This
higher output brings about a higher sales level, which may compensate
for the higher unit cost.
But, due to decreasing returns to scale, this advantage does no longer
holds from a certain size on and the firm will then switch to the
cheaper capital-intensive activity. This switch is called: depth-invest-
ment or intensive investment.
In order to introduce this phenomenon, we have to leave the assumption
of section 2, that the labour-intensive activity is the cheapest one. We
now assume that c <C and then get the master trajectory of figurelY   2Y
5.3 on the next page.
Compared with the former section, the growth to the final stationary
stage is now interrupted by another stationary stage, as far as the*
output  (and thus: sales) volume is concerned, starting  at  Q  =  Q21 0
Thus the firm passes through different stages during its optimal trajec-
tory. Models describing the growth of the firm in this way are called:
metamorphosis models (see: Kieser e.a., 1977; Albach, 1976).
*
The depth-investment stage starts when the output level Q is attained.21
Below this level, the marginal revenue of a capital good assigned to
labour-intensivity activity 2, exceeds the marginal revenue of a capital




By means of the definition of output in equation (4.1) and of operating
income in (4.6), this results in: 1)
fli  >   41 2   -  1 1) := C (8)
dQ    q2 - ql       3




Q* .                                                      Q1Y
K
0 ,)7X          -Il
q2(1+k)X(0)
(1+k)X(0) -0.-.-- ,----- - Y.-I                               /2 (1+k)X(0)_.-·- -' /










growth '  stationary
(1) investment (2) state
Figure 5.3. The master trajectory if i > (1-f)r and c <C
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*
So  criterion  (7)  and  the critical Q21-value are linked  through  the
*
definition of Q21:
*    dS
(9)Q   =   Q21  -dq-   5
In order to explain this link, we rewrite the third inequality of foot-
note 1:
1) From (4.1), (4.6) and (7) we get:
3P 3P v ap
CllIcl   + q2P-wt 2   (121 2 3 K2 - a > cllP + ('1Kl B K  -rt 1 + Cl2   
- a-
Qi!1+qp-Wt >QLL+qp_,4 -lEg_we >LER_,4 -
3 K 2 2   3 K 1 1 3
K2
2  3 K    1
2                         1                                       1
w(£  - £ )
dEfl -w t   >q  dPR - wt  - d.Efl       2     1   . (Note that PQ := S)
 2 dQ 2    1 dQ 1   dQ    2 - q1
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3S 3 S                                            dS
FE  - FiE1  >  * 2  -   2 1  -   C 2  -   1)  35 >  (12  - 1 l)w
(10)
In (10), inequality (7) is translated into a sales advantage of activity
2 based on its larger capital productivity (q2 > qi) and into a cost
advantage of activity  1  due  to its lower labour intensity  (1 1< £2) .  Due
to the decreasing marginal return dS/dQ and the growth of Q, there will
be a moment at which the sign turns into its opposite: the larger output
of activity 2 no longer results in a surplus of marginal sales such as
to counterbalance the cost disadvantage. Therefore the firm will then
switch to the capital-intensive adtivity 1.
A second remark on formula (10) concerns the absence of depreciation and
the cost of capital. From (1) we know that they amount to:
(1--8-)at-kr+(--g)- (11)1i1-f 1+k 1+k 1-f
per capital good. So they are independent of the activity to which the
relevant (marginal) capital good will be assigned. Therefore they do not
*
influence the level of Q21'
Compared with the model in: Lesourne & Leban, 1978, described in chapter
3, we now have more information about the depth-investment process. We
have designed a model yielding conditions to the appearance of depth-
investments which have an economic meaning. Moreover, after a period of
depth-investment, the firm starts growing again instead of sticking in a
stationary state. In this way, depth-investments are described as a mean
of  reorganizing  the  production-process  in  order  to  enable  further
growth. This fits in with the theory of critical thresholds in the life
cycle of a firm,  as presented for example in:  Clifford,  1976, and:
Albach, 1976, in the area of business finance and management.
Our last remark on the article of Lesourne and Leban concerns their
definition of the depth-investment process as a substitution between
labour and capital. As described in: Pasinetti, 1977, substitution is
defined as the process caused by changes in the relative prices of the
inputs. In our model, as well as in that of Lesourne & Leban, the change
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from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production is caused by the
diminishing returns to scale. So, we prefer to speak about "realloca-
tion" of labour and capital in this context.
As   shown in figure   5.3, the reallocation process takes   some  time.   This*
is because the firm needs more capital goods to produce an output Q   by21
means of capital-intensive activity 1. This growth of the capital stock
must be financed by means of retained earnings and additional debt
money, restricted by the present amount of equity.  So, the financial
means to buy more capital goods are restricted and this results in th
e
gradual course of the reallocation process.
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Figure 5.4. The depth-investment process in dynamic activity analysis.
During the switch from activity 2 to activity  1, the ouput is kept
constant, so'the line ala2 is a so called isoquant. In order to find the
slope of this line, we derive from (1)-(3):
2)
2) (Please turn over)
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q2 - qi 41£ 2  -  q, 1  KQ= L+ (12)
 2- 11 12-11
Based on the fact that the isoquant is defined by:
dQ = 0 (13)
we easily derive from (12) that its slope is:
dK     2q  -ql
 =q i  - qi <0 (14)12 2- 1
So,  the expansion of the capital good stock during the reallocation
period is attended with a decrease of labour in the relevant model. We
*
may further derive Q from (12) in an alternative way. It makes sense12
to switch to the capital-intensive activity as soon as the marginal
contribution to the profit stream of labour becomes negative:
3-S-  w  <  O  +   112 1&  -w<  O  +   ·dS<  W(t 2   -  1 1)  .    Q  >Q* (15)3L dQ 3 L dQ     42 - ql         12
2) Conceive Kl and K2 as variables, of which the solution values are to
be found from  (1)  and  (2)  for fixed values of Q and L, and apply
Cramer's rule to solve the linear equation system (see for example:
Chiang, 1974, 116):
FQ q21 P i       Ql
Dl=  lL   12.   =1 2 Q-  q2L;  D2  -  1  1    L]  =  qlL -1 1 Q
[qi  q21
D3=   1 1   1 z   =  q11 2  -   2  1
Dl  D2  12Q- q2L + qlL- 1 1Q
K=K l+K 2=D+F=
3 3 41  2  - 1 1 2
which results in the above formula (see also: Schouten, 1957, for the
same results in a slightly different notation).
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The introduction of more (efficient) production activities in this two-
inputs case will not yield new information. We then get a larger number
of switches during the optimal trajectory towards still more capital-
intensive activities, but the rules governing the reallocation process
will not be different.  Every time only two adjacent activities are
compared in the same way as described in this section for the activities
1 and 2. Suppose, for example,  that a third activity is introduced,
which is more capital-intensive than activity 2, so:
 2  <   3'   2/1 2     3/1 3 (16)
then the second reallocat on process starts as soon as the firm has
attained the output level Q23' fixed by:
*        dS      w(13  -1 2)
Q - Q23 -dq-   3 -  2
(17)
* *
(assuming that Q23 < Q2Y' of course).
4. Consolidation.
Both previous master trajectories dealt with the case of cheap debt
money (i > (1-f)r) implying an optimal financial structure with maximum
borrowing during the whole trajectory. In this section we will turn to
the case of cheap equity (i < (1-f)r), yielding the possibility of a
change in the optimal financial structure of the firm during its growth
process.  We  further assume,  that  labour-intensive activity 2 has a
smaller unit cost (c   > c2X) which implies,  just like in section 2,1X
that the firm will assign all its capital goods to that activity during
the whole planning period. In this way we can concentrate on the conso-
lidation process only.
If the firm starts with a sufficiently small amount of equity (see our
discussion about initial conditions in section 2), we get the optimal
pattern as presented in figure 5.5 on the next page.
Figure 5.5 shows that the firm starts with maximum borrowing in spite of
the fact that debt is the expensive way of financing. The reason is that
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ditional capital good, bought by means of debt money, yields a positive
income and so increases the rate of growth:
dS
Q < Q2yx -35> (:2YX (18)
1    ,in which : c   - - ld  + (1 -  f)at (1-g)r}
2YX   q2 '  2
In (18), c2YX is the unit cost of activity 2 if the relevant capital
good is financed by debt money only (see the explanation of (1)). For-
mula (18) can be rewritten as:
Q < Q2yx - -l g { (1-f)  K  + ga}  > (1-f)r (19)
2
If we compare (19) with (2), we can easily derive that the left hand
side of (19) is the marginal revenue of a capital good assigned to
activity 2,  apart from financing costs. The right hand side is the
financing cost net of corporation profit tax if the relevant capital
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good is financed by debt money only.
So, the firm will invest all its equity in capital goods and will fur-
thermore attract as much debt money as is possible to invest in order to
maximize the flow of earnings. Due to the fact that equity is cheaper
than debt money (i < (1-f)r), shareholders will waive dividend pay-out,
because retained earnings,  invested in the firm again, will yield a
revenue larger than (1-f)r and so larger than i, which is the "cut-off"
criterion for the growth process to the shareholders, as we have already
pointed out in section 2.
The link with the classical leverage formula may be obvious if we
define:
30-i-lg{(1-f) Fir + ga} =R: marginal return to total capital
2
(1-f)r = CY: (marginal) cost of
debt capital
RE:
marginal return to equity
We then get the next leverage formula:
 = R + (R- CY)  (20)
From (20)  we  can conclude  that  increasing  the leverage  factor Y/X
results in a higher return to equity if
R > CY (21)
which is the same condition as for (19), resulting in the range of Q on
which (maximum) debt financing is profitable.
*
As soon as the output level Q is attained, the marginal revenue as2YX
defined in (19) equals the marginal cost of borrowing. Shareholders can
now choose from three different ways of spending the earnings:
1. Accept them as dividend pay-out, resulting in a rate of
return of i, when invested elsewhere.
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2. Use them for further expansion investments, yielding a
rate of return less than (1-f)r, due to the decreasing
return to scale.
3. Use them to pay back debt money, saving an amount of (1-
f)r rent payments.
Because the last possibility is the most attractive one, for: i <
( 1-f)r,    the   firm   will now start    to   pay   back debt money by means   of
retained earnings. Because rent payments are falling down during this
consolidation process, a growing . stream of earnings becomes available
for redemption and the decrease of debt money accelerates till at T =
t6,7 in figure 5.5 all debt is paid back.
We can present this change of the financial structure in another way by
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Figure 5.6. The consolidation process.
In figure 5.6, only area II is a feasible region. In area I debt amounts
to more than the allowed maximum rate k, in area III there should be
equity not invested in capital goods, which is excluded by equation
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(4.20).  The relevant critical X-values  can easily been derived from
figure 5.5.
After this consolidation phase, the cost of capital has been decreased
to such a degree that it is profitable for the firm to start growing
again:
dS
Q < Q x -  dii > C2X
(22)
in which :c = 1-   {  we.    +     (1     -   -l ) a    +     (1-g)    -i  -
2X   42 '  z
In (22), c2X is the unit cost of activity 2 if the relevant capital good
is financed by equity only. This results in:
*1 30
Q  <  Q2x -  TziI {(1-f )  Fig  +  ga}    >
i (23)
Here, i is the cost of capital because of the situation of self-finan-
cing.
As soon as the firm has paid back its loans, it starts growing at a
higher rate on path 7 than it has ended with on path 1.3  The firm will
3) At the end of path 1 it holds that:
X(tl,6) - (1-f)(0 - -1  rK) + g{ (1+k) (tl,6) - aK} (23a)
At the beginning of path 7, it holds that:
X( t 6,7 ) - ( 1-f)0 + g( ( t 6,7) - aK) (23b)
From (23a) and (23b) it results that:
 (tl,6) <  (t6,7) -
1-f 1-f -k
1  -g(1+k)   (0  -  '1 k   rK)   -agK  <1-go  -agK-   -1=2  0  <  .i krX
which is always true, due to assumption (A2) of chapter 4, the non-nega-
tiveness of X and because of (4.27, 28).
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*
continue this expansion till the output level Q is attained on T =2X
t7'8 in figure 5.5. Then it will stop expanding in order to avoid that
the marginal return falls below the critical i-level. The firm will keep
*
investments on the replacement level aIC X and will pay out the remaining
dividend to the shareholders.
Just as on the previous trajectories, we see an accelerating movement
during each of the stages of  the growth process. Further,  the above
described trajectory shows in a simple way the change in the financial
structure  as  it has  been observed  in several maturing  firms  (see:
Albach, 1976, and: Clifford, 1976).
5. Depth-investments and consolidation.
We now have discussed the main features of our model: the growth and
stationary stages, the reallocation of labour and capital goods and the
redemption of debt money. The last two master trajectories to be discus-
sed here, contain all these features simultaneously. They only differ as
far as the sequence of the reallocation and the consolidation process is
concerned. Because all the relevant features have already been discussed
in the previous sections, we only need to point out the differences
between both trajectories.
From the above mentioned trajectories we have learnt, that consolidation
only occurs if equity is cheaper than debt and that there is a switch to
the capital-intensive activity only if this activity yields lower unit
costs. To get both changes of the policy of the firm in the same trajec-
tory, we have to assume that:
i < (1-f)r and: c <C (24)1 X    2X
Which of the relevant changes will occur first, appears to depend on the
fact whether:
C >C (25)IYX <  2YX
which can be rewritten into (see (18)):
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,Z 2     1 1 , ,1   1
1  -l r k   w f  lir -  ;i  1{ (1- .i,%)"  +  (1-g) rl                   (26)
On the left hand side,  the part between brackets represents the dif-
ference in labour per unit output between both activities. So, the left
hand side represents the marginal saving of wage payments per unit
output when switching from labour-intensive activity 2 to capital-inten-
sive activity 1. The first part between brackets on the right hand side
represents the difference in capital per unit output between both activ-
ities. The second part represents the financing cost per capital good in
the case of full debt financing. So, the right hand side stands for the
increase of the financing cost per unit output when switching from
labour-intensive activity 2 to capital-intensive activity 1.
D,K,L,Q,Y
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Figure 5.7. The master trajectory if i < (1-f)r, c <C and:
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If the marginal saving of wage payments is larger than the increase of
the financing cost, the firm will first decrease the labour-input by
switching to capital-intensive activity 1 and after that it will worry
about decreasing the cost of capital through the redemption of debt
money. We then have the situation as presented in figure 5.7 on the
previous page.
The master trajectory of figure 5.7 shows two stages, having a station-
ary output level before the final stationary stage is attained.  The
reader may notice that, although the trajectory is more complex, all the
relevant features have already been discussed with the help of the
previous master trajectories. The possibility that depth investments and
the reallocation process coincide, is prohibited by assumption (A4) of
the former chapter for the sake of simplicity.
If the marginal saving on wage payments, as defined in (26), is less
than the increase of the cost of capital, switching to capital-intensive
activity 1 has no sense and the firm will first pay back its debt money
and later on it will change to the capital-intensive activity (see
figure 5.8 on the next page).
In the same way as in section 2, we can conceive the above trajectories
as caused by different (sub)policies of the firm during the successive
stages. Both patterns discussed in this section, contain three growth
stages, on which managerial (sub)goals may be assumed to be dominating,
and two "threshold" stages on which the firm mainly emphasize diminis-
hing the (production or the financing) costs. Finally, in the stationary
stage, a policy of guaranteeing maximum dividend pay-out is established.
6. Summary.
The master trajectories of  the four different sets of trajectories,
resulting from the optimal solution are presented here. Which of these
sets is the optimal one,  depends on whether equity or debt is the
cheapest mode of money capital and on whether capital-intensive activity
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Figure 5.8. The master trajectory if i < (1-f)r, c <C and:1X   2X
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The initial values of the state variables, i.e. equity and the capital
good stock, determine whether the whole relevant master trajectory is
passed through or only a part of it.
All master trajectories consist of a succession of growth and stationary
stages,  which agrees with  descriptions  of the  life cycle of firms as
described by other authors. The conditions under which depth-investments
and/or redemption of debt money may occur are presented and their eco-
nomic meaning has been analysed.
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CHAPTER 6. A FURTHER ANALYSIS
1. Introduction.
In chapter 5 we have described the optimal solution of our model in the
same way as done in most publications on dynamics of the firm. Still, a
lot of worthwhile economic analyses remain to be done. We will present
two more ways of analysis in this chapter. The first way of analysis is
a derivation of global decision rules, which together constitute the
policy of the firm. The stepping stones in the four mabter trajectories
of chapter 5 are the Q*-values, of which several are present in more
than one trajectory. In chapter 5 we have discussed the factors influen-
cing the level of each Q -value. This chapter starts with another way of
discussing these Q -values, based on the three aspects of the policy of
the firm in the relevant model concerning production, finance and in-
vestment/dividend.
There after, we will study the influence of environmental changes on six
different features of the growth process of the firm. This is a sensit-
ivity analysis concerning parameters that are important in economic
analysis: the interest rate r, the discount rate i, the wage rate w, the
borrowing rate k, the corporation profit tax rate f and the investment
grant rate g.
2. Optimal decision rules.
2.1. Production.
In the model, two types of decisions concerning production can be dis-
tinguished: to which activity should the capital goods be assigned? and:
to what level should the output be increased? In this first part of
section 2, we will restrict ourselves to the former question, as the
latter one is in fact within the area of investment and dividend policy.
The firm can assign the available capital goods to capital-intensive
activity 1 or to labour-intensive activity 2. In section 3 of chapter 5
we have already shown that the cost of capital is irrelevant in this
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assignment problem because this cost does not depend on the way in which
a capital good will be used. This is in accordance with empirical fin-
dings of Gardner & Sheldon, 1975, who found no important financial in-
fluence on the capital/output  rate of firms. Therefore,  the decision
rule is based on the marginal return to a capital good, defined as the
difference between marginal sales and the marginal cost per capital
good:
Assign a capital good to  activity 1 1activity 2 J
if.  1.S   - 4    f >1  2-S   _    -
3 Kl         1  i 4  3 K2
Wa  -Z )
if : 13 {fi  q22- ql1 - Q {0 Q21                    (1)
So,  financing cost and depreciation are out of consideration in this
decision rule. The output level on which the growing firm will switch to
the capital-intensive activity 1 appears to depend on the wage rate and
some more  technical  parameters.  Note  that  government has no direct
influence on this output level,  for,  the profit tax rate f and the
investment grant   rate  g  are not present  in  ( 1).   We  will  use this infor-
mation for the sensitivity analysis in section 3 of this chapter.
2.2. Financial structure.
The financial structure is characterized by the relative amounts of the
two kinds of money capital that are available to the firm: equity and
debt. The amount of debt that the firm can attract is restricted by the
size of equity. So, the financial structure has two extreme cases: the
case that the assets are financed by equity only and the case that the
firm is financing by means of the maximal amount of debt that is allowed
for. Which of both cases is the optimal one, depends on the marginal
return to equity.  This  return depends,  among others,  on the chosen
activity (which fixes the marginal return to a capital good, as discus-
sed in section (2.1)) and the relevant financial structure (which fixes
the cost of capital). In formula (2) of chapter 5, we have presented the
marginal return to equity in the case of maximum debt financing and of a
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labour-intensive way of production (activity 2). From this formula we
can derive the following formula of marginal return to equity in the
case of maximum debt financing (R Y):
1         30
R = {(1-f)(rir - -rliE r) + ga}  ,j-1,2. (2)
j Y                1      -1*k-                                                            
k
in which the suffix j stands for the actual production activity used by
the firm. The expression has been explained in chapter 5 already. From
(5.23) we can derive the marginal return to equity in the self-financing
case (Rjx) in the same way:
30
RjX = -i42 {(1-f) FEI + ga}  ,  j-l,  2.                          (3)
The firm will now try to realize such a financial structure as to maxim-
ize marginal return to equity, so:
self-financing
choose for {                          1 if: R   I >} R  -maximum debt financing  jX 1 <     jY
if ·   dS  f 51  I{ d j + (1 - .df)a + (1-g)r} .. dQ '
i f:    Q  {2 1 Qlyx (4)
From (4) we can derive that the financing decision is influenced by all
parameters to be discussed in the sensitivity analysis. Above that, also
the choice of the production activity has its impact on the decision
through the technical parameters  Z     and  q . The above discussion   is   a
*
way to explain Q yx' alternative to  the discussion in section 4 of
chapter 5.
2.3. Investment and dividend.
The last decision rule to be studied in this section concerns the in-
vestment  and  dividend  policy of  the  firm.  The  firm can spend  its
earnings in two ways: to pay out dividend or to retain it in the firm in
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order to invest in capital goods and/or to pay back debt money. The last
mentioned decision has implicitly been discussed in the previous part of
this section:  redemption of debt starts as soon as the firm attains
*
the Q -level on which self-financing becomes optimal instead of max-
jyx
imum debt financing. The second possibility, is preferable as long as
marginal return to equity exceeds the discount rate of the shareholders
i, for the discount rate represents the rate of return that the share-
holders can obtain elsewhere. As soon as marginal return to equity falls
below i, the firm will pay out dividend instead of going on with expan-
sion investments, as we have discfssed already in section 2 of chapter
5. In that case the firm will still invest, but only on the replacement
level so as to keep the capital good stock (and so: the output) on the
optimal level. In this way, the following decision rule can be designed:
don't pay out dividend and spend all earnings on investments
{ make only replacement investments and pay out all remaining earnings }
decrease the capital good stock and pay out all earnings
if RjN   i; j= 1,2 ;N=X, Y (5)
The three decision rules as formulated in (1), (4) and (5), cover all
*
the Q -values of the master trajectories of chapter 5. These expressions
reveal that there is in fact only one policy of the firm, consisting of
three decisions rules. The variety of optimal trajectories is caused by
differences in the initial state of the firm and by different environ-
mental conditions, represented by different sets of values of the para-
meters under which it has to operate.
3. Environmental influence on the trajectory of the firm.
In the previous section, we have explained the way in which the relevant
*
Q -levels are fixed. Now, we will study how changes in the values of the
parameters, enumerated in section 1, influence these values (realloc-
ation,  final output  and consolidation)  and  the growth of  the  firm
towards  those  threshold  values  (expansion).  Moreover we will study
changes in the parameters that cause a switch to another master trajec-
tory (substitution and financial substitution effect).  In this way we
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will discuss the environmental influence on the six different feature
s
that characterize the shape of the master trajectories.
3.1. Reallocation.
In chapter 5 we discussed the reallocation of labour and capital due to
decreasing marginal  returns.  During the optimal  trajectories of  the
firm, labour and capital are complementary inputs, due to the assumed
linear production activities, except in the depth investment stage, in
which:
* dS 2 1 (6)
w(1   -i )
Q "Q21 - 35 -   2 -q1
Before going on, we remind that we are dealing with decreasing returns
to scale, so changes in the values of the parameters that cause a rise
(fall) of the value of the right hand side imply a fall (rise) of the
*
value of Q From (6) and (4.25) we now can derive that a rise of the21'
wage rate will decrease the output level on which the firm starts the
reallocation process.  None of the other parameters, mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter, appear to influence this level.
3.2. Final output.
In the final stage of the trajectory, the firm has attained the optimal
level of output and it yields maximal profit. The level of output (and
of employment)  depends on the values of the environmental parameters,
for, from the previous section we know that this level is fixed by:
RjN =i + (7)
  = Cjx = . i {92 j+  (1  - -,i.%)a +  (1-g) -14F }  when i <  (1-f )r
dS                                              k
;iii   -    c j y    -   - I{  tz  j    +    (1    -   .i.f f) a    .1.   .1 k    r   +    (1    -   -1+k   -    g)    -i f   }
when i > (1-f)r (8)
From (8) we conclude that,  in the case of i > (1-f)r, a rise of the
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profit tax rate f, of the discount rate i, of the interest rate r and/or
of the wage rate w will decrease the final output level and hence the
level of employment and the amount of issued dividend. On the other
hand, an increase of the borrowing rate k and the investment grant rate
g will raise the stationary value of Q. The explanation is quite obvious
and will therefore be left to the reader.
In  the  case of expensive debt money  (i  < (1-f)r), neither  r  nor  k  in-
fluences the final output level, because the firm does not borrow in its
final stage. The remaining parameters f, g, i and w affect the final
output level in the same way as in the above case.
3.3. Consolidation.
The third feature of the growth process of the firm to be studied here
is the output level at which the firm starts its consolidation. From
chapter 5 we know that this level is fixed by:
*     dS
Q = QjYX- .35 - . I{w£ j + (1 - -1.5)8+ (1-g)r}         (9)
In the same way as in the analysis of the final output effect, we can
derive directly from (9) that the firm will start paying back its debt
at a lower level of output, when the wage rate w or the interest rate i
is increasing. A rise of the corporation profit tax rate f and of the
investment grant rate g will increase the relevant output level.
3.4. Expansion.
In this part we will discuss the environmental influence on the rate of
growth of the firm. We can measure the firm size, and thus its rate of
growth, by means of several standards such as sales, employment, assets
and equity. Smyth e.a.,  1975, and:  Shalit & Sankar, 1977, have shown
that  in empirical research,  these standards are not interchangeable
without any more and that different conclusions can be drawn, depending
on the measure chosen by the analyst. As in our model shareholders
wealth is the criterion function, we have chosen equity as a measure of
the size of the firm, because this standard is the only one relevant for
the shareholders.
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Because we have fixed the lower bound of dividend pay-out on zero value,
the firm does not pay out any dividend before attaining the final sta-
tionary stage. So, from (4.17) we derive that before entering the final
stage, it holds that:
X = (1-f)(0 - rY) + gI (10)
3X (11)- =I>0
3g
In this way, the model confirms that investment grants have a positive
influence on the rate of growth of the firm. From (10) and (4.23) we can
derive that:
 =-( 1-f) (1 1Kl  + 12K2)   <  0 , (12)
which shows the negative influence of the wage rate on the rate of
growth. The same holds for the corporation profit tax rate f, if we
assume that:
(1  --lkk  -  g) i>ga (13)
The left hand side of (13) is the minimum return to a capital good,
necessary to satisfy the shareholders. The part between brackets is the
reciprocal of the purchasing power multiplier in (5.2). It represents
the amount of equity needed to buy a capital good when it is financed
with as much debt and investment grants as possible. The right hand side
is the decrease in depreciation caused by the investment grant. So, in
(13) we assume that the return of the relevant capital good to the
shareholders is not based only on the advantage of investment grants.
This assumption is sufficient to derive from (10) that: 1)
0-ry>0+1X<0 (14)
3f
1) From (10), Y<k X and: X+Y=K results that:
(please turn over)
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When the firm is borrowing, the interest rate also has a negative in-
fluence on the rate of growth, for, from (10) we can derive:
111 =  -  ( 1-f)   Y  <  0  when  Y  > 0 (15)3r
Finally, when the firm is borrowing at the maximum rate, the value of
the borrowing rate will influence the rate of growth:
Y=k X+K= (1+k)X +
•1
X= {(1-f)0 + {(1+k)a - k(1-f)r} )4 (16)
1 - g(1+k)
From (16) we derive that:2)
iR > o (17)
3 k   '
which implies that relaxing the borrowing constraint will accelerate the
growth process of the firm.
1) (continued)
3 X                 k
ST  =   -    (0   -    ry)   4     -    0   +  -1+k   r    K
From the master trajectories of chapter 5 we can derive that, when i >
(1-f)r:
30  k
Y  >   0 +   Q  <   Qjy +  5 2  >1+k  r  +   (1   - -1+kk-  g)   Tif-  T%  a
Due to the concavity of S, and so of 0, this yields:
O)  K i f l i  O> K 1-1 r+(1 -1. _g) _L _.&.a}
3K , 1+k 1+k 1-f 1-f
which results, together with (13), in (14). In the case of i < (1-f)r
*
(in which: Y>0+Q<Q ) the same results can be derived.
jyx
2) please look at the following page.
95
3.5. Substitution.
In this part we will discuss substitution between labour and capital in
the final stage of a trajectory, i.e. the change in the relative amounts
of both inputs due to a change in their relative prices, at a given
level of output.  This appears  through a switch from one production
activity to the other in the final stage. As the output level, and thus
total and marginal returns are fixed, the firm will minimize its costs.
This agrees with findings in the previous chapter, based on the shape of
the master trajectories, that
activity 1,the final activity is
{
when c
1N <<}  c    -activity 2   2N
when (-{2}  812 ' N = X, Y (18)K
in which : cK : cost of capital in the final stage
= (1 - -l ) a + -1 k r + (1 - -1 k - g) Tif when i > (1-f)r
=(1-  -l )    a   +   (1-g)14 when i < (1-f)r
2) Expression (16) results in:
  k = (1- 1(1+k) }2{(1-f)gO + [a - (1-g)(1-f)r +
+ (1 - g(ltk)) (1-f)  ]X}
due to the concavity of 0 and of the fact that K = (1+k)X, this implies:
 > {1 - g(1+k) }21(1-f)1-f + a - (1-g)(1-f)r} X
*
When i> (1-f)r, so Q<Q one can derive, like in footnote 1 :jY
ix> 1    1     }2{(1 --L- g)(i - (1-f)r) + (1-g)a} > 0
3k ,1 - g(1+k) 1+k
*
When i< (1-f)r, so Q<Q the above inequality results in:
jyx'
        1  -   (1+k)   } 2   (1-g)   a>   0
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812: rate of technical substitution between activity 1 and
activity 2
q2 -  1=              >0
1 2 q 1    -  1  1   2
This is in accordance with the well known analysis in static micro
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Figure 6.1. Substitution of labour and capital.
The line ala2 is the isoquant as defined in (5.13). In (5.14) we derived
its slope,  and so tang a :
dK      2 -  1 (19)
tang a  = - ·  E=  41£ 2  -  q2  1   =  S12
We assume this slope to be exogenously fixed. Now, consider the so
called iso-budget line a3a4, defined by:
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total costs =C K K+w L=y( : fixed budget) (20)
This line represents all combinations of inputs of labour and capital if
the budget of y is spent. The point where the iso-budget line touches
the isoquant of the highest output level, represents the combination of
inputs of labour and capital that results in the highest output level
for a fixed budget y and for fixed prices of labour, w, and capital, cK•
From figure 6.1  one can derive that this point is a2 (so the firm
prefers the capital-intensive activity) if:
tang B > tang a (21)
so, from (19) and (20), if:
w  > s (22)c    12
K
This is in accordance with (18). Now, the value of tang B may decrease
due to a decrease of the cost of labour, w, and/or a rise of the cost of
capital cK. Then the iso-budget line (we still keep the budget fixed on
the level y) switches to a5a6 and al will become the optimal combination
of inputs.
The improvement of (18) compared to the analysis of figure 6.1 is that,
due to the more complex underlying model, we have derived more details
of the composition of the cost of capital cK and so we are able to trace
more precisely the influence of separate parameters on the substitution
process.
From (18) can be derived that a rise of the wage rate w, the investment
grant rate g and the borrowing rate k will stimulate the choice of the
capital-intensive production activity 1 and so substitution in a capit-
al-intensive direction. A rise of the interest rate r and of the dis-
count rate i will stimulate substitution in a labour-intensive direc-
tion. The same is true for a rise of the corporation profit tax rate f,
due to assumption (13) in this section.
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3.6. Financial substitution.
From the master trajectories, described in chapter 5, one can conclude
that:
the optimal final financial structure is:
1  :exlimuf .:::in:inancing 1 when *{ 0 r (23)
If we call i/(1-f)  : the price Of equity, and r : the price of debt,
then we may use the term "financial substitution" to denote a change in
the inputs of debt and equity in the final stage due to a change in
their (relative) prices. This is analogous to the substitution process
as defined in production theory (see the previous part of this section).









Figure 6.2. Changes that cause financial substitution effects.
If the set of values of the relevant parameters belongs to area I of
figure 6.2, the firm will finally finance its equipment only by means of
equity. In area II the firm will borrow at the maximum rate in its final
stage.
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A movement from a to b may be caused by a rise of the time preference
rate and/or a  rising  corporation profit  tax  level.  It  provokes an
increase of debt at the cost of equity. A movement from b to c may be
caused by a rising interest rate. In that case, debt is pushed out and
replaced by equity.
In the next table we have summarized the findings of this section:
a rise of profit investm.  time pref. borrowing interest wage
tax rate grant r. rate rate rate rate
f g i k r w
impact on
reallocation *t
level            0          0          0          0          0        -
final output
level           -          +          - (+) (-)       -
consolidation
level           +          +          0          0          -        -
expansion rate  -          +          0          +          -        -
substitution   + L +K +L (+ K) (+ L) +K
financial
substitution   +Y         0         +Y         0         +X       0
Table 6.1. Impact of the parameters on the main features
of the master trajectories.
In which : + : rise of the feature value
-   : fall of the feature value
0   : no influence on the relevant feature
+ K : substitution in a capital-intensive direction
+ L : substitution in a labour-intensive direction
+ X : substitution towards a self-financing structure
+ Y : substitution towards maximum borrowing
( ) : the parameter only influences the feature if i > (1-f)r
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4. Influence of (sets of) environmental parameters.
In the former section we have studied the main features of the master
trajectories and how they are influenced by changes in the values of the
environmental parameters.  So,  we have discussed the separate rows of
table 6.1 there. In this section we will discuss the columns of table
6.1 by considering changes in the environmental parameters apart from
each other. We will study the over-all influence of each such parameter
on the trajectory by putting together its influences on the different
features. We will demonstrate this with the help of the first optimal
trajectory of chapter 5, section ' 5. The reader can easily  do  the  same
analysis for the other trajectories himself. In the remaining part of
this chapter, substitution effects will be left out of consideration
becduse they imply a change to another trajectory.
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4.1. Corporation profit tax rate.
From table 6.1 can be concluded that the corporation profit tax rate has
different, sometimes opposite influences on the optimal trajectory of
*
the firm. As far as the three Q -values are concerned, table 6.1 indic-
ates that a rise of the corporation profit tax rate f will result in a
**
decrease  of Qix (final output effelt), an in
crease  of Qiyx (consolida-
tion  effect)  and  an  unaltered Q21-level. The  fact  that Qiyx rises,
meaning that the firm will postpone the consolidation process, stems
frnm decreasing net cost of borrowing when the tax rate rises, due to
the tax deduction effect. On the other hand, the rise· of the tax rate
will decrease earnings after tax payments from which (expansion)invest-
uents have to be paid. In this way, the rate of growth falls down. This
all may result in the altered shape of the trajectory of figure 6.3 as
presented in the following figure:
D,K,L,Q,Y
A
Qix  (-)                                                   Q
Qlyx- (') ) K
-*42<  \»\            
,-.
-.- ,
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F       -,               ,/
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Figure 6.4. Change of the trajectory of figure 6.2
when f increases.
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The signs on the vertical axis of figure 6.4 indicate an increase (+) or
*
a  decrease (-) of the relevant Q -value , compared to figure 6.3.  The
signs on the horizontal axis indicate an increase (+) or a decrease (-)
of the relevant period, compared to figure 6.3.
The first two periods increase due to the lower rate of growth and the
*
unaltered Q value. The third period increases because of the lower21                                 *
rate of growth and because of  the rise of Q . The fourth period1YX
increases due to the lower rate of growth and due to the larger amount
*
of debt to be paid back. On the other hand, the increased value of Q
1YX
implies a greater profit volume which will (partly) counter-balance both
time lasting effects. In the fifth period two opposite influences of a
rise of f hold, too: the fall of the rate of growth due to increased
**
taxes and  the smaller distance between Q and Q due to a rise1YX     1X
of Q    and a fall of Q  .1YX 1X-
We can conclude that a rise of the corporation profit tax rate f will
favour employment in the firm till T = t9 11:  the depth-investment
process is postponed and it will take place in a more moderate tempo.
Above that the employment level in the fourth stage will be on a higher
level. Further, due to a rise of the corporation profit tax rate, the
firm will keep its debt for a longer time period, for, till T = t4,9 all
periods increase. But, after T = tg ll' so when we are talking about
mature firms, a rise in the corporation profit tax rate will provoke,
beside a decreasing growth rate,  also declining profits and also a
declining employment level in the final stage.
From the above discussion the enrichment may become clear of economic
analysis due to the introduction of dynamics. In static theory only the
influence of the corporation profit tax rate in the final stage can be
studied, while dynamic analysis reveals a more complex influence of the
corporation profit tax rate, depending on the maturity of the firm.
4.2. Investment grant rate.
A rise of the investment grant rate will cause, according to table 6.1,
*                     *                            *a rise of Q as well as of Q while the value of Q will be unal-1 X                1YX'                    21
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tered. As the rate of growth will also rise due to the additional finan-
cial means, we get the following figure.
D,K,L,Q,Y
A
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--/         ':i ./.-.--<<., I.- ..-- *.- -./ ...-- - L.--
(-)    (-)      (1)    (1) j;'Y (1)
'D T
Ot
1,3   t3,4    t4,9    t9,11 11,12
t                           Z
Figure 6.5. Change    of the trajectory of figure    6.2    when   g
increases.
The government of several countries have introduced investment grants
mainly to increase employment by stimulating investments.  So,  it is
interesting to see whether employment will in fact increase when g
rises. From figure 6.5 can be concluded that, due to the higher growth
rate, employment rises more quickly in the first stage. But the reverse
of the medal is that the same higher growth rate makes earlier the
moment on which depth investments, and thus the decrease in employment,
*
will start  (note that  the output level Q21'  on which this process
starts, is not altered). After this period of depth investments, invest-
ment grants will influence employment in a positive way because of the
*
increase of  the growth rate  and of the  threshold values of Q and
*                                                          1 YX
Qix· So,  investment grants may have opposite influences. On the one
hand, they lower the cost of capital, there by freeing financial means
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to stimulate growth and to attain higher output levels. On the other
hand,  the decrease of the cost of capital stimulates firms to depth
investments and to push out labour, if there is an attractive way of
capital-intensive production available.
4.3. Abolishing investment grants.
The rates we have discussed in the previous two parts of this section
can be conceived as describing the influence of government on the policy
of the firm. The main difference between them is that the corporation
profit tax is a global instrumen.t, having a checking influence, while
investment grants are awarded to stimulate separate firms. One might
wonder what kind of influence should result from coupling both instrum-
ents by assuming,  for example,  that the government may decrease the
investment grant rate and uses the financial means saved to decrease the
corporation profit tax rate in order to decrease the specific character
of its policy. Verhoeven,  1982, found some figures that enable us to
link both instruments for the Dutch case. He calculated that, if the
government  should  fully  abolish  investment  grants,  the  corporation
profit tax rate should be decreased from 48% to 22,5%. This is an ex-
treme case of course, but is may clarify the combined effect of dimin-
ishing investment grants as well as corporation profit tax.
Consider the investment grant rate g and the corporation profit tax rate
f as variables. Then, we can derive from (10) that, before the station-
ary stage it holds that:
8 X = - (0- rY) Af + I Ag (24)
Abolishing investment grants and the above mentioned decrease of corpor-
ation profit tax imply:
Ag=-gand :Af=0,225 - 0,48=-0,255 (25)
From (24) and (25) we can derive that the above combination of gover-
nmental measures causes an acceleration of the growth of the firm if:
AX >0+ 0,255 (0 - rY) >g I (26)
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so, if investment grants received by the firm, gI, are less than 25*% of
profit before tax, 0 - rY.
*
We further know from the previous parts of this section that Q   is
21*
insensitive to changes of f and g and that Q will decrease when f
*             1Y
X
and/or g is falling. As far as Q is concerned, we can derive from (3)1X
that:
* 30 i - g(a+i) (27)




Abolishing investment grants, say at T = ta' will in(de)crease Q1X





Because of: f= 0,48 as long as T< ta, and: f= 0,225, g=0 when T>
ta, (28) implies:
if :i- g(i+a) )(<) _i_+ if :i >(<)    K a (29)
0,52 0,775 0,33 - g
The effect thus depends on the time preference rate of the shareholders
i, the investment grant rate g and the depreciation rate a. We present
the relationship by means of the following table.
average
grant% 16% 12%       8%        4%
lifetime
3 years 38,2% 23,2% 13,0% 5,6%
6 years 17,2% 10,4% 5,8% 2,5%
9 years 11,1% 6,7% 3,8% 1,6%
12 years 8,2% 5,0% 2,8% 1,2%
15 years 6,7% 3,9% 2,2% 0,9%
Table 6.2. Threshold values of i concerning the influence
of investment grants on final employment.
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In table 6.2 the critical i-values appear as a function of the lifetime
of the investment project and the average investment grant rate of the
relevant project. In this table we have transformed the relevant rates
of the continuous model into values of the discrete rates as used in
practice.3)
From table 6.2 can be concluded that abolishing investment grants will
increase profit and employment in the final stage of the optimal trajec-
tory of figure 6.2 for medium and long range investment projects # 6
years) that do not consist of investments that are granted at the maxim-
um  rate  (g <   0,12) .  Assume  that  we are dealing  with  such a project,  then
we can put all the above mentioned effects together as follows:
D,K,L,Q,Y
di
Q     (+)ix
))     Q
K
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Q21 - (0)
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Figure 6.6. Change of the trajectory of figure 6.2 when g=0
and f decreases.
3) Say i' is the discount rate used by the shareholders in % per year,
than:  ln(lti' )= i. Further:  a= -  ln(1  -                )1lifetime
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From figure 6.6 can be concluded that, if the government should abolish
investment grants in the Dutch case and should lower the profit tax
rate, then this should stimulate depth investment and consolidation in
younger firms having a high marginal return to sales, and should in-
crease the profit and employment level in mature firms, having a more
moderate marginal return to sales, supposed that equity and capital-
intensive production are cheap.
4.4. Financial parameters.
If we want to study changes in the time preference rate' i, the borrowing
rate k and/or the interest rate r, we should be aware of the causality
between changes of their values. A change of i and/or r may be caused by
autonomous changes in the market, and they may or may not influence the
value of k. But, if we conceive the value of k as an indicator of the
risk class to which the firm belongs (see chapter 2, section 8), then a
rise of k implies a switch to a class of firms with a higher degree of
risk and we can assume that thus a rise of k will cause a rise of r and
i. In this section we will study the relation last mentioned in more
detail.
From table 6.1 we can conclude that these simultaneous changes will not
*
influence the reallocation level Q and will lower the consolidation21*
level Q in figure 6.3.
1 YX
The influence of the change mentioned above in the values of the three
financial parameters on the expansion rate is not clear without anymore,
because of the contrary sign of the influence of a rise of the borrowing
rate k (+) and of the interest rate r (-). The relationship assumed
above can be presented as:
dr
r  =  r(k)  with  : -dk  >  0  and  :  i  =  i(k), so: (30)
3X 3X 3X 3 X 3r 3X
dX    =   3-2   dk    +   3-7    d r    +   3-i     d i    =   6-7   8-k    dk    +   6-7   d r
having the sign: { (-) x (t) x (t)}  + { (-) x (t)}  = -    (31)
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From (31) results that a rise of k and hence of r (and i) will lower the
expansion rate during the period that the firm is borrowing at the
maximum rate. After the consolidation period, k nor r appear in the X-
formula, so they do not longer influence the rate of growth. In fact,
during the consolidation period the firm changes to a less risky class,
which will decrease i and r. We skip this refinement here, but we refer
to the work of Senchak, 1975, mentioned already in section 8 of chapter
2 who introduced the interest rate as a function of the leverage factor.
As far as our trajectory is concerned, we assume that the rise of k will
only raise r and i during the fir6t four periods, till the consolidation
*
stage is finished. So the final output level Q will not be influenced.1X
Taking all in all, when k, r and i are rising we get a change of figure
6.3. as presented in figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7. Change of the trajectory of figure 6.2 when k, i
and r increase.
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The firm starts in figure 6.7 at a higher output level,  compared to
figure 6.2, due to the extended borrowing facility. Together with the
*
unchanged reallocation level Q this will shorten the first period.21
Opposite influence comes from the decreased expansion rate,  so the
length of the first period is undetermined. Also in the third period
contrary forces influence the length of the period: the decrease  of
*
the  consolidation level Q will shorten the period, while the decrea-1YX
sed expansion rate will extend the length of the period. In the consol-
idation stage, the amount of debt to be paid back is positively influen-*
ced by the  rise of the  value k, while  the fall of the value of Qiyx
has the  opposite effect. In the beginning of this stage, the increase
of X will be lower than in figure 6.3 due to the higher leverage level.
Finally, in the fifth stage, the length of the period is determined by**
the greater difference between the values of Q and Q
1 X      1 YX'
*
Although we could very well trace the changes in the Q -values due to a
rise of k, i and r, it still remains difficult to give a picture of the
change of the whole trajectory because of the decreasing growth of
equity. Anyhow, the firm starts at a higher output and employment level
and will start its consolidation at a lower output level. Due to the
fact that all debt has been paid back before the final stages are enter-
ed, and so the time preference rate has taken its value of figure 6.3
again,  final profit and employment levels remain unchanged. The de-
creased growth of equity up to the fourth period (so: in younger firms)
may be translated into a flatter change of employment and of output in
those stages.
4.5. Wage rate.
From table 6.1. we can conclude that a rise of the wage rate will lower
the output levels on which the firm starts its depth investments, its
redemption of debt money and its final output stage. This need not to
imply that the final stage will be attained earlier, for, the expansion
rate will decrease as well. This implies that in the case of a rise (or
fall) of the wage rate, the change of the length of any period is unde-
termined, unless we have more specific information about the values of
the parameters of the model. Anyhow, a rise of the wage rate will de-
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crease output and employment during the whole trajectory of the firm.
5. Summary.
An analytical solution of an optimal control model lends itself very
well to all kinds of (marginal) analysis. In this chapter we studied the
solution in more detail by means of three presentations.  First,  we
derived decision rules the firm has to apply in order to realize its
optimal policy. These decision rules relate to production, finance and
investment, the building blocks of our model. After that, we concerned
ourselves with the influence of ·several "environmental" parameters on
six distinct characteristics of the master trajectories. This influence
may cause changes in the shape of the relevant trajectory or it may
cause the firm to change to another master trajectory. Finally we stud-
ied the environmental influence through changes in the values of three
sets of parameters: the governmental parameters (corporation profit tax
rate and investment grant rate),  the financial parameters (borrowing
rate, interest rate and time preference rate of the shareholders) and,
at the end, a social parameter (the wage rate).
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS.
In this short concluding chapter, we will look back to the results of
the previous three chapters.  We have extended the tradition of the
dynamic micro-economic theory of the firm by introducing activity ana-
lysis and investment grants. Further, we have enriched economic analysis
by dealing more intensively with sensitivity analysis.
The analysis is conclusive on the optimal production, investment, finan-
cing and dividend policy of the firm. We will summarize the main results
in the following twelve statements:
1. If we assume that the sales-function and the properties of the pro-
duction activities are exogenously fixed, then the following factors
will determine the optimal trajectory of the firm during the planning
period:
a. the relationship between the total costs per unit output of the
two activities (ci 2 (2)' as far as the optimal production policy
is concerned,
b. the relationship between the prices of equity and debt (after
corporation profit tax) as far as the optimal financial policy is
concerned (i < (1-f)r),>
c. the size of the initial available amount of equity,  X(0),  and
equipment, K(0), as far as the stage is concerned at which the
firm starts on its trajectory.
2. When the price of debt is less than the price of equity, the firm
will always borrow at the maximum level on its optimal trajectory.
3. When the total cost per unit output of the capital-intensive activity
exceeds that of the labour-intensive one, the firm will never perform
the capital-intensive activity.
4. When the price of debt exceeds the price of equity,  the firm may
still be interested in borrowing. The output level must be so small
that marginal return on investment exceeds the price of debt.
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5. When the total cost per unit output of the labour-intensive activity
exceeds that of the capital-intensive one, it may still be profitable
to the firm to perform the labour-intensive activity. The output
level must be so small that the sales advantage per unit of a capital
good assigned to the labour-intensive activity, surpasses the total
cost disadvantage of the latter activity.
6. The firm may perform both available production activities at the same
time, but only during a transitory stage of depth investments on its
optimal trajectory.
7. Although the firm in our model only maximizes its value in favour of
the shareholders, it seems to act like it is pursuing different (sub)
goals during the successive stages of its trajectory.  So,  it may
start as a growth maximizer,  switching to cost minimization and,
after a second or even a third period of growth maximization, it may
end as a profit maximizer.
8. The optimal trajectories are based on three decision rules, concer-
ning production (choice of production activities), finance (choice of
the financial structure) and the distribution of the financial means
 between investments and dividend.
9.  The  influence of changes  of the parameter values  (i.e. : rates  of:
corporate profit tax, investment grants, time preference rate of the
shareholders,  borrowing,  interest  and  wage)  on  the  shape of  an
optimal trajectory is complicated. This influence can be subdivided
into impacts of these changes on:
a. the reallocation level: the output  level on which the firm
switches from labour-intensive to capital-intensive production,
b.  the final output level: the output level on which the firm stops
expanding its output and starts paying out dividend,
c.  the consolidation level:  the output  level on which the firm
starts switching from maximum debt financing to self-financing,
d.  the expansion rate:  the speed at which the amount of equity
increases,
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e.  the substitution effect: the choice of the production activity in
the final stage of a trajectory,
f.  the financial substitution effect:  the choice of the financial
structure in the final stage of a trajectory.
10. Under certain circumstances, as described in chapter 6, abolishing
investment grants combined with a decrease of the corporation profit
tax rate,  will stimulate depth investments  and consolidation in
younger firms and will raise profit and employment in mature firms.
11. Under the same circumstances, as mentioned under 10, extension of
the borrowing facilities, combined with an increase of the interest
rate and of the discount rate, will lower the increase of equity and
the output level on which the firm starts paying back debt, but will
not affect the final profit and employment level.
12. Under the circumstances, mentioned under 10., a decrease of the wage
rate will increase output and employment during the whole trajectory
of the firm.
Apart from these results, the study may be the basis for further exten-
sions. It should be interesting, for example, to study the allocation of
labour between firms operating on the same market, by introducing com-
petitors in the framework of a dynamic game, as is done in the more
limited advertising models by Levine & Th&pot, 1982. Another extension
that merits consideration, is the introduction of a time dependend sales
function, as published for example in: Lesourne & Leban, 1980, through
which the impact of business cycles on the allocation of labour and
capital can be studied. Further improvement of modelling the production
problem could be realized by introducing vintages of machines (Virmany,
1976) and switching costs. Next, one could replace the assumption of an
imperfect output market by the assumption of a perfect output market,
which implies fixing the selling price. Then, the model becomes a linear
optimal control model.  This kind of model can be solved by means of
linear programming (see: Krener, 1982), which opens the opportunity to
build more extensive, detailed models, having a greater value for prac-
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titioners. In this way, Vicker's bridge from micro-economics to business
economics could be pushed on. Also the dynamic interaction between the
firm's  development  and its  investors  seems  a valuable extension.  A
further refinement of the description of the tax systems, especially the
impact on the investor's income (see: Yla-Liedenpohja, 1978) will then
be necessary. Finally, the introduction of stochastic elements into such
aspects as financing, technical progress and demand may enrich the value
of the analysis, on the understanding that, in spite of the increased
complexity, an analytical analysis remains possible in the way we have
done in this thesis.
Many more ideas can be raised here. They all will confirm that the
underlying research is done in an area having many opportunities for




APPENDIX 1. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE.
1. Introduction.
This appendix is meant to be an informal introduction to the Maximum
Principle, in the tradition of Dorfman, 1969, and Ludwig, 1978, page
162.1  First, we will introduce some technical terms. After that the
optimality conditions will be presented in three steps. We start with a
description of the Maximum Principle in a more general form, together
with a discussion of the so called "Hamiltonian (function)" and the
"costate variables". Second we will study the impact of constraints on
the control variables and introduce a "dynamic Lagrangian (function)".
Finally, some ways will be presented in which constraints on the state
variables can be dealt with.
This appendix is called an informal introduction, because it concentra-
tes on the main ideas leading to the optimality conditions, without
bothering about  technical  issues  such as:  continuity,  shape of  the
relevant functions and constraints etc. But after the presentation of
the main points,  we will state the optimality conditions in a more
complete form.
2. Technical terms.
In this section we will use the Jorgenson model of chapter 3 to intro-
duce some technical terms. The problem reads:
Z
maximize : f e-iT{p.Q(K(T), L(T)) - w.L(T) - c.I(T)} dT   (1)
I, L       0
1) We refer to the following books for more mathematical, rigorous or
more detailed introductions with an economic background: Intriligator,
1971,  pp.  292-305  and pp.  344-369:  quite an easy  introduction but
without an explicit discussion of constraints on control and state
variables; Takayama, 1974, pp. 600-719: more rigorous, not dealing with
constraints on state variables; Sethi & Thompson, 1981: a comprehensive
tour through Optimal Control Land, paying much attention to published
applications; Kamien & Schwartz, 1981, pp. 11-250; a handsome step by
step introduction to the optimality conditions, dealing extensively with
constraints on the state variables.
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subject to :K- I(T) - a.K(T) (2)
In order to get a proper description of the problem, we have to add the
following constraints:
I    < I(T) < I (3)min max
K(T)   ) 0 (4)
K(0) = k (5)0
A description of the above problem in the jargon of Optimal Control
Theory can be given as follows (Sethi & Thompson, 1981, 2):
The system to be controlled is the firm. The state of the system is
measured by the state variable K. The value of this state variable is
controlled (directly or indirectly) by the control variables I(T) and
L(T). Given the value of the state variable K and the control variable
I, the state equation (or: system equation) (2) determines the instan-
taneous rate of change of the state variable. So, based on the initial
value K(0), fixed by the initial state condition (5), and the values of
I over the whole planning period (control history), we can integrate (2)
over time to get the state trajectory of the firm. The firm wants an in-
vestment and employment plan, maximizing the objective function (1). The
designer of this plan has to reckon with the laws of motion of the firm
as described in (2) and (5), with the state constraint (4) and with the
control constraints  (3).  Any  plan,  fulfilling  these constraints  is
called a feasible solution.
We shall now turn to the optimality conditions of the Maximum Principle.
To facilitate the more general presentation in this appendix, we will
now switch to a notation, quite different from the notation in the rest
of this work.
3. The Maximum Principle of Pontryagin.
At any date t, the firm has a specific state inherited from its past
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performance,  represented  by  the  state  vector x(t). This  vector  may
consist, for example,  of the amount of equity, the stock of capital
goods, the employment level, the goodwill etc. Based on this state the
firm makes decisions represented by the control vector u(t),  consis-
ting, for example, of investments, dividend pay out etc. These control
variables have their impact on the performance level of the firm (pro-
fit, sales, employment). This performance level is measured in terms
of a rate per unit of time, f (x(t),u(t),t) and a valuation of the final
state of the firm s(x(z),z).  We assume that the firm maximizes this
performance level over the planning period [O, z], so:
Z
maximize : V(x„ u, 0) = f fl(x(t), u(t), t)dt + s(x(z), z) (6)
-                     0
U
in which : x(t) : m dimensional vector of state variables.
x(0) = xO  : initial state (exogeneously given).
U(t) : n dimensional vector   of   control
variables.
-
u           : entire trajectory of control variables
over the planning period.
t            : time, 0<t<z.
s(x(z),  z) : (discounted) salvage value of the firm
at the end of the planning period.
Above that, the relevant controls influence the rate of change of the
state. This rate also depends on the present state and date:
xi = fi(x(t), u(t), t) ,i=i, ..., m (7)
For the time being we assume that the present state does not restrict
the decision possibilities of the firm.
-
Now, the problem is to select a decision history U (i.e.: the policy of
the firm during the planning period), that maximizes the result V, assu-
med that the firm initially is in the state xl. The complexity is caused
by the twofold effect of a decision history: an immediate effect on the
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result through f  and a carry-over effect through its i
mpact on the
state of the firm and thus on future results. The Maximum Principle
handles this problem by reducing the optimization over the whole plan-
ning period to the (sub) optimization over successive short time inter-
vals.
More specifically, to explain the Maximum Principle we must study the
problem for an arbitrary short time interval within the planning period,
say  [t,  t-la t]. Within this interval,   the firm cannot change its control
history u(t). The performance level that can be reached by the firm from
t onwards, may then be described by:
Z
V(x,u,t) = fQ(x(t),u(t),t).8 + f   f,(x(T),u(T),r)dr + s(x(z),z)t·+21 t
(8)
The first part of the right hand side represents the immediate effect,
the second part is the same function as in (6), but starting at ttit.
We are now going to study the decision problem of the firm in the inter-
val  [t,  t-+A t],    assuming  that  the  firm  will  act  in an optimal way after
*
that  period.  Therefore we  introduce  the symbol V , representing  the
performance level  if the firm carries out the best policy.  Thus at
date t we may write:
*                              -
V (x(t),t) = maximum V(x(t),u,t) (9)
-
U
Assume  that  the firm realizes  this best policy  from  t-Id t  on.  The  perfor-
mance of (8), then turns into:
*
W(x(t),u(t),t) = fl(x(t),u(t),t). A+V (x(t-la t), t-lat) (10)
The policy of the firm over the interval  [t,t-16 tl  is thus optimal if:
*
t-Id t




+ V*(x(t-Itt), t-la t)} (11)
The  reduction of  the overall optimization problem to an incremental
optimization is now presented in (8), (10) and (11), assuming that these
equations hold for all t, 0<t< z. The relevant optimiz
ation problem
has  two  aspects:  the  choice  of  the control u(t) and the  (indirect)
choice of the state x(t).
In order to derive from (8), (10) and (11) the three optimality condi-
tions of the Maximum Principle to be discussed in this Bection, we will
first introduce the function 41(t),  to denote the marginal contribution
of the state variable xi(t) to the performance level under the optimal
policy, and the symbol *(t) to denote the m dimensional vector of values
of *i at date t, so:
3 * (12)*(t) := - V (X(t),t)3x
From (11) and (12) can be derived, that the optimal value of the control
*
history u , has to fulfill the so-called "Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman
equation":
m
maximum { fl(x (t),u(t),t) + I  *i(t) fi(x*(t),u(t),t) +
i=1
U(t)
+L V*(x*(t),t)} = 0 for each t, 0< t< z. (13)3t
(see, for example, Bryson & Ho, 1969, 131-135, Sethi & Thompson, 1981,*
27-29).  Because 3 V  /3 t  does not depend  on  u,   the same optimal value  of
the control results from:
maximize H(x (t),u(t), 4 (t),t)
U(t)
m
*                                  *
:= fl(x (t),u(t),t) + I  *i(t)fi(x (t),u(t),t
i=1
for  each  t,   0  <   t  < z (14)
122
In order to understand the meaning of (14), we have to go back to (10
)
and (11) and see how the application of u(t) influences the value of the
performance level, V (x(t),t), in two ways. The first way of influencing
concerns the instantaneous, direct influence of the application of u on
V*. This contribution can be formulated as:
fl(x*(t),u(t),t).At (15)
The second way in which V  will be influenced is an indirect one, and is
caused    by the change    of the state variable    at   t.+At,  8 x,   due    to    the




in which : Ax = At.x(t) = At.fi(x (t),u(t),t) (16)
Adding (15) and (16) results in the total influence on the performance
level of the application of the control u(t) during a short interval
[t,t-lat]:
{fl(x*(t),u(t),t) + %*i(t) fi(x*(t),u(t),t)} .At
*
= H(x (t),u(t),*(t),t).At (17)
From (17) and (13) we can derive that the value of the function H in
(14) represents an approximation of the performance stream during a very
small period of time. It is a function of the control vector u(t). The
optimal adjustment  of  the  state variables  is  implicitly considered
through the vector * (t). The function  H is called "Hamiltonian function"
and derives its name from the Irish physicist and mathematician William
R. Hamilton, 1806-1865. The "marginal values" of the state variables
*i(t), discussed before as "marginal contributions to the performance
level", are called: "costate variables".
Related to condition (14), a second optimality condition can be derived
from  (13), by considering x(t) instead  of  u(t) as argument  to  be  fixed
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on its optimal value  (see also: Bensoussan  e.a.,   1974,
17). Suppose
small perturbations of the state variables aroun
d the optimal value
x (t) on a fixed point of time t. If we keep t
he control history on its
optimal value u , then for x - x*(t) the followi
ng first order condition
has to hold in order to satisfy (13):
3,* 3** (18)
ax tH(x (t), u*(t), *(t)) +TE v (x (t),t)1 - 0
This leads to the so called "Euler-Lagrange equation":
3 f   m   3f3 H    0         i
-   * 1    -   Txj    =   a-xj         ill   *i   i.xj     ,     j    -
1 ..., m
(19)
i = 1, ..., m
(see: Sethi & Thompson, 1981, 29-31. Bryson & Ho, 1964, 138, derived
(19) in a different way). This equation asserts that, in the case of the
optimal policy of the firm, the marginal value of the state decreases at
a rate proportional to its direct contribution to the performance level
plus its more lasting contribution through the increase of (the value
of) the state. In other words: the state loses value or depreciates as
time passes, at the rate at which its potential contribution to the
performance level becomes  its past contribution (Dorfman,   1969,  821).
The  relevant  contribution may have  a negative value,  such as,  for
example, the contribution of debt money in Ludwig's model of chapter 3.
A third optimality condition to be dealt with in this section concerns a
special case: the marginal contribution of the state at the end of the
planning period: 4(z). From (6), (9) and (12) we can derive that:
Z
11,(z) - 9'2 v*(x*(z),z) = a-x { J fo(x*(t),u*(t),t)dt+8(x*(z),z)} +Z
3* (20)11,(z) =TE S(X (Z),Z)
This condition is called "transversality condition". It states that the
marginal contribution only consists of the discounted marginal salvage
value. For, at the final time point of the planning period, t = z, the
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state cannot generate a performance stream that still i
ncreases the
performance level within the planning period.
Taking the final value *i(z) from (20) and integrating (19) results in
another expression  of * i(t)   :
33H 3* (21)
*  i (t) =Jts-xi
dt t- s(x (z),z) ,i=1 ..., m3x
i
So,  in the optimal solution,  the marginal value of a state variable
(capital good, equity, goodwill) equals its total future marginal con-
tribution  to  the  performance  level,  including its marginal salvage
value.
The transition from the overall approach of (6)  to the incremental
approach of (11) has changed the dynamic optimization problem into an
infinite number of static optimization problems, coupled through (19)
and (20).
These are the main results of the Maximum Principle to be discussed in
this section. We will now summarize them, and add some mathematical
details about  sufficiency  conditions  and uniqueness  of  the optimal




V(xl,5,0) = f  fl(x(T),u(T),T)dr + s(x(z),z)    (22)-
U
subject to : xi = fi(x(t),u(t),t) (23)
X (0) = X , i = 1, ..., m (24)i       io
in which : t : time, 0< t<z
z    : planning horizon (fixed)
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u(t) : n  dimensional  vector  of  control  variables,
piecewise continuous.  So, a finite number of
jumps in the control variables is allowed for.
Further we assume:
u(t) EU,U a given set in Rn (25)
-
u    : control history over the whole planning period
x(t) : n dimensional vector of state variables
x    : exogenously fixed initial state of the firm
f () : instantaneous performance stream, continuously
differentiable in (x,u,t)
fiC) : rate of change of state variable xi, contin-
uously differentiable in (x,u,t)





H(x,u,4, t) = fO(x,u,t) + E *i.fi(x,u,t) (26)
i=1
*
then, for an optimal history u (t) of the above problem 1 and the resul-
*
ting state trajectory x (t), it is necessary that there is a continuous,
non zero vector function *(t) = (*1(t), ..., 1 'm(t)) such that:
**
Hoptimal := {H(x (t),u (t),*(t),t}
*
= maximum { H(x (t),u(t),p (t),t)}
U(t)
for  eacht,0 <   t  < z (27)
*
and, except at points of discontinuity of U (t), that:
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* *
*i(t) = -  x  H(x (t),u (t), *(t),t)  ,i-1,  ..., 0          (28)
*
*i(z) - ax  8(X (z),z) , i = 1, ..., m (29)
i
The above conditions are necessary but not sufficient for an optimal
solution.  The  Norwegians  Seierstad  and  Sydsaeter  published  several
formulations of sufficiency conditions for different optimal control
problems  (Seierstad &  Sydsaeter,  1977).  For the above problem they




Suppose (x (t),u (t)) is a feasible solution of problem 1, satisfying
the conditions of theorem 1. Then this solution is optimal to problem 1
if : H as defined in (27), is concave in x, x € Rn, or:
optimal'
if  : the Hamiltonian, as defined  in  (24), is jointly concave  in  x and u,
and U, as defined  in  (23), is convex,  for all x  and  u E {U x  R  .
Finally, we borrow from Van Long & Vousden the following uniqueness
theorem (Van Long & Vousden,  1977,  30) :
Theorem 3. (uniqueness)
* *
Let (x (t),u (t)) be an optimal solution to problem 1, satisfying suf-
ficiency theorem 2. If H is strictly concave in x, than any other
optimal **    *
optimal solution (x(t),u(t)) 0 (x (t),u (t)) must satisfy x(t) = x (t).
4. Mixed control constraints.
In the former section we only dealt implicitly with a feasible region of
the control variables u (t). These controls must lie in some set U,
being the entire n dimensional Euclidian space or a proper subset of it.
In this section we will specify this region more precisely and we will
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study the consequences for the optimality conditions. In fact, we intro-
duce the assumption that the decisions of the firm are limited in absol-
ute terms or by the actual state of the firm. For example: the produc-
tion level is non-negative and may be restricted by the amount of avail-
able machinery, or: the amount of loans that can be attracted is limited
by the size of equity:
Q ) 0 and Q = QCK(t),L(t),t)                                (30)
kX(t) - Y(t) 2 0
with state variables    : K (amount of machinery)  and X (amount
of equity),
control variables: L (employment  level),  Y  (amount  of
debt),
k  : maximum borrowing rate
Q(): production function
t  : time.
More generally:
gk(x(t),u(t),t) ) 0, k = 1, ..., r (31)
in which the functions gk are assumed to be continuously differentiable
in (x,u,t) space. Further we assume that each function Zk contains at
least one control variable u as an argument.j
In order to study the impact of this kind of restrictions on the optimal
policy of the firm, we return to the incremental decision problem as
presented in (8) through (11) and (14). We have to change the definition
*
in (9) of the performance level of the best overall policy, V  into:
V(x(t),t) = maximum V(x(t),u,t)
I.
U
for all Z with values u(t) satisfying:
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gk(x(t),u(t),t) ) 0, k = 1, ..., r                           (32)
The incremental description of the optimal policy in (14) now changes
into:
*
maximize   : H(x (t),u(t),4(t),t) for each t, 0<t<z
U(t)
*
subject to : gk(x (t),u(t),t) ) 0 (33)
*
Note  that x (t) has a fixed value  and *(t) is a given vector valued
function of u(t) if t is fixed.  So,  the available policies u(t) are
limited by the actual state of the firm. The optimization problem is
thus transformed into an infinite number of constrained optimization
problems of the form:
maximize : Z(U(t),t) for each t, 0<t<z
U(t)
subject to : zk(u(t),t) )0,k=1 ,..., r                  (34)
The  solutions  of  these  problems,  together  constituting  the optimal
control history over the whole planning period, are derived through the
well-known Method of Lagrange Multipliers (see for instance: Intriliga-
tor, 1971, 28, Takayama, 1974, 373). For each restriction, we introduce
a Lagrange multiplier Ak(t) , representing its "shadow price". That is
the impact of a marginal relaxation of the restriction on the instan-
**
taneous increase of the performance stream at date t, H(x (t), u (t),t).
The shadow price will be zero if the relevant restriction is not binding
in the optimal solution, because the relaxation of such a restriction
will not yield a better performance:
**
Ak(t).gk(x (t), u (t),t) = 0 (35)
Shadow prices can only be non-negative because relaxation of restric-
tions cannot lead to a fall of the maximum performance level:
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A (t) I 0 (36)k
In the optimal situation, the marginal contribution of the j-th control
variable equals its marginal costs. These costs are the units of capa-
city of the relevant restrictions, needed to realise a marginal rise of
the control variable, weighed by the relevant shadow prices:
r *
 ; H(u*(t),t) = -I  Ak(t) a.iII gk(u (t),t)                    (37)k=1
The restrictions on the control variables also have an impact on the
optimal state trajectories and so on the conditions, coupling the above
subproblems (34). From (19) we know that in the optimal solution the
depreciation rate of the state equals its contribution to the performan-
ce level.  This contribution consisted of two parts, an instantaneous
increase of the performance level and an increase of the state valued by
the costate variables  * i(t), representing future performance streams.
Now, we have to add a third term. For, changes in the state variables
cause changes in the feasible control region, due to the assumption in
(31)  that boundaries depend on the actual state of the firm. In the
optimal solution we may value these changes through the above introduced
shadow prices Ak(t).  So, (19) turns  into:
·     3 H r agk  4=,
i 3x k  3 x ' 1, ...,-*(t)=-  +    E     X    (t) -       .                            mi k=1  i
**
in which : gk = gk(x (t),u (t),t) (38)
As stated, (35) through (38) are based on the Method of Lagrange Multi-
pliers used in constrained programming problems. We can simplify the
notation of (37) and (38) by introducing the Lagrangian function (or:
"extended Hamiltonian"):
L(x,u,$,1,t) := H(x(t),u(t),4(t),t) +
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r
+ I Ak(t).gk(x(t),u(t),t) (39)
k=1
So (37) and (38) may be rewritten as:
3L
(40)
_ 1 i(t) = Tx 
'i=1, ..., m
1.L  = O j = 1, ..., n (41)3u
j
Integration of (40)  backwards,  starting from the obviously unchanged
tragsversality condition (20), results  in  the new version of  (21):
Z
*i(t) = <  dt + ex  s(x (z),z) ,i-1, ..., m             (42)
In the optimal solution, the marginal value of the state variable equals
its total future marginal contribution to the performance level plus its
valued contribution to relieve (or restrict) the decision possibilities
of the firm.
From (35) and (39) can be concluded that the value of the Lagrangian
equals the value of the Hamiltonian. But, the difference comes up as
soon as we start studying the influence of control and state variables
through the relevant partial derivatives. Then the derivatives of the
Lagrangian appear to contain the impact of changes in the boundaries of
the control region on the instantaneous optimal performance H.




maximize : V(xl,U,0) = f fl(x(t),u(·r),T)dr + s(x(z),z) (43)




xi = fi(x(t),u(t),t) ,i=1, ...,
m (44)




in which all the above variables and functions have the same
characteristics as in problem 1 and further: gk() is continuous-
ly differentiable in (x,u).
Theorem 4. (necessity)
Let the Hamiltonian be:
m
H(x,u,$,t) = fl(x,u,t) + I *i.fi(x,u,t) (47)
i=1
and define the Lagrangian:
r
L(x,u,*,A,t) = H(x,u,4,t) + I Ak(t).gk(x,u,t) (48)
k=1
*
then, for an optimal control history u (t) of the above problem 2 and
*
the resulting state trajectory x (t) to be optimal, it is necessary that
there are functions *(t) = (01(t), ..., *m(t)) and A(t) = (Al(t), ...,
Ar(t)) ) 0, in which *(t) is continuous and *(t) and A (t) are piecewise
continuous, such that:
H        := H(x (t),u (t),$(t),t)
optimal
= maximum H(x (t),u(t),*(t),t)
U(t)
for  each   t,   0  <    t  < z (49)
*
and,  except at points of discontinuity of u  (t)  and A (t),  that:
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;i(t) = _ i L(x (t),u (t),0(t),A (t),t) ,i-1, ..., m    (50)
 u  L(x (t),u*(t),0 (t), A (t), t) =O
'j=1 , ..., n    (51)
**
Ak(t).gk(x (t),u (t),t) = 0 , k = 1, ..., r (52)
*i(z) =  x  s(x*(z),z)
(53)
The above conditions are necessary for the optimal solution. The follow-




Suppose (x (t),u (t)) is a feasible solution of problem 2, satisfying
the conditions of Theorem 4. Then this solution is optimal to problem 2
if  H(x, uA,t) as defined  in  (26) is concave  in  (x, u) and gk(x,u,t)  is
quasi concave in (x, u).
In the second sufficiency theorem,  to be presented here,  the above
mentioned concavity requirement on the Hamiltonian is relaxed and the
quasi-concavity of gk is not assumed but the functions gk must satisfy a
"constraint qualification", guaranteeing a well shaped feasible region
without so called "cusp points":
Constraint qualification.
**
Let Z(t) = {z : gz(x (t),u (t),t) = 0} be the set of indices of active
constraints. In this case the constraint qualification is satisfied if
the number of indices of Z(t) equals the rank of the
matrix {  ir (gz(x*(t),u*(t),t)} with :z€ Z(t) and :
j
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j = 1, ..., n (54)
This condition asserts that the number of active constraints is less
than or equal to the number of control variables, although the total
number of constraints may exceed the number of control variables. An
extensive discussion of the constraint qualification can be found in
Takayama (1974), pag. 86-108. Further we have to define:
A(t) := {x : g(x,u,t) ) 0 for some u} (55)
Theorem 6. (sufficiency)
**
Suppose (x (t),u (t)) is a feasible solution of problem 2,  satisfying
the conditions of theorem 4 and the constraint qualification (54). In
this case, the solution is optimal to problem 2 if:
A(t) is convex, and:
H         defined in (49), is a concave function of x on A(t).
optimal'
The following uniqueness theorems stem from Van Long & Vousden, 1977,
page 30 and Seierstad & Sydsaeter, 1975, page 376:
Theorem 7. (uniqueness)
**
Let (x (t),u (t)) be an optimal solution of problem 2, satisfying suf-
ficiency theorems 5 and/or 6, then this solution is the only optimal one
if L, as defined in (48), fulfills:
23L
2 < 0 (Seierstad & Sydsaeter).
3u
If H is strictly concave in x, then any other optimal solution
optimal
*  *
(x, u) 0 (x ,u )must satisfy x(t) = x*(t). (Van Long & Vousden).
5. State constraints.
The interpretation of the Maximum Principle in section 3 can be found in
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several publications on applications of the Maximum Principle to econom-
ic theory. Amplifications when control constraints are introduced, are
not explicitly dealt with.  But often the reader is referred to the
interpretation of Lagrange multipliers in static constrained optimiza-
tion problems, which implies omitting the interpretation of the real
dynamic formula (38). In the case of state constraints, we found nowhere
any attempt to give an interpretation. So we have to steer with the help
of our own compass.
Apparently there are three   ways.of def ining the relevant optimality
conditions.  The definitions with the easiest interpretation will be
presented first. It has discontinuous costate variables, a fact that is
difficult for solution procedures. The definition with the nicest tech-
nical characteristics will be presented last,  because it has a less
obvious interpretation of the Hamiltonian. This definition will be used
to solve the relevant models in this book. The remaining method will be
used as an intermediate one, facilitating the interpretation of the last
way of defining the optimality conditions.
We drop the control constraints as discussed in the former section for a
while and concentrate on dealing with state constraints only. So, con-
sider the problem:
maximize   :   f (x,u,t) dt + s(x(z),z)                      (56)
subject to : xi = fi(x, u,t), i = 1, ..., m (57)
h£(x,t) 2 0,1=1, ..., s                     (58)
X (0) = X (59)i       10
The first method deals with the constraints of (58) in the same way as
with  the control constraints  (31)  by introducing dynamic Lagrangian
parameters,  say v(t), and defining the optimality conditions in the
usual way (we drop obvious arguments) :
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Form the Hamiltonian of the above problem:
H(x,u'*,t) = fo + I *ifi (60)
i
and the Lagrangian:
L(x,u,111,11,t) = H +E 111(t).h (61)2 Z
Then, necessary conditions to an optimal solution are:
3L
111 i  =  - Txi (62)
3L
3-u  = 0 (63)
j
P .h  = 0 (64)£   1
U )0 (65)£
3s
*i(z) = axi (66)
i=l, . . . ,m i j=1, . . . ,n; £ =1, ..., s.
The interpretation of the dynamic Lagrangian multipliers of the condit-
ions (62) through (66) is the same as in the former section. So, the
extension of the problem by introduction of state constraints seems to
give no new difficulties. But, this is only true in the case where the
first total derivative of the state constraints, dh/dx, contains one or
more control variables. Then the system can be steered by means of the
controls in such a way as to approach or to leave the boundaries in an
arbitrarily smoothed way. If the first total derivative of any state
constraint does not contain a control variable, which is the case in our
models, then we get discontinuities in the costate variables. The less
controllable motion of the system may cause bumps against the state
constraint boundaries at certain points in time, say t . The decreasing
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marginal value of the state, as described for an "non bumping" case in
(19) and (38), will then depend on the instantaneous restricting state
constraint(s)   only.   If we denote  by B p l (t ): the marginal  harm  to  the
instantaneous performance level due to the state constraint h  on time
t , then the next conditions have to be added to the above conditions:
P
s     3h
*i(tp-) _ *i(tp+) = 111 Bp 1 53                                    (67)
B   .h  = 0 (68)
pt t
B )0 (69)P£
0  <  t     <   . . .   <  t    <   z   : discontinuity points  of *i (70)P           V
-+
In which t and t are the left- an right-hand side limit of t . Equa-PP  p
tion  (62)  now only holds at moments when * i exists  and  (63) only applies
when u are continuous.
j
Although the above formulation is easy to interpret, the discontinuity
of * i  is a nasty characteristic  when  one is looking for solution proce-
dures.  In this book, we will use another formulation published in:
Russak,  1970.  In order to understand the main ideas, we will first
present another formulation used,  for example,  by Arrow and Kurz to
handle  (non negativity) constraints on the state variables (Arrow &
Kurz, 1970, 41). In the relevant formulation, the state constraints (58)
are replaced by:
0£(x,u,t) ) 0 whenever h£ (x,t) = 0 (71)
dh 3h 3 h .
0 -1=-It_Lx (72)1   dt 3t 3x
Transgressing boundaries is thus prevented by requiring a move along or
away from the boundary when the system is on the relevant boundary. The
state constraint is therefore replaced by a control contraint. If the
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first derivative to time has no control variable as an argument, then
one has to take the derivative of the smallest degree that has a control
variable as an argument. We suppose furthermore that the first derivat-
ive is a function of u.
We can apply the optimality conditions of the former section to the
problem (56), (57), (59), (71), (72):
Let the Hamiltonian and the Langrangian be:
H(x,u,0-,t) = fl + I *i·fi (73)
i
L(x,u,4,0-,t) - H +I #£(t)032 (74)
£
Then, necessary conditions to an optimal solution are:
1 3L
(75)4 =-a-x
81 = O (76)
3u
11£ (t).0£  =  0  when h£  " 0 (77)
"(t) 1 0 (78)





The link between the auxiliary variables of the conditions (62)-(66) and
of (73)-(80) is that:
4 ./ + 6111 (81)3x
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1 1= -V (82)
The transformation of the state constraint into a control constraint
yielded a dynamic Lagrangian parameter B from which we have additional
information through (79). But still, 4 is discontinuous. This is solved
in the third formulation to be discussed here by defining 9 in such a
way that (Seierstad & Sydsaeter, 1975, 388):
p£(tp-) -111(tp+)=Bpz '1 = 1, ..., s ;p= 1, ..., v.  (83)
with   the same conditions as stated   in (67) through   (70).   Then *,  as
defined  in (79), becomes continuous  on all discontinuity points  of * .
Abov.e that, according to Seierstad & Sydsaeter, it can be proved that
the above formulation (73)  - (80),  (83), yields the same results as
defining the Hamiltonian as:
= == = =
H(x,u,4,11,t) = fl + I *i'fi + E 11£41 (84)i i
This is the formulation presented in: Russak, 1970. Note that the Hamil-
tonian in (84) has not the same meaning as the preceding Hamiltonians.
The latter are formulations of the instantaneous performance flow only,
while to the former some valuation of the boundaries of the state space
has been added.
In order to avoid overlap, we will now present the theorems concerning




maximize : V(xl,u,0) = f f (x(T),u(r),T) dr + s(x(z),z)   (85)-                    0
U
subject to : xi    = fi(x(t),u(t),t): state equations (86)
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gk(x(t),u(t),t) 7
0 : control constraints (87)
hz(x(t),t) ) 0 : state constraints (88)
xi(0) =
x : initial state constraints (89)
i0
i=l,...,m;j=1,..., 4 k=l,...,r;£=1,...,s
x    : continuous
i
u    : piecewise continuous
f ( ),  fiC ),gk( ),hz ( ),  and s( )  : all continuously differentiable
in their own arguments.
t      : time, 0<t<z
z     : planning horizon (fixed)
-
u     : control history over the whole planning period
x Q   : exogeneously fixed initial state of the firm
The following theorems are derived from Russak, 1974, Seierstad & Syd-
saeter, 1977, and: Van Long & Vousden, 1977. The non negativity of the
functions u and the concerning transversality conditions are derived in:
Peter Janssen, 1980, at that time working at the Technical University of
Eindhoven with Prof. Hautus. In Russak, 1976, a "reversed" characteriza-
tion of u is derived.
Theorem 8. (necessity)
Let the Hamiltonian be:
m s
H(x,u,tl„11 't) = fl + I  ti(t).fi + E 9£(t).01 (90)
i=1 £=1
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and the Lagrangian be defined as:
r




(92)0£(X,U,t) := dt=ST-+ax  f(x,u,t)
and suppose each 02. contains at least one control variable as an argum-*
ent. Then, for an optimal control history u (t) of the above problem 3
*
and·the resulting state trajectory x (t) to be optimal, it is necessary
that the constraint qualification (54) holds and that there are func-
tions *(t) = (41(t), ..., *m(t)), A(t) = (Al(t), ..., Ar(t)) and u (t) =
C  1(t), ,-I, 118(t)) such that:
**
H       := H(x (t),u (t),4(t),1(t),t)
optimal
= maximum {H(x (t),u(t)&(t),A(t),t)}
U(t)
for  each   t,   0  <    t  c z (93)
*
and, except at points of discontinuity of u (t) :
*  *
*i(t) - _   ; L(x ,u ,$,11 *,t)
: costate equations             (94)
3          **
au       L(x    'u    ,$,11,A .t) : first order conditions (95)
j
*  *
Ak(t).gk(x ,u ,t) = 0 : complementary slackness
conditions (96)
*
pz.h£(x    ,t)    = 0 : complementary slackness
conditions (97)
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0 4 0 (98)
£
Ak(t), 1'£(t) ) 0 : non negativity restrictions
(99)
*
*i(z) =  i s(x (z),z)
: transversality conditions (100)
*
1'1(z).h (x (z),z) : transversality conditions (101)
Further it must hold that:
*(t) : continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives
*(t)  and A (t) : continuous on intervals of continuity of u(t)
p (t) : continuous on intervals of continuity of u and
when 0 (x,u,t) is discontinuous.
More over, on points of discontinuity of u, say t , it holds that
P
l i t  (t p- )     -    l i z  (t p t)    =   B p 1
(102)
B   .h  = 0 (103)pl t




Suppose (x (t),u (t)) is a feasible solution of problem 3, satisfying
the conditions of theorem 8. Then this solution is optimal to problem 3
if A(t), as defined in (55), is convex and H . as defined in (93),
optimal'




Let  (x  (t),u  (t))  be an optimal solution of problem 3, satisfying  suf-
ficiency theorem 9, then this is the only optimal solution if L, as




If H is strictly concave  in  x  on  A(t),   then any other optimaloptimal * *          *
solution (x,u) 0 (x ,u ) must satisfy x(t) = x (t).
6. Summary.
After the introduction of  some technical terms,  by which the main
features of optimal control models are usually described, the optimality
conditions of a non-constrained optimal control problem are presented,
based on an incremental approach. The meaning of the Hamiltonian and the
costate variables is dealt with. At the end of this section, sufficiency
and uniqueness conditions are added. In the next section, constraints on
control variables are introduced. The Hamiltonian function is extended
to a dynamic Lagrangian function and the meaning of dynamic Lagrangian
multipliers is discussed. This section, too, ends with a statement of
the relevant sufficiency and uniqueness conditions. Finally, the impact
of constraints on the state variables are discussed.  The reader is
ushered into the optimality conditions as defined by Russak (1970).
These optimality conditions have nice (continuity) properties which make
them superior to other formulations. The optimality conditions of the
general problem,  containing control  and state constraints,  and the
relevant sufficiency and uniqueness conditions conclude this appendix.
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APPENDIX 2. SOLUTIONS OF THE MODELS OF CHAPTER 3.
1. Introduction.
The Maximum Principle, as presented in the preceding appendix, results
in a set of conditions to be fulfilled by the optimal solution of an
optimal control model, but not in the optimal solution itself. In order
to find the optimal solution, we have to solve the system of optimality
conditions. The usual procedure to solve is a tryal and error procedure.
In this and the next appendix, we will use a systematic way of searching
for optimal solutions. The procedure has been developed to reduce the
heuristics of the solution stage as much as possible. Having developed
this procedure, we could shorten solving time substantially and, more
over, it enabled us to solve more complex models such as that of chapter
4.
This procedure may have a more general applicability. Therefore we will
present  its  principles  first,  before applying  it  to  the models  of
chapter 3.
2. A general solution procedure.
To facilitate the discussion, we will first dwell upon the nature of an
optimal solution. The firm, which is the system to be controlled in this
book, must be guided in such a way as to maximize some performance level
without violating fixed restrictions. The set of active restrictions may
change over time, due to changes in the shapes of the restrictions and
due to changes in the optimal policy of the firm. Now, conceive the
development of the firm over time as a succession of stages that can be
distinguished from each other by differences in the set of active con-
straints. With this idea as basis, we will first derive which stages
(called: paths) are feasible and what are the (distinguishing) features
of each of them (see figure A2.1 on the next page). After that we will
string them to complete patterns, and these strings are the very optimal
solutions  of  the model.  The systematic way in which to deal with
stringing paths is the new feature of our solution procedure.
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enumerate all combinations of zero
and non-zero valued  A k  and  1;£  .
select "feasible paths".
select "final paths".
select, say, path j and
is no remove it from "final paths",
"feasible paths" consider path j as a new set,
empty? set g = 1.
4
yes name the last mentioned set:
"g-staged strings of final path j".
Izil
select those strings that fulfill
the initial state constraints
and the sufficiency conditions,
present them as: "optimal solutions".
A
form all combinations of a g-staged
string of final path j and a feasible
preceding path.
 e there  yes
<  such feasible   '>- set g=g t 1.-
 binations 
n1
Figure A2.1. Scheme of the solution procedure.
We go back to appendix 1 in order to point out how to distinguish
between paths. Because we are looking for optimal control patterns, we
are mainly interested in studying changes in the set of active con-
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straints. From the complementary slackness conditions (96) and (97) in
appendix 1 we can derive a way of describing distinct paths through
their  sets of zero-valued and positive valued lagrangian parameters  Ak'
and of zero-valued or negative derivatives of the auxiliary variables
PE .
Positive respectively negative values indicate  that the concerning
restrictions are active. The first stage of the solution procedure, i.e.
finding feasible paths and their characteristics, consists of enumera-
ting all combinations of zero and non-zero-valued lagrangian parameters
and derivatives of the auxiliary variables, and deriving characteristics
for each combination as such. Some combinations can be left out without
much study (for example: a control variable cannot be on an upper boun-
dary and at the same time on a lower boundary if these boundaries have
different values, so the relevant lagrangian parameters cannot be posit-
ive at the same time. Thus, all combinations in which both parameters
are positive can be left out). Other combinations appear to be infea-
sible only after the derivation of its characteristics. This analysis
thus yields a set of feasible paths and information about the character-
istics of the distinct paths.
The second stage of the solution procedure is the coupling of paths to
strings, covering the optimal policy of the firm over the whole planning
period. This is done by starting at the time horizon z, and going back-
wards in time. Based on the transversality conditions (100) and (101) of
appendix 1 we can select those paths that may be final paths, i.e. paths
feasible at T = z. For each such final path we will then select feasible
preceding paths. Therefore we test for each path whether coupling with
the relevant final path will or will not violate the (necessary) contin-
uity properties of the state variables and the auxiliary variables *i'
A k and Ut as
prescribed by Theorem 8 of appendix  1.  In this testing
procedure we will often use characteristics as derived in the former
stage of the solution procedure.
If the set of feasible preceding paths appears to be empty, then the
relevant final paths are descriptions of the optimal policy of the firm
for the whole planning period, supposing they fulfill the initial state
constraints (89) and the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 9 in appendix
1.
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If the set of feasible preceding paths is not empty, we apply the tes-
ting procedure for feasible preceding paths again to each of them.
Depending on when the set of feasible preceding paths becomes empty, we
may have to apply the testing procedure again, in this way finding a
still longer string of paths, constituting an optimal policy pattern.
3. The model of Jorgenson.
Jorgenson solved his model by means of the Calculus of Variations, a
technique closely related to the 'Maximum Principle. The main advantage
of the Maximum Principle over the Calculus of Variations is that it is
more suitable to handle constraints on control and state variables.
To get a solution of the model by means of the Maximum Principle, we
introduce (artificial) boundaries on the variables I: I (< 0) andmin
Imax (> 0)0 We assume
I to be very small and I to be very large,
min max
so as to describe a nearly instantaneous adjustment of K in:
K=I-a K when I=I o r I=I (1)min max
Furthermore we improve the model by introducing a non-negativity con-
straint and an initial constraint on K. So we get:
00
,  -iT
maximize  j e { p.Q(K(T),L(T)) - w.L(T)  - c.I(T)} dT (2)
I, L     0
subject to K = I(T) - a.K(T) (3)
I         <    I( T)  < I (4)min max
K(T)  ) 0 (5)
K(0) = ko
(6)
In the above problem, constraints (4) are control constraints and (5) is
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a state constraint, so Theorems 8 through 10 of appendix 1 apply to this
problem. An exception must be made for the transversality condition,
because Jorgenson supposes an infinite time horizon, whereas we deal
with finite time horizons in the preceding appendix.  As the costate
variable represents the marginal contribution of the state to the per-
formance function,  one can imagine that the transversality condition
(100) of appendix 1 changes into:
lim *(T) = 0 (7)
T +Co
For a more detailed discussion of the infinite horizon problem we refer
to Sethi & Thompson, 1981, page 85 and Seierstad & Sydsaeter, 1976, page
383. Dropping obvious arguments, we can write:
Let the Hamiltonian be:
H = e-ir <PQ - wL- cI}  + (0 + p )(I - aK) (8)
and the Lagrangian:
L  =   H  +  A l(I   -   Imin)   +  12(Imax  - I) (9)
then it must hold that:
3L -iT   300 = - - = - e    P- + a(* t y) (10)3K 3K
3L -iT
TE=-e c + 0 + P + Al- X2= 0 (11)
a L= e-iT {P - w  - 0 (12)
A l(I   -   Imin)   = 0 (13)




11.K = O (16)
Al' X 2' 11 > 0 (17)
lim *(T) = 0 (18)
T + M
lim p(T).k(T) = 0                                    (19)
T + 00
The continuity properties  of 4, A,  and P are described in theorem  8  of
appendix 1. We will concentrate on situations in which it is profitable
at least to start up production. This is described by the assumption
that marginal revenue exceeds the marginal costs of both inputs for the
first piece of output to be produced:
p >wandp >c(i+a)for Q-K=L-0 (20)
In this case, K will always be positive,  so u = 0. Now,  from (9),  (13)
and (14) we can derive that three paths have to be studied.
path. nr.    X       X                    I12
1                0             0                          I       <I<Imin max
2    +   0          I=I
min
3           0         +                            I=I
max
Table A2.1. Paths of the model of Jorgenson.
The  fourth  combination,  with  both  lagrangian  parameters  having  a
positive value, is not feasible due to the fact that from (13) and (14)
it holds:
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Al   0, A2>0+I =I=I (21)min max
which is contrary to the assumption that I <0<Imin max
Finally we can derive from (12) that:
12 = H (22)
3 L  p
This fixed optimal labour productivity implies, due to the concavity of
Q(K,L) that Q may be conceived as a concave function Df K. So, to each













Figure A2.2. Production as a function of K
for optimal values of L.
We will now discuss the characteristics of the distinct paths.
Path  1.(A l  =  1 2  =  0)
From  Al   =  X 2   =   0   and   (1 0)    and   (1 1)   we can derive:
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*  -  -e-i'rp  + a(,1' + 11) (23)
-iT
0+B=e   c                                               (24)
Differentiating the last equation to time results in:
*+,- -ie-iTc (25)
Combining (23) through (25) yields:
e i'rp 22 - (a + i) c e-iT + u (26)3K
From (15) and (26) we may conclude:
p  <  (a + i) c (27)
Assumption (20) together with (22) and (27) imply that:
Q >0+ K> 0+ 11 = 0 (28)
Inserting (28) in (26) delivers:
p  = (a + i) c (29)
From (22) and (29)  the conclusion can be drawn that output and both
*          *                    *
inputs have a stationary value, say Q,K  and L,o n path 1. Further-
more we can conclude from (24) that path 1 fulfills the transversality
conditions (18) and (19), because from (24):
4  + P  =  0  when  T+ 00, which enables: (30)
* =P=0 when T+00 and K>O (31)
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Path 2. (kl > 0, X2 = 0)
There is one interesting feature of path 2 to be presented in this stage




And furthermore (11) yields:
-iT




while from the transversality conditions (18),  (19) and from (32)  it
must hold that:
for T+ - and K>O: * =P-0 (35)
which is contrary to (34), so path 2 cannot fulfill the transversality
conditions and therefore it cannot be a final path.
Path  3.  (1 1  =  0,  X 2  >  0)
In the same way one can derive that path 3 cannot be a final path. From
(14):
.
A >0+I=I +K>0+K>0 (36)
2            max
Thus (18) and (19) imply:
for T + m : * = V = 0 (37)
which is contrary to condition (11) that states:
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-iT
X 2)0+4+11=e C+A >0 (38)2
so path 3, too, cannot be a final path.
According to the above findings the coupling procedure is quite simple:
only path 1 can be a final path and the other two paths can only precede
path 1. So, the only "one staged string" as defined in figure A2.1, is:
path 1. The question we must check is: can path 1 be an initial path as
well? If so, it should obey the initial state condition (6). In combina-
tion with the findings of (29) we.can conclude that there is a necessary
condition for path 1 to be an initial path as well and thus to be a
complete string:
*
K(0) = K (39)
So, only for one initial value of K, namely the stationary value, path 1
is the optimal initial path. In that case, the firm starts on path 1 at
T = 0 and remains on it during the whole planning period.
This solution satisfies the sufficiency conditions of theorem (Al.9) as
well as the uniqueness condition of theorem (Al.10). So it is the unique
optimal solution for K(0) = K .
We now have to check for two staged strings. That is: can paths 2 and 3
precede path 1 and on which conditions?
Path 2 + path 1.
Because K is positive on path 2 as well as on path 1, v has a fixed
value (see: (16)). Together with the continuity of 4 and the fact that
1 2  =  0,  we   may thus conclude   from   (11)   that A l is continuous. There-
fore, X 1 has to become zero at the end of path 2. This is possible, only
if
A l<O when A l  =0 o n path 2 (40)
From (10)  and (11), together with X 2 =  0 and w  = 0 ke derive:
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-iT (41)Al= -e ic-4
" e-iT{ P it- (a +i)  c}  +a A l (42)3K
So, from (40) and (42) follows the necessary condition:
p 4 <  (a + i)  c on the coupling time point. (43)
3K
Because of the decrease of K on path 2, the concavity of Q and the fixed
labour productivity (see: (22)), (43) results in:
*                          *
K / K  on path 2 + K(0) > K (44)
In this way, we have derived from the continuity properties of *  and A l
a necessary initial state constraint for the relevant string. We leave
it to the reader to check the sufficiency and uniqueness conditions.
Path 3 + path 1.
In  the  same  way  as  in  the  case  of  path  2 +  path  1,  we can derive  the
continuity  of  X 2  on the coupling time point,   so  it  must  hold  that:
X 2 <  0  when X 2  =  0  on path 3 (45)
and this results in the necessary condition:
*
K(0) < K (46)
Now we must check whether there are feasible strings of the third gener-
ation,  containing three paths each. There are four possible combina-
tions:
154
( 1)   path   1  +   path  2  +   path   1
( 2)   path  3 +   path  2 +   path  1
(3) path 1 + path 3 + path 1
(4)  path 2 +  path 3 +  path  1
They all are infeasible. The first combination, for example, requires
A l  )  O when A l  =  0  on path 2 (47)
due  to the continuity  of X 1  on the first coupling point  and  due  to  the
fact  that  A l= 0 o n path 1 and A l> 0 on  path  2.   In  the  same  way  as
derived in (40) - (44), this results in
*
K <  K  on path 2 (48)
And this is contrary to condition (44)
The second combination is infeasible because the succession of path 3 by
path 2 demands a necessary condition that is contrary to condition (44),
which is necessary, in its turn, for the succession of path 2 by path 1.
From (11) we derive:
-iT
4+U=A 2-Al+e c (49)
Furthermore we have seen:
41 + 11 : continuous
X2   0 on path 3 and 12 = 0 on path 2 (50)
A l =  0 on path 3  and A l  >  0 on path  2.
Thus the continuity of (4 +B) can only be guaranteed if
X 2(t3,2) -0- Al(t ,2)
(51)
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in which : t : point in time on which path j succeeds path i
i,j
A (t-  ) : left hand side limit of Ak on T=tk i,j i,j
Ak(ti,j) : right hand side limit of Ak on T = ti,j
It is necessary for meeting (51) that
A l  )  0  when A l  =  0  on path 2, (52)
resulting in:
*
K  <    K      on   path   2.
Because of the decrease of K on path 2, this implies:
*
K<K on t (53)
2,1
*
Knowing that K=K on path 1, this should imply a jump in K on t2,1
which is infeasible. So, (51) seems to prevent the coupling on t2,1 and
thus the second combination is infeasible.
The infeasibility of the two remaining combinations can be shown along
the same lines as presented above. In summary, we found three optimal
solutions:
if K(0) > K  : path 2 + path 1
*
if K(0) =K  : path 1
if K(0) < K  : path 3 + path 1
With the knowledge that K falls as quickly as possible on path 2 (I =
Imin) and rises as quickly as possible on path 3 (I = Imax)' we can
state that the optimal policy of the firm is: to jump to the stationary
***
state (Q ,K ,L ) at start of the planning period and to remain there
till the end.
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4. The model of Ludwig.
After having discussed to a great extend the main features of the solu-
tion procedure with the help of Jorgenson's model, we will outline the
solutions of the other models in this appendix, occasionally illustrated
by some details. The interested reader can find more in the relevant
publications themselves.
Assume Y(0) > 0 and X(0) > 0, then  from  (3.28),  (3.29)  and  (3.31)
follows that:
X( T)    >    0   and    Y( T)    >    0,    0  <     T  < z (54)
Furthermore Ludwig assumes a positive concave net return (defined as:
sales after depreciation) function:
2
R(K)  - aK > 0  811 > a and L.11 < 0 (55)
'  3 K                        23K
Note that, due to K=X+Y,i t holds that:
dR     3 R 3R
dK=YX -5-9 (56)
Finally, he introduces an imperfect capital market through:
it r (57)
Now, the Hamiltonian becomes:
H=  e-iT  R(X+Y)  -  (a  +  r).Y -  I +  B}  +
   4 1(I   -   aX  -   B)   +  4 2(B   - aY) (58)
and the Lagrangian:
L =  H  +  A l (hI  -  B)  +
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+ X 2{m(R(X+Y) - aX - (a + r).Y) + aX +B- I} + 13B (59)
In order to present a uniform treatise of the optimality conditions of
all models in this book, we did not introduce discounted lagrangian
parameters in the above lagrangian function, as distinct from Ludwig. As
the model contains only control constraints,  theorems 4 through 7 of
appendix 1 apply. The necessary conditions are
3 L            -iT dR -1 1 2   + (1-d)a} (60)41"-FiE=a*l-e liE  21 dK'm
3L -iT
42 =-  -a*2- (e   .+ 12m) { . - a - r                (61)
3L -iT
S-B -
e -41+42-Al+12+A 3=0 (62)
3L -e-iT + h A  -A -O (63)3-I- 41 1       2
Al (hI   -    B)    = 0 (64)




01(z) =e   ; 42(z) =0 (67)
11, 12' X 3 1 0 (68)
Again, in order to get a consistent definition for all models, we do not
follow Ludwig's definition,  but alter it slightly.  From (64) through
(66) we can form the paths as presented in table A2.2 on the next page.
Path 7 is infeasible, because from (64) through (66) it results that
(R - aK - rY)m + aX = 0 (69)
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path nr.   )1  12  13   path nr.   Al   X2   A3
1 +00                          5 0+ +
2       0+0             6+0+
3        ++0              7+ + +
4      00+           8 0 0 0
Table A2.2. Paths of the model of Ludwig.
while (3.21) and (3.22) imply:
(R - aK - rY)m ) 0 (70)
and (54):
aX > 0 (71)
Path 8 is infeasible because we can derive from (60) through (63) that
Al =A 2 = 13 = 0 implies:
S=ati,a+r+i=r (72)dK
which is contrary to assumption (57).
We will now turn to the characteristics of the remaining paths.
Path 1.
First we derive a stationary value of K on path 1:
-iT dR
(73)A   >0
1                                0 1    -a*l-  e       diE
+
- iT       dR




(75)Al = e -41+42
-iT
(76)h Al =e -41
(75), (76) + (1-h)1 1 "*2
(77)
-iT 42
(76), (77) + t (-ie      _ 41)  - TZh
(78)
dR
(79)(73),  (74),  (76)  -  (78) +   -  a =  (1-h)i t h r+K-  0
*
Let us indicate this stationary value of K with: K . The assumed valuesY
of the lagrangian parameters result in the following conditions:
.
X >0 B = hI (80)
1
1 2  =  1 3=  0      '   +     I <   (R-   (atr)Y-  aX)m  taX +
B (81)
(64) - (66) B) 0 (82)
These expressions lead to the following characteristics:
(80), (3.28), (3.29) :K=X=Y-I- a(X +Y) -0
*





Furthermore  we  can derive a  dynamic  equation of  the only positive
lagrangian parameter,  A l:
(74), (77), (79) + Al = a Al - (i - r)e
-iT
(85)
Condition (81) can be reformulated as:
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*
(81), (83),  (84)  :  (rm + a)Y<  mR(K ) - (m - h)a (86)
Finally, we can use the above optimal values of I and B to specify more
precisely the state equations of path 1:





Taking all in all, we have found the following characteristics of path
1:
*




(87) :X= (1-h)aK  -a X
(88) :Y= haK  -a Y
•                   -iT
(85)  :Al=  all  -  (i -  r)e
(68) :A  )0
1
(76)     : 41
= e -hAl-iT
(77)  : 42=  (1-h)1 1
(69) : A 2 = A 3 = 0
*
(86)  : (a + m) Y < mR(K ) - (m - h)aK 
In the same way, we can derive the characteristics of the other 5 paths.
In order to avoid confusing details, we will present only those charac-
teristics that are needed to demonstrate the coupling procedure and to







Y = -m(R - aK - rY) < 0 (90)
.(R(K:x) - aK X - rY) + hal<X < aY (91)
-iT (92)





Path 3 : A l > 0, A 2 > 0' k3 = 0
X = m(R - aK - rY)                                          (94)
Y   -1 h{ m(R-aK-rY)    taX} -aY (95)
x  =-11.-le-iT((1-h)i + hr + a - 21) + X2m(hr-·dR + a)}  (96)2   -h l 3K dK
-iT
41=e - h A l + A 2
(97)
4 2  = (1-h)Al (98)
Path 4 : Al = X2 = 0, X3 > 0






Y = -ay (102)
D = (1-m)(R - aK - rY) (103)
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-iT
1|' 1  =
e + X2 (104)
* =-13 (105)2
Path 6 : A l > O' A 2 = 0' 13 > 0
-iT 1  (di  -  a  -  ( 1-h)i  - hr) (106)13=aX 3+e h  dK
-iT
*l=e -h Al (107)
42 = (1-h)A 1 - X 3                                              (108)
The next step in the solution procedure is to select feasible final
paths. We will restrict ourselves here to checking path 1, because we
intend to present the procedure only for a subset of optimal strings.
With the help of that presentation, the interested reader will be able
to construct the remaining optimal strings.





-0 when T+ z (109)
This expression implies:
1 1<  0 when A l  = 0 on a final path. (110)
From (85) we derive:
i)r+i>r (111)
due to assumption (57). So, path 1 can only be a feasible final path if
the discount rate exceeds the interest rate on debt capital.
In order to find criteria to select feasible preceding paths, we derive
from (85), (109) and (111):
A,(tj, )>0 (112)
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and from (76) and (77):
it 
11'1(t+ ) =e   11 -h A (t+ ) (113)jl         1  jl
42(tjl) = (1-h)11(tjl) > 0 (114)
in which : tjl: point in time on which path 1 succeeds path j.
We are now able to select feasible preceding paths:
path 2 :not feasible, because 42(t21) -0, so there should be a jump
in *2'     while  *2 is continuous.
path 3 : allowed if X2(t31)= 0+ 12< O when12 - 0+
dRdj -a)  (1-h)i +h r s o:K<  Ky on path 3 (115)
*
Furthermore K must increase on path 3 in order to reach K . In
Y
the Jorgenson model we handled a similar problem by supposing a
sufficiently large marginal revenue when K = 0. Ludwig deals
with this problem in a different way by deriving a sufficiently
large initial value of X in the following way:
K - X + Y + K = X + Y =-  i; m (R-aK- rY) t-  aX - aY (116)
Due to the concavity of R it holds that:
dR                 *       dR
R(K) >K .32 and, while K< KY, so : -diE >a+r:
R(K) > (r + a)K (117)
So K is certainly positive if
1lhm (rK- rY) + *a X- •Y>O- < (118)mr + ha(1-h)a
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path 4 : infeasible because 42(t41) 4 0
path 5 : infeasible because 42(t51) 4 0
path 6 : feasible if X 3(t61) - 0 + + 13 < 0 when A 3 = 0 +
dR32 -a<  (1-h)i t h r s o:K)  Ky on path 6. (119)
In the same way, one can find that there are no feasible predecessors of
the  paths  3  and  6.   So  we have foun'd both strings, ending  with  path  1:
if i>r and K(0) <K   and Itfll <
mr + ha
X(0) (1-h)a : path 3 + pa
th 1
if i>r and K(0) >K  : path 6 + path 1
In the same way, the other patterns presented in chapter 3 can be deri-
ved.
5. The model of Lesourne and Leban.
To get a closed control region, we add artificial boundaries on D and I.
Furthermore we remove Y by substituting (K-X) for it and so we get:
-iT
maximize :J D e   dT                                      (120)
D, I,L       0
subject to :X= (1-f)(R -w L- (r+a)K - rX) -D (121)
K=I-a K (122)
X<  K< (1+k)X (123)
0<D<D (124)max
I <I<I (125)min max
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R = R(K,L) , strictly increasing and concave
This model contains state constraints  (123) as well as control con-
straints (124) and (125), so theorems 8 up to 10 of appendix 1 hold in
this case. The Hamiltonian is:
-iT
H = e  D + (41 -1'1 + (1+kh 2)((1-f){R - wL - (r+a)K + rX) - D}
      42      M  1    -   U 2  (I- aK)
(126)
and the Lagrangian:
L- H+ AlD + 12(Dmax - D) + A 3(I - Imin) + 14(Imax - I)   (127)
From the Jorgenson model we know that paths, during which the controls
are on an artificial boundary, describe adjustments of the initial state
of the firm in such a way as to become a point on an optimal string. 1)
Because of their lack of economic meaning, we drop them here, assuming:
X2=13=4=0 (128)
We now get the following optimality conditions:
41 = -  41 - 111 + (1+k)02) (1-f)r (129)
42=-  (* 1  - 1 1 1  +  (1+k)1' 2)   (1-f)   ( -  -   (rta) ) (130)
-iT
41   -  p l  +   (1+k)#2   = e +Al (131)
4  =112- Ul2
(132)
1) Arrow and Kurz have proved, more in general, that jumps in the state
variables can occur only at the beginning of a planning period if the
Hamiltonian in the optimal solution is strictly concave in the state
variables (Arrow & Kurz (1970), page 56).
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Ul(K - x) = 0, B 2((1+k)X - K) = 0 (136)
A l'  1 1 1'  p 2  9 0 (137)
lim 01(T) = 0, lim *2(T) = 0 (138)T + 00 T + co
lim 111(T).(K - X) = 0,  lim B 2(T).((1+k)X - K) = 0 (139)
T + 00 T + 00
From (131) and (133) the result is that:
3R
SL =w + R= R(K)  in the optimal solution (140)
From (134) and (136) we derive six possible paths:
path nr. Al   Ul 02 path  nr.         1 1       111       W 2
1 0-0   4+ -0
2 0 0-   5+0-
3 0 0 0   6+0 0
Table A2.3. Paths of the model of Lesourne & Leban.
On the paths  1  through  3 it holds  that A l  = 0.  Due  to  (131)  and  (132)
this results in:
-iT
*1  + 42  + ie = -k U (141)2
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-iT (142)41 + (1+k)*2 + ie = -k Ki 1
and by inserting (129) and (130):
e-iT(1-f) (f.G -a- -i f) -k 1,2 (143)
e-,T(1-f)  <  -  a -  l k(kr + .i f)1  - .i  k'l (144)
Path 1.
(136) : 01 < 0,1'2 = 0 + Y = O and X = K < (1+k)X (145)
(144)    :   , 1   <   0  +    -   a   <  .1: i:(1'r   + ·T (146)
(143)  :  11 2 =  0+  -  a  = -Tif-  K -K (147)
(146),   i 1 (148)(147)  :1-f< -1 (kr + -1 f) +  i< (1-f)r
So, this path can appear only if equity is cheaper than debt capital.
Path 2.
(136) : ul " 0, P2 <0+X<K= (1+k)X (149)
( 144)   :  1 1 1  =  0 +   -  a  = T: <kr  + -l f)-   K  - K (150)
•                                         i
(143) : u <0+811-a<- (151)
2 3K 1-f
(150),
(151) :i> (1-f)r is necessary to enable path 2 (152)
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Path 3.
(136) : pl = 112= 0 + X<K<(1+k)X (153)
In the same way as described above, this yields :i= (1-f)r, which is
excluded by assumption (3.52).  So, two paths remain:  the pure equity
financing case and the maximum debt financing case. On both paths, the
capital stock has a stationary value and so, due to the fixed financial
structure:
K=0+X=0 (154)
whigh yields an expression for D and I:
* *
(121), (154),Y=0: D= (1-f){R(KX) -w L- aKX} (155)
I = aK                                      (156)
(121), (158), Y=k X:D= (1-f){R(K ) -w L- (a + -L r) K*1 (157)1+k     y
I=a
K (158)
From (131), (132), (138) and (139) one can conclude that paths 1 and 2
can fulfill the transversality conditions if all auxiliary variables
vanish when T approaches oo .
In the same way as for paths 1 through 3, we can derive from (131) and
(132) for paths 4 through 6:
•                       -iT
Al=41+42+ku2+ie (159)
•                            -iT
A l=  111 1  +   (1+k)* 2  +  k  p 1   + ie (160)
These expressions will be used for the coupling procedure later on.
Furthermore, (130) through (132) result in:
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*2 =' 2 -Ul = - (e-iT + Al)(1-f)( - (r+a)) (161)
Path 4.
(136) :pl<0' 02=0+ X=K<(1+k) X (162)
(161).' 3R(1 6 2) : - -a c r-K) K (163)3K XY
Path 5.
(136) :pl " 0, #2 <0+ X< K< (1+k) X (164)
(161)
(164) ':     -   a  )    r  -   K  < K y (165)
From  (140),   (163)   and the strict increasing property  of  R,  we  can  con-
clude that:
R-w L- (r+a) K>0+X>0 (166)
Path 6.
(136) : pl= 02=0 + X<K< (ltk) X (167)
(161).' 3 R            *
(167)    :   FiE  -a   =r-   K=
K (168)
--XY
From (140), (168) and the concavity of R we can conclude that on path 6
(R - wL - (a+r)K) is on its maximum, so:
R - wL - (a+r)K > 0 (169)
(121), (168), (169) :
X>0+Y<0, due to K=0 (170)
So, the firm is paying back debt capital, keeping its capital stock and
its money capital on a fixed level.
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The  fact  that Alie positive on paths 4 through 6, prevents that the
transversality condition can hold, for, due to (131) and (132):
-iT
42(T) = 0+ 112 =1'1+ 41-kl'2= e +Al>0 (171)
So, for T+ - and *1 - 0 (see: (138)), it must hold that
lim 92(T) > 0 (172)T + 00
due   to the transversality condition   (139).   This   is   path   5   when Al  is
positive. On that path, K is strictly increasing, so, we can assume that
it surpasses K x while T is still far from infinity, and thus it will
change into another path before that time. None of the other two paths
is a feasible final path, due to (172), so paths 1 and 2 are the only
final paths.
This brings us to the coupling procedure. Paths 1 and 2 are the only
final paths and, just like in the former models, may form a whole string
if the initial state is exactly the relevant stationary state, so:
if :i< (1-f)r and X(0) = K , then the optimal trajectory is:
path 1, with : K(T) = K 
Y(T) = 0
I (T)    =    aK 
D(T) = (1-f){ r(K ) - wL - aK (173)
if :i> (1-f)r and X(0) = -l k K , then the optimal trajectory is:
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path  2,  with:»K(T)  = K 
k   *
Y( T)   =  ---  K1+k  Y
*
I(T) =a KY
D(T)  =  (1-f){ R(K )  - wL -  (a + -  E r)K } (174)
Strings consisting of two stages are formed by coupling paths 4 through
6 before path 1 or 2. From (104) in appendix 1 one can derive the con-
tinuity  of  0 1  and 02,  even  when the control variables  'I  and  D  are  jum-
ping, for in that case, 0(x,u,t), as defined in (92) of appendix 1, will
be  discontinuous  and  so,  111  and 02 are continuous.   This nice
property
implies, through   (131), the continuity   of Al'  so   it is necessary   for
paths preceding paths 1 and 2 that:
A l <  O when A l  = O on
a preceding path. (175)
Let us consider the relevant three paths apart from each other:
Path 4.
From (129), (130), (131), (159) and#2 = 0 one can derive that (175)
implies:
-iT
Al =*1 + 42 + ie
-iT 3R i ,
= -e    (1-f){§-K-a- 1--f1 <  0 when A l= 0 (176)
*
+   -  a' T f-K,KX (177)
Together with the necessary condition (163),  this results in another
necessary condition:
i < (1-f)r (178)
So, we get:
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if i < (1-f)r and 4x < X(0) < K , then the optimal trajectory is:
path 4 + path 1
*
K X<K< Kx K= K 
K>0
Y=0 Y=0
D=0 D =  (1-f){ R(K ) - wL - aK (179)
which is the case of pure equity financed growth.
Path 5.
From (165) and (166) result two possibilities of ending this path:
(5.1) : Al - 0 and then a change to path 1 or path 2
(5.2)  :K= K X before A l =0
(5.1) 1 1=0 and then a change to path 1 or path 2.
On  path  5 it holds  that u 1  = 0, so through  (129)  -  (131)  and  (160)  we
can translate (175) into:
 1 = - e-iT(1-f)(1+k){ - -a--i k(kr +Tif)} < 0 (180)
'R-a, -i (kr + Tif) -K•K (181)
Due to the continuity of X and K, this path must be connected with path
2, the case of maximum debt financing. Due to its necessary condition
(152) we get:
if i > (1-f)r and X(0) < -1 k K , then the optimal trajectory is:
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path 5 + path 2
*
K <
KY K = K 
K>0
Y.-k K Y =1*k KY1+k
D=0 D =  (1-f){ R(K )  - wL-  (a + -l  k r)K } (182)
which is the case of maximum debt financed growth.
(5.2)  K= KYX before A l  = 0.
We must check the following extensions:
path  1  : not allowed for, because  then a  jump  in A l should occur, which
is prohibited by the optimality conditions, as shown in rela-
tion to (175).
path 4 : infeasible, too, because  then it must hold  for  the left  side
limit of Y on the coupling point of time:
 =bl>0 (183)
and for the right side limit:
 Y=O (184)
so we get on the coupling time point:
+            +                            +
X+Y=K=X (185)
which implies a jump in X, and this is contrary to the contin-
uity of X.
path 6 : feasible, starting with Y = 0. It may end with:
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0<Y< kx and X 1 =O  or:  Y=0   and A l) 0. (186)
In the same way as above, we can check that only the last
situation results in a feasible successor,  i.e. path 4,  and
*
that after transgression of this path, till K = K , path 1 is
entered.
Combining all necessary conditions, we can derive the following optimal
patterns from the above analysis:
1     *If i < (1-f) and X(0) < -i  Kxy '  then the optimal trajectory
is:
path 5 + path 6 + path 4 + path 1
*               *           *           *          *
K < K X
K =
K X KYX <  K A  KX    K=K X
K>0 X>O,Y<0  K>0
Y = kX 0<Y<k x Y=O Y=0
*
D=0 D=0 D=0 D  =   (1-f){r(KX)  -  wL
- aI< 
1     *If i < (1-f)r and X(0) = -i k Kyx'  then the optimal trajectory
is:
path 6 + path 4 + path 1
1*  *If i < (1-f)r and -1+k KyX < X(0) < K  , then the optimal traj-
ectory is:
path 4 + path 1. (187)
We will finish this section with a derivation of the critical Q-value
Q, discussed in the main text. If the output in the optimal solution is
below this level, capital goods and labour are complementary inputs. If
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the output exceeds this level, both inputs become substitutes to each
other.
First, we repeat some information that will be used in the derivation:
(126):  Q = f Ll-0 +   - a  and   - (1=4 (188)
dr
d(Q--)
(3.48): 8(Q)  :=     dQQ   is
a decreasing function of Q with:
8(0)  >  0  and 8( - )   < 0 (189)
The strict concavity of R(Q) and the optimality condition (140) give:
it  >   0.4  <   0   and    '   H  -
w (190)
dQ
We start the derivation by transforming (190) with the help op (188):
aR . dR   19. - n dR
3I.    dQ 0 DI.    (1 )t·3 i- wi  (11)  -
wL (191)
Differentiation of (191) yields:
d dR
(192)
C 1-a)   dii(QdQ)   dQ  =   wdL
Inserting (188) and (189) in (192) results into:
(11) A {a   dK + (1-a)  dL} =wdL (193)
Substituting w by (191) and omitting (1-ot):
dL      a A L
8{a ·  dK + (1-0)  dL} -   · d- + 32- K{·a- (1-=M}
(194)
dQ




(195)8  =Q 2+ .dii
dQ
Inserting (195) into the denominator of (194) yields:
dL          a B L
3X =                               2 (196)
K{ a  %  -   (1-a)   Q  i- 1
dQ
From (190) we can conclude that the denominator of (196) has a positive
value,  so (dL/dK) has  the same sign as A.  From  (189)  we know that there
is a value of Q, say Q, for which this sign must change from a positive
value into a negative value, which thus implies the transition from the
case of complementary inputs into the case of substitution.
6. Summary.
As far as we know, none of the publications on dynamic economic models
of the firm in the area of Optimal Control contains a description of the
way in which the author has found the relevant optimal solution. Discus-
sions with several authors confirm, that the solution in most cases has
been arrived at in a heuristic,  intuitive way. In this appendix we
present a general, iterative procedure to solve Optimal Control models
containing mixed control and state constraints, that is based on the
optimality conditions as formulated in the previous appendix. The proce-
dure is applied to the three dynamic models of the firm that may be
regarded as precursors of the model of chapter 4.
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APPENDIX 3. SOLUTION OF THE MODEL OF CHAPTER 4.
1. A reduced form of the model.
In order to simplify the solution procedure, we will first leave out
some mathematically superflous elements in the formulation (4.16) -
(4.28). From (4.19) and (4.20) results that, for a given state of the
firm, not all control variables can be chosen freely, so the firm has in
fact less independent instruments than the number of control variables.
This fact will be used to reduce the model by leaving ovt two endogenous
variables. In our formulation, we have selected K  and Y to be removed
from the model. We can rewrite (4.19) and (4.20) in:
K2-K- 1K                                                  (1)
Y =K-X (2)
Substitution of the above expressions in (4.16) through (4.24) results
in the next reduced form of the model:
 -iT -izmaximize:je D dT + e {X(Z) - gK(z)} (3)
D, I,Kl      0
subject to :X= (1-f)(0 +r X- rK) -D+g I (4)
K=I-a K (5)
KA X (6)
(1+k)X P K (7)
K<K (8)
1
D A O, Kl )
0 (9)
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in which  :  0 -  { qlp(Q)  -  Le l} Kl  +
+ {q2*Q)  - 4 2} (K - Kl)- aK (10)
Q = q1Kl + q2(K - Kl) = (ql - q2)Kl + q2K (11)
So, 0 is a function of K and Kl. The non-negativeness of K is ensured by
(8) and (9). The non-negativeness of X is ensured by the non-negativen-
ess of K together with (7).
To get a closed control region, we have to put artificial boundaries to
D and I in the same way as done in several models of appendix 2:
D< D (12)max
I <I<I (13)min max
Two state variables remain: X and K, but the set of controls has been
reduced to {D, I,Kl ' The reduced model will be used in this appendix.
Through (1) and (2) one can easily trace the consequences of the optimal
solution for the removed variables.
2. Optimality conditions.
Equations (6) and (7) are constraints on state variables, (8) is a mixed
constraint and (9) are pure control constraints, so theorems 8 through
10 of appendix 2 apply to this case. From theorem 8 we derive the fol-
lowing optimality conditions:
Let the Hamiltonian be:
-iT
H- e   D + {01 -1'1 + (1+k),12} {(1-f)[OCK,Kl) + rX - rK]
- D + gI}  + (42 + 01 - 112)(I - aK) (14)
and let the Lagrangian be defined as:
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L=H+ Al(K- Kl) + 12Kl + X 3D+X.(D - D) +4  max
+ X 5(I - Imin) + X 6(Imax - I) (15)
Then there must be functions *1(T), 42(T), 111(T), 112(T), Al(T), 12(T)
and  X 3(T),   such   that:
3L (16)41 - - FiE= - {*1 - 1,1 + (1+k) t,2}  (1-f)r
;     =  _  111=  _  {111 1   -  u 1  +  (1+k)  112}    (1-f)   {   -   r}   +2  3K
+  a(02 +1 1 1  -0 2) -A l (17)
3L -iT
FE = e - 11'1   01 - (1+k) U 2 + A 3 - A 4 = 0 (18)
3L
TY={01 - 111 + (1+k) 02}  +11,2 +01 -112 + X5 -A6= 0  (19)
BL 30
Fir  =   { 41   -  0 1   +   (1+k)  y 2}     (1-f)     KI  -  A l   +  A 2  - 0 (20)
Al(K - Kl) - 0, ..., X 6(I - I) = 0 (21)max
'11 4 0,1,2 < 0, 01(K - X) = 0,112{(1+k)X - K} -0 (22)
Ak) 0, ug ) 0, k= 1, ..., 6 ; £ = 1, 2. (23)
-iz -iz
*1(z) = e , 02(z) =_ge (24)
01(Z) {K(Z) - X(z)} = 0, 02(z) {(ltk)X(z) - K(z)} = 0 (25)
4    : continuous with piecewise continuous derivatives (26)
0, A  :  continuous on intervals of continuity of { D, I,Kl}    (27)
U 1     :  continuous  on intervals of continuity of { D, I,Kl}
or when (K - X) is discontinuous (28)
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U 2      :  continuous on intervals of continuity  of { D,I,Kl}
or when { (ltk)  - K} is discontinuous (29)
3. A reduced form of the optimality conditions.
Before starting to design the optimal solution, we may simplify the
optimality conditions. In the first place, we leave out cases in which D
and/or I are on their artificial boundaries, so:
X4=A5=16=0 (30)
Further,  from the conditions in section  2  we can derive  that u l'  :1 2  and
A 3
are continuous functions.   From (28) follows   that  u l is continuous
if { D,  I, Kl} continuous and/or  (K -  ) discontinuous,       (31)
which can be rewritten, using (4) and (5), into:
if { D,  I, Kl} continuous and/or
{ (1-g)I +D-  [a - (1-f)r]K -  (1-f)rX - (1-f)0}  is
discontinuous (32)
Due to the closed control region, X and K are continuous, so at least
one of the control variables must be discontinuous in order to get a
discontinuity of the last expression of (32). So, the above conditions
(32) are complementary to each other and (31) will always be fulfilled.
Therefore  we may conclude  that 11 1 is continuous  in the above optimality
conditions.
In  the  same  way  one can derive the continuity  of 02  from  (4),   (5)  and
(29).   Because  of the continuity  of P 1  and u 2, and because  of  (18),   (26)
and   (30)  we may further conclude   that  X 3 is continuous.
Taking all in all, we can reduce (16) through (29) to the next form:





42  =  u 2  -  1, 1  -
g(e +A ) (34)
3
•        -iT
41 =-(e + 13)(1-f)r (35)
•                  3002 - - (e-iT + 13){(1-f) (5-K- r) + ag} -Al (36)
(e-iT + 13)(1-f)  --Al- 12                           (37)
11(K - Kl) = 0' 12Kl = 0, X 3D =
0 (38)
P l<  0,  U 2< 0 (39)
1 1 1(K   -   X)    =    0,   112<(1+k) X   -   K}     =
0 (40)
A k> O'u g) 0,k=1,2,3;1=1,2. (41)
-iz -iz
01(z) = e ' 42(z) = -ge (42)
01(Z) {K(Z) - X(z)} = 0, 02(z) {(1+k)X(z) - K(z)} - 0 (43)
4 1'  4 2'  1 3'  ul   and  0 2 : continuous functions (44)
41'  42'  A l  and X 2 : continuous on intervals of continuity
of {D,I,Kl} (45)
Finally we will derive some equations that will be needed later on in
this appendix. We know that:
Q - qIKI + q2(K - Kl) - (ql -  2)Kl +  2K (46)
and from (10) that:
0=S- (wgl - we 2)Kl - (#£2 + a)K (47)
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so: 1.L =q - .22-- (48)
3 K 1  2  '  @K-  92
1
30                       dS
5.Ki = W(£ 2 - 11  - Cq 1 -  2  dii (49)
30           dS
5-K =  24 - 42 - a (50)
Finally, we can easily find, due to assumption A4 in chapter 4, that
only two different rankings of the relevant unit costs can occur:
ClN < C2N< c21 ' or : c21    2N    lN '
<C <C N = X, Y, YX
w(£  - Z )





From (38) and (40) one can form 32 different combinations of zero and
non-zero valued  lagrangian  parameters  and first derivatives  of  the
auxiliary variables vz . Not all of them are feasible paths.  In this
section we will look for combinations that cannot fulfill the above
optimality conditions and the assumptions Al through A6 as defined in
section 7  of  chapter 4.  The  remaining combinations,  which are  the
feasible paths constituting the optimal patterns, will be discussed in
more detail in the next section.
a.#1 =02=13= 0
From (33) results that:
-iT                                 -iT
e          =  4     -  0 1   +  (1+k)  u 2  + 41=-ie (52)1
Together with (35) this leads to the necessary condition that i = (1-
f)r, which in contrary to assumption A3. So, the above combination is
infeasible.
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b.  A l  =  X 2  =  0  and  p     =  P =01 2
c. Al = 12 = 0 and p.2 = 13 = 0
d. Al= 12=0 andul= 13= 0
If A l=1 2=0'i t results from (37) and (49)  that:
dS        w(t 2   -11)




dQ   42    2
in which B is a parameter to be specified later on, than its holds that
1- (wt    + a +B)  - -- (Wt 2 + a +B)                                          (55) 1 '  1
We will use this theorem to prove that each of the above mentioned three
cases conflicts with assumption A4. This assumption excludes the inci-
dental cases in which the unit costs of both activities, defined for
different financial structures, equal each other. We start with
  1  = 0 2  = 0, which implies through  (33
)  and  (34)  that
(56) 41 =-42
together with  (35),  (36),  (50)  and A l  =   ' this results  in:
dS   1 , (57)dii= qi tw£2 + (1 -T f) a + (1-g)r} :- c2YX
From (53) and (57) we can conclude that
(58)
( YX = C2YX
which is contrary to assumption A4. So, combination b is infeasible.
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In the case of u2 = X 3 = 0, we get from (33) and (34):
-iT
"1=11'1+ie (59)
    41        4 2    =    -     (1-g)    1' 1 (60)
Combining (59) and (60) with (35), (36) and (50) yields:
dS   1  ,
liii =   tw£2 + (1 - -i-lf)a + (1-g) .l fl  :- c                   (61)2X
Due to (53) and (61) a necessary condition to case c should be: clX =
c2x' which is excluded by assumption A4, so combination c is infeasible.
Whenul  =A 3  =  0  we can derive  from  (33)  and  (34)  that:
-iT
(1+k)  02  =  -  41   - ie (62)
g  111 1   +  4 2  ={1-  g(1+k)} U 2 (63)
resulting in:
  -  -      { '* 2+  (1   - -i )   a  "1  -ib  r  "1   (1 k-  g)   i     '-   czY   (64)
Together with (55) this leads to the necessary condition that: cly =
c2Y, which is, again contrary to assumption A4 and therefore combination
d is cancelled.
e.01<0and#2<0
f. Al > O and A 2 > 0
Due to (40) and the conditions (4) through (8), the first case implies
that
X=K=0+ K l=I=D=0 (65)
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The second case results into the same conclusion through (38):
K=K 1=O+X=I=D=0 (66)
Due to the continuity of X, both cases have the necessary initial con-
dition:
X(t ) =0 (67)
0
in which t  is the moment at which the relevant case ssarts. But, as we
shall see in the next section, none of the remaining paths can end with
a zero amount of equity. So, there are no feasible preceding paths for
the above cases. Furthermore, assumption A5 of chapter 4 prohibits the
above cases to be feasible initial paths, because the initial value of
equity must be more than zero. So, there is no place for the cases e and
f in any optimal trajectory and therefore they are infeasible.
All in all, the following combinations are infeasible:
case       A l       1 2       1 3        "1       "2
a                   000
b O O 00
C O 0 0   0
d 0 0 0 0
e             +            +
f                                -      -
Table A3.1. The infeasible combinations.
5. Feasible paths.
Based on the complementary slackness conditions (38) and (40) and table
1, we can now list the remaining feasible paths, see table A3.2 on the
next page.
In this section we will demonstrate in more detail the main characteris-
tics of these feasible paths. We need this information partly for the
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path path
nr   Al  X2  13   ul  U2
nr Al  12  13   #1  #2
10++ 0-7 0+ + -    0
20+0 0-8 0+0 -    0
300+ 0-9+0+ 0     0
4+0+ 0-1000+ -    0
5+0 00-11+0+ -    0
60++ 0 0 12 + 0 0 -    0
Table A3.2. The feasible paths.
coupling procedure and partly for the analysis of the optimal solution
In this section we will apply another numbering of formulas: the first
number indicates the path concerned and the second number the rank of
the formula in the relevant subsection.
Path 1.
Al =ul= 0 (1.1)
A   >0, X3 >0'11
<0 (1.2)22
(38),(40),   :    Kl  = 0 (1.3)
(1.2) D=0 (1.4)
(ltk)X  =K-Y= kx (1.5)
(37),(41), : 12 - - (e i.r + 13)(1-f) 32   + 30-< 011
(49),(51),
dS              *
(1.1)
+3Q  =   c21  +   Q < Q21
(1.6)
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(33)-(36), :  g 01 +11,2 - {1 - g(1+k)} :,2 < 0+
(39),(1.1)
(A.6) (e-iT + X 3) { - (1-f) 3-0
+ (1-g)(1-f)r - ag} < 0 +
dS                 *                                    (1.7)3Ei '  c2yx +   Q<  Q2yx
(4),(5),    :    - (1-f) {0 - -i  rK} + g(K + aK)-
(40),(1.2) a k{1-g(1+k)} - (1-f){0 + 1-f - 1+k r 14 (1.8)
Due to the concavity of S, (1.4) and (1.7) it holds that:
dS                                               (1.9)
S    >     Q    dii   >    K. (12 0 C 2YX
(38),(47), :  0=S- (9£2 + a)K (1.10)
(1.2)
(1.8-10),   :  {1 - g(1+k)} > (1-f) {1 - 14·k) rK} + A > lif rK  (1.11)
(59)
(1.5,11) :X>O,K>O,Y>0 (1.12)
Due to (1.2), A 3 is positive on path 1, but its value may approach zero
at the beginning or at the end of this path. From the non-negativeness
restriction (41), we can derive the following necessary conditions for
such cases:
+
1 3=  0 +  X 3  1   O  when X 3  =  O  on  path l (1.13)
+
X =0+X < 0 when X = 0 on path 1        ·       (1.14)333
(An arrow to the right (left) indicates the right (left) side limit of
the relevant variable on the relevant time intersection). pow we will
translate these conditions in conditions on the parameters and/or on the
value of Q.
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(33)-(36), :   3 =1- (1-1·lc)g < 1 + (1+k) 1 21 + ie-iT
(1.1)
-  -   (11.k)(1I))   .-iT  '2  I ·tq  -   92,1    when '3  - 0 (1.15)
+
+
(1.13,15)  : 13 - 0+ .512< c (1.16)dQ   2Y
+
(A4),(51), : X3 = 0 +  c21 < CZY+  cly> c2Y
(1.6,7,16) (1.17)
C2YX < C2Y +   i> (1-f)r
+
dS                *




(38),(40), :  Kl "0-K=K 2 (2.3)
(2.2)
(1+k)X  =K-   Y- kx (2.3)
(33),(35), :  41 = - (1+k)  2 - ie-iT . - e-iT(1-f)r (2.4)
(2.1)
(AJ),(40), :  112 < O+  i > (1-f)r (2.5)
(2.4)
In the same way as on path 1, we can derive:
dS               *(33)-(36),  :   g 41 + 42 = {1- g(1+k)}  11   + - =c    - Q=Q (2.6)
2   dQ    2Y         2Y
(2.1,4)
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Analogously to (1.6) of path 1, we get:
dS                                                     (2.7)
(37),
:      dQ  >   C21
(2.1,2)
(2.8)







(38),(40), :  D-0
(3.2) (3.3)
(ltk)X =K-Y=kx
Analogous to the previous paths, it holds that:
30             dS                         * (3.4)
(37),(49), :  5-K,-= 0 + dQ = c21 +  Q = Q21
(3.1)
Just like on path 1 we can derive:
dS                                                     (3.5)(33)-(36), : · ii , c2YX
(39),(3.1)
(3.6)
(A4),(51), :  clYX < C2YX
(3.4,5)
We will now prove that X increases on path 3.
(1.5) :  K = (1+k)X (3.7)
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(4),(5),   :  X- (1-f)  0 --   rK} +g I
(3.3)
(1-f)=  1  - g(1+k)  (0 + (T F-  1+k r) 4 (3.8)
Due to the concavity of S and (3.5) it holds that:
dS
s  ,    Q  .dii  >   Q. C2YX
(3.9)
Together with (46), (59) and (3.6) this results in:
S >11Klw + 12(K- K2)w + K{(1- 15)a + (11)r}     (3.10)
(47),(3.10):  0 >{(1-g)r--L a}K (3.11)1-f
1   1-f
(3.8.1 1)              :         X    >   -·l*krK>
0 q.e.d. (3.12)
We can further derive from (46) and (3.4):
 =0+  q2(l+k); = q2K = (q2 - qi)Kl (3.13)
(3.12,13), : X>O,K l>O'K 2=K-K l<0 (3.14)
qi < q2
Just like on path 1 we can derive that:
(1+k)(1-f) -iT ida_X3 " -1- (14·k)g e    2 idQ  c2'1  when X3 =0    (3.15)
and combining this with (3.4) and the necessary conditions as mentioned
on path 1, we get:
++
dS
A =0+ dQ <   c2Y +    cly  >  c3                            2Y
+                                         (3.16)+
dS .





Al   0, X 3  0,"2 <
0 (4.2)
Next results can be found in the same way as on the above paths, so we
will only mention them:
(4.2) :  K = Kl
D=0 (4.3)




< - Q,Q (4.4): = c21    21
(4.1,2)
dS                * (4.5)(33)-(36), : liq' C2yx - Q < Q2yx
(4.1,2)
(4.6)
(A4),(51), :  clYX < C2YX
(4.4,5)
(4),(4,2-5) and the concavity of S:
X>O,K>O,Y>0 (4.7)
In the same way as on the previous paths we derive from (33) - (36):
1                          -iT1 3   =   1   -   g(1+k)     1       (1+k)    2}    + ie (4.8)
Which now leads, due to (4.1) and (37), to:
(1+k)(1-f) e-iT ql {d  - cly} when 13 = 0 (4.9)A   = -3     1 - (1+k)g
This results, together with (4.6), in the following necessary conditions
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for zero initial or final values  of A 3  on path  4:
+
+




12=A 3=111= 0 (5.1)
Al > 0,112 <
0 (5.2)
(5.1,2) : K=Kl (5.3)
( 1+k)X  =  K-   Y  = kX (5.4)
Like on path 2 it holds, due to (5.1), that:
i > (1-f)r (5.5)




30              dS
(37),(49), : Tr-) 0+ -< c (5.7)dQ    21
1
(5.1,2)







(6.1,2) : Kl=0-K=K (6.3)2
D=0 (6.4)
dS                 *(33)-(36), :  g*1 +11'2 " 0+ liii- c2yx-  Q - Q2yx (6.5)
(6.1)
(37), (49), : a i 4 0 +  < c21
(6.6)
(6.1,2)
(A4),(51), :  clYX > C2YX
(6.7)
(6.5,6)
In the same way as on path 1, the concavity of S, together with (6.5)
leads to:
X>0+Y<0 (because K=0 due to Q=0) (6.8)
-iT(33)-(36),  :   (1-g) X 3 = 41   42   (1-g) ie     +
(58)
-iT
q2e .flil (6.9)X 3 = (1-g)(1-f) {c2X - d4 when X3 = 0
Which results together with (6.5) and analogous to path 1 in:
+                +        *
X 3  -  0 +  Q'  Q2x + c <C
+ i > (1-f)r2YX   2X
(6.10)+ + *
X 3  -  0+  Q<   Q2x +      c2YX>  c2X




X 2  0,13>0'Ul< 0 (7.2)
(7.1,2) :   K l=0-K=K 2
D=0 (7.3)
K=X-Y=0
dS                 *
(37),(49), : dQ > C21-  Q < Q21 (7.4)
(7.1,2)
'    dS(33)-(36),  :  g '1,1 +11,2 =- (1-g) 1,1 +  < c2YX (7.5)
(39),(7.1,2)
(A4),(51), : c >C (7.6)1YX 2YX
(7.4,5)
1-f                   •




Just like on path 6, it holds that:
1 -iT
1   =-(41   + * ) t ie when 1 3  = 0 (7.8)31-g 12
+ +
*
(A4),(51), : X3 -0+ Q' Q2x +   c21 < c2X +   clX > c2X (7.9)
(7.4,8)
+ + *





(8.1,2) :     Kl=0-K=K2
(8.3)
K=X-Y=0
-   i   e-iT  =   e-iT   ( 1-f) r +      i   <   ( 1-f) r (8.4)(A3),(33), :  1111 = 111
(35),(39),
(8.1)
-iT   dS               *(33)-(36), :  41 +11'2 = - (1-g) ie   + ·dii- (2x-  Q - Q2x (8.5)
(8.1,2,4)
(37), ,   10  <0+ .dS , c (8.6)3 K dQ 21
(8.1,2)
1
(A4),(51), : c >C (8.7)1 X   2X
(8.5,6)
Path 9.
A   =01=u =0 (9.1)22
Al > 0,13
>0 (9.2)
(9.1,2) :  K = Kl
(9.3)
D=0
dS                 *(33)-(37), :  g*1 = 42 = 0 + dq = ciyx -  Q = Qiyx (9.4)
(9.1)
(37), :   10   ,0+ .dS< c (9.5)
3 K        dQ    21
(9.1,2)
1








 le           {c     _ 112 1  when A    - 0 (9.8)(33)-(36), :  X  -









1 3  -0 +   Q<   Qix + c , C +   i < (1-f)r1YX    1X
Path 10.




(10.1,2) : D=0 (10.3)
K=X-Y=0 (10.4)
30              dS                         *
(37),(49),   :    52   =  0 +  dq=  c21  - Q=Q (10.5)21
(10.1)
1
(A2),(4)- : x. 1-f O+118-K > 0 (10.6)
1-g     1-g
(6),(10.3)
(10.4,6) : Q=0+ K l>O,K 2<0 (see path 3) (10.7)
In the same way as on path 7 we get:





(A4),(51), :  clYX > C2YX
(10.4,8)
Like on path 9 it holds that:
-iT
 le
I c    - .di 1  when 1   - 0 (10.10)A   =
3   (1-g)(1-f) ' 1X dQ J        3
+ *
(A4),(51), : 13 - 0+ Q) Qix+ clX > c2X
(10,4,10) (10.11)
+ *
1 3 -  0 +  Q<  Qix + CIX 2X<C
Path 11.
X 2 = u 2 =
0 (11.1)
Al > 0, X3> 0'1'l<
0 (11.2)




(3 7) , (4 9) ,      ·        3.0       ,      0  +     111  <      c           +         Q   b Q (11.4)' DK dQ    21         21
(11.1,2)
1
In the same way as on path 10 we can derive that:
X>0+K>0+Q>0 (11.5)
Also the necessary conditions  for X 3 to vanish can be found  in the same
way as  on path  10,  for  the same formula of A
3






13 =0+Q< Qix   + clX < ClYX   + i< (1-f)r (11.7)
Path 12.
12 -13 = "2-0 (12.1)
Al > 0,Ul <
0 (12.2)
(12.1,2) :  K = Kl
(12.3)
K=X-Y=0
Lika  on  path  8, 1 3-u 2=0 results  in the necessary condition:
i < (1-f)r (12.4)
*
(34)-(37), :  01 + 42 = - (1-g) e iT + dq = cix-   Q- Q (12.5)1X
(12.1,2)
30       dS
(37 ),(49 ), : Fir > O +  Ei< c21 (12.6)
(12.1,2)
1
(A4),(51), : c <C (12.7)1X   2X
(12.5,6)
6. Final paths.
Final paths must fulfill the transversality conditions. Together with
(33) and (34) we get:
111(z) = (1+k) B 2(z) - 13(z) (68)
01(z) - w2(z) - g X3(z) (69)
1-gimplying:   112(z) = -A (z) (70)k   3
We  will now demonstrate  in an indirect  way  that A 3  has to vanish  at  the
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planning horizon. Suppose:
A (z) > 0 (71)
3
Then, by (70) and (43) it must hold that:
112(z) > 0+ K(z) = (1+k)X(z) < X(z)+ 111(z) = 0 (72)
This results, together with (69) and (70) in:
#1(z) =     g       31 - (1+k)8 A (z) = 0 (73)
Due to (71) this can only be true if:
(1+k)g = 1, (74)
which is contrary to assumption A6. So, due to (69),  (70) and (74),
feasible final paths are characterized by:
#1(z) = 02(z) = X3(z) = 0 (75)
This results in the following final paths:
path  necessary conditions main properties of
nr the stationary state
2   i > (1-f)r and c >C Y=kX and K=K lY   2Y
5   i > (1-f)r and c <C Y=k X and K=KlY         2Y                                           1
8   i < (1-f)r and c >C Y=0  and K=KlY    2Y                    2
12   i < (1-f)r and c <C Y=0  and K=K
lY    2Y                    1
Table A3.3. The feasible final paths.
As described in figure 1 of appendix 2, we will now start looking for
feasible paths, preceding the above mentioned final paths. In order to
select them,  we derive some coupling conditions from the optimality
conditions in the next section.
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7. Coupling conditions.
From (2) and from the fact that the variables X and K are continuous, we
can derive that Y must be continuous, so:
+ +
Y = Y on a coupling time point (76)
We have derived in (44) that:
1 3  is continuous (77)
From the continuity of K and from the fact that activity 1 is the capit-
al-intensive one, so ql < 42, it results that:
+ + + *
K = K2 and Q = QJN +
+
*
Q< Q on a coupling point of time (78)JN
in which :j-1,2,2 1;N=X,Y,Y X, 0(1=2 1-N-0)
The above implication is true because:
+ + ++ + +
Q - qi Ki + 42(K - Kl) < 42K when Kl > 0,
+ +
for: K=K and ql <  2'
In the same way one can derive that:
+   +      +          +**
K=Kland Q-QJN+Q'QJN (79)
Beside the rankings as mentioned in (51), we need the following implica-
tion which can easily been derived:
i < (1-f)r + clX > c2X +  cly > c2Y +  clYX > c2YX (80)
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8. Coupling procedure.
This section describes the selection of feasible preceding paths. Only
for the first set of strings, all ending with path 2, we will describe
this procedure at length. With this information on relevant details, the
reader is able to construct the selection procedure for the remaining
sets of strings with the help of the tables, presented later on.
8.1. Strings ending with path 2.
From the coupling conditions and the characteristics of path 2, we can
derive that a path, preceding path 2, must have the next' properties:
+             +                                              +
Y=  kX  ;cly >  c2Y  ; X 3  =  0  and  :  i  > (1-f)r (81)
We will now check which path(s) fulfill(s) these constraints:
path feasible reason
nr predecessor
1          yes       
3 no 1   >03
+ +
4            no        13 >0 for Q> Q21 > QIYdue to cly> c2Yand Q> 0
5 no C <C should be necessary for feasibilitylY    2Y
+
6 no X  > 0 because i > (1-f)r
3
+
7           no       X3 > 0 because i > (1-f)r
8          no       i < (1-f)r should be necessary for feasibility
+




11          no      13 > 0 because i > (1-f)r
12 no i < (1-f)r should be necessary for feasibility
Table A3.4. Selection of paths preceding path 2.
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So, only path 1 can precede path 2. On path 1, the amount of capital
goods rises and so, because there is no switch of production activity,
total output increases. From this fact, from the necessary conditions of
the final path 2 and from the characteristics of paths 1 and 2, we can
derive the following properties for a feasible path preceding path 1:
path 1 preceding path
+ + + +
Y = kX +    Y = kX
+*   +*
Q < Q2Y and Kl = 0
+
Q < Q2y (82)
+ +
A   >0                   +     1>O
3                                   3
on both paths: i > (1-f)r and c >ClY   2Y
None of the feasible paths can meet all these conditions:
path feasible reason
nr predecessor
2 no A   =0
3+ *   +   (12 *
3              no         Q- Q21 - qlK(t31) + Q=  12K(t31) - q.- Q21 > QZY
* +   +   %  *
4             no        Q21 <Q- qlK(t41) +Q- q2K(t41) > qI Q21 > Q2y
5 no C <C should be necessary for feasibility
l Y   2Y
+ +
6 no Y < kX
7 no Y=0
8 no i < (1-f)r should be necessary for feasibility
+ +




Table A3.5. Selection of paths preceding path 1 + path 2.
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By combining the above results with (1.5,12) and (2.3,6) of section 5,
we get the following strings of final path 2, in the case of i> (1-
f)r, c >C and: K(0) - (1+k) X(0):lY    2Y
initial conditions optimal trajectory
X(0) = al path 2
X(0) < al path 1 + path 2
Table A3.6. Optimal trajectories resulting from tables A3.4 and A3.5.
1                                                  (83)in which : al = (1+k)q2   y
8.2. Strings ending with path 5.
In the same way as above, by combining the properties of the paths and
the coupling conditions in selecting feasible preceding paths, one can
derive the other trajectories. From these remaining strings, we will
only present the conditions to be posed on preceding paths. The selec-
tion procedure itself will be left to the reader. For the string ending
with path 5, we get the specific preceding conditions of table A3.7 on
conditions to precede
path 5 path 5 path 4 path 3 path 1
+
*              *               *                 *                    *
Q=Q Q ' Qly Q>Q21 Q <  Q21                    21Q<Q1Y
+                                                        +                +
when K >
Kl when Kl > Kl
+ + + + + + + +
Y = kx Y = kX Y = kX Y = kX Y = kX
+             +               +                  +
X =0 A =0 X >0 A >0 A   >0
3             3               3                 3                    3
predecessor path 4 path 3 path 1                -
Table A3.7. Preceding conditions of the strings with final path 5.
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the previous page. Apart from these specific conditions, it must hold
during the whole trajectory that:
i > (1-f)r and c <C (84)lY    2Y
From table A3.6 and the characteristics of the paths, we can derive the
following strings and relevant initial conditions in the case of i >
(1-f)r, cly < C and: K(0) = (ltk)X(0) :2Y
initial conditions optimal trajectory
X(0) = bl path 5
b2 < X(0) < bl path 4 + path 5
b3  <    X( 0)   < b2 path 3 + path 4 + path 5
X(0) < b3 path 1 + path 3 + path 4 + path 5
Table A3.8. Optimal trajectories resulting from table A3.7.
1* 1* 1*
in which : bl = (1+k)q1 Qly, 1,2 = (ltk)ql Q21' b3 = (ltk)q2 Q21 (85)
8:,3. Strings ending with path 8.
conditions to precede
path 8 path 8 path 7 path 6 path 1
*               *           +*                           + *Q=Q Q=Q Q<Q Q < Q2yx2X          2X            21
+
Kl = 0 when Kl = 0
+              +              +             +
Y =0 Y=0 Y=0 Y>0 Y>0
+               +              +              +
13-0 A =0 X >0 X >0 A   >03                    3                   3                  3
predecessor path 7 path 6 path 1
Table A3.9. Selection of paths preceding path 2.
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Note that during the whole trajectory it must hold that:
i < (1-f)r and cIX > c2X +  cly > c2Y +  clYX > c2YX (86)
So, we get in the case of i < (1-f)r and c >C1 X   2X:
initial conditions optimal trajectory
X(0) = K(0) and c < X(0) path 8
1
X(0) = K(0) and c2 < X(0) < Cl   path 7 + path 8
K(0) = b2 and c3 < X(0) < c2   path 6 + path 7 1 path 8
K(0) = (1+k)X(0) and X(0) < c3   path 1 + path 6 + path 7 + path 8
Table A3.10. Optimal trajectories resulting from table A3.9.
in which :c  = 1 n* 1
* 1*
1    q2 '*2X' c.2 - q2 Q2yx and (:3 = (1+k)q2 Q2yx (87)
8.4. Strings ending with path 12.
conditions to precede
path 12 path 12
-
path 11
+             +          +*       +*              *
Q=Q Q=Q when K=K Q>Q when K=K1X            1X          1        21          2
+ +*
K =




A =0 X =0 A   >0
3                   3                             3
i < (1-f)r i < (1-f)r i < (1-f)r
( X <
c C <C C   <C
2 X      1 X   2 X              1 X   2 X
preceding path  9 when c <C1YX 2YX
path path 11 path 10 when c >C1YX 2YX
Tabel A3.11. Selection of paths preceding path 12.
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*
In constructing table A3.11 we used the following orderings of Q -
values:
*
i   <   ( 1-f) r +  · Q < Q;Y < 4X1YX
*                    *                 *
Q2yx < Q2Y < Q2x
* * * *
' Q2yx < Q27 < Q2x < Q (88)1X* * *
elx < c2x +    Q21 < Q2x < Qix
From table A3.11 can be derived that two distinct strings may precede
path 11, one ending with path 9 and the other ending with path 10. In
addition, we have found a supplementary condition which indicates, that
each string holds under different conditions. We will present the tables
of the relevant strings apart from each other. The condition on c re-
*                                  jyx
sults in another ordering of Q -values:
*         *          *
eIYX  f   c2yx + Q12   5   Q2yx  5 Q (89)1YX
This ordering will be used in the selection procedure, too.
conditions to precede
path 9 path 4 path 3 path 1
+ * * + * + * + *
Q ' Qlyx (> Q21)   Q > Qlyx Q < Q21 Q<Q21
+                                                                        + + + + + +
Y>0 Y = kx Y = kX Y = kX
+                     +              +               +
X >0 X >0 X >0 X   >0
3                      3               3                3
i < (1-f)r i < (1-f)r i < (1-f)r i < (1-f)r
clYX <
c C <C C <C C     <C
2YX 1YX 2YX 1YX 2YX 1YX 2YX
predecessor  path 4 path 3 path 1           -
Table A3.12. Selection of paths preceding path 9 when clYX < c2YX'
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So we get the next optimal strings and initial conditions to match in
the  case  of  i  <  (1-f)r and  clYX <  c2yx  (+  clX <  c2X   
initial conditions : optimal trajectories
K(0)     = X(0) and dl < X(0) path 12
K(0) = X(0) and d2 c X(0) < dl
paths 11 + 12
K(0) = c2 and d3 < X(0) < d2   paths  9 + 11 + 12
K(0) = (ltk)X(0) and d4 4 X(0) <d 3 paths 4+9+1 1+1 2
K(0) - (1+k)X(0) and d5 < X(0) <d 4 paths 3+4+9+1 1+1 2
K(0) = (1+k)X(0) and X(0) < d5 paths 1+  3+ 4+ 9+  11 +  12
Table A3.13. Optimal trajectories from tables A3.11 and A3.12.
1 * 1 * 1 1*
In which : dl = 1
=
i. Qix , d2 - 4 Qiyx, d3 = 1+k ql Qiyx,
11 *   11 *
d4   =   1+k   q 1   Q21    ,   d5   =   ltE Ii;  Q21
' (90)
conditions to precede
path 10 path 7 path 6 path 1
+            +    +   +            +            +*                                   *                                   *
Q< Q l when Kl =K
Q<Q Q < Q2yx Q < Q2yx21
+                                        +             +
*
Q = Q21 when K2 = K
+                       +             +             +    +
Y=0 Y=0 Y>0 Y - kX
+                       +             +             +
1 >0 X >0 1 >0 A   >0
3                          3               3               3
predecessor path 7 path 6 path 1          -
Table A3.14. Selection of paths preceding path 10 when clYX > c 2YX'
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Note that during, the whole trajectory it holds that:
C >C and i < (1-f)r (91)
1YX 2YX
From table A3.14 and the properties of the relevant paths we can derive
the following optimal patterns:
initial conditions optimal trajectory
K(0) = X(0) and e < X(0) path 12
1
K(0) = X(0) and e2 < X(0) < el
paths 11 + 12
K(0) = X(0) and e
3 <  X(0) < e2
paths 10 +  11 +  12
K(0) = X(0) and e4 < X(0) < e3
paths 7 + 10 + 11 + 12
K(0) = d4 and e  < X(0) <e 4 paths 6+ 7+ 10 + 11 + 125
K(0) = (1+k)X(0) and X(0) <e 5  paths 1+6+7+1 0+1 1+1 2
Table A3.15. Optimal patterns resulting from tables A3.11 and A3.14.
* 1* 1 * 1     *
In which : e
1 - Qix ' e2 - TI- 921' e3 -  2 Q21' e4 - .Ii2 Q2yx'
1 1*
e5 " 1+k q2 02Yx' (92)
9.     St mmary.
In order to solve the model of chapter 4, it is reduced to its mathema-
tically most condensed form. The reduced model still contains 2 state
variables,  3  control variables,  2  state  constraints  and  3  (mixed)
control constraints. The solution procedure, as designed in appendix 2,
is then applied to this reduced model and the main features of this
process are described.
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150, 174, 202 stationary, 1, 4, 39, 41, 65,
capacity, 66        -                     70, 72, 82, 84, 85, 93, 104
market, 12, 17, 21, 27, 30, 51, 113 succeding, 174
stationary/threshold value of, 4, Pattern,
62, 72, 73, 79, 84, 87, 90-92, financial growth, 7
95, 99, 101-103, 105, 107-109, (optimal), 38, 39, 42, 60, 62,
112, 113, 150, 155, 174, 175 63, 70, 77, 84, 143-146, 152,
return on, 31, 61, 66, 67, 74, Z7, 153, 162, 164, 165, 170, 174,
148 182, 201, 203-208
Pay off/back debt, see: redemption
Parameters, 4, 49, 58, 87-92, 95, period, 44
97-99, 109, 112 Performance,
constraint on the, 4 index, 33
Partial elasticity of output with level, 57, 119, 120, 122, 124,
respect to input, 45 127, 128, 136, 143
Partial information, 20 level, (marginal) contribution
Path/stage, 38-43, 49, 60-63, 65, to the, 121-124, 129, 130, 147
68-72, 81, 82, 84, 109, 112, stream, instantaneous, 125,
143-145, 148-155, 157, 158, 160- 128-130, 138
174, 185-199, 201-208 Planning,
consolidation, 39, 109 capacity, 15
contraction, 39 horizon, 11, 12, 33, 35, 51
depth-investment, 72, 91, 112 123, 124, 139, 145, 147, 199
final, 40, 62, 63, 69, 72, 84, 91- period, 30, 41, 45, 51, 56, 57,
93, 95, 98, 102, 106, 109, 113, 60, 69, 77, 111, 118-120,
144, 145, 151, 152, 162, 170, 123-125, 128, 139, 145, 152,
198, 199, 203 155, 166
(in)feasible, 39, 60, 61, 144-146, Plant choice function, 24
158, 162, 182, 185, 202 Policy,
initial, 103, 111, 152, 185 incremental, 127, 128
intermediate, 1, 112 overall, 127
maximum debt financed growth, 173 rule, see: decision rule
(maximum) growth, 1, 4, 39, 47, variable, 16, 128
65, 69, 70, 82, 84, 85, 93, 112 Power, 13
preceding, 144-146, 152, 162-164,    Prestige, 13
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Price, (flow), 13, 14, 34, 40-42, 54,
policy, 8 68, 69, 76, 91, 102, 105-107,
sales function, 17, 19 109, 113, 119
selling, 16-18, 30-32, 35, 52, 113 Profitable,
setting mechanism, 17, 21 alternatives, 58
shadow, 128, 129 limits, 58
Pricing (policy), 17, 19, 21 Programming problem, 128, 129, 134
Product, 17, 30 Proportionate effect, Gibrat's
development, 7 law of, 14
mix, 8 Public services„ 28
range, 7, 8 Purchasing power, 29
Production, multiplier, 68, 93
activity, 50, 51, 56-58, 60, 61, Putty - clay model, 24
65, 66, 71, 72, 74-78, 81-84,
87-89, 91, 95, 97, 111-113, 183, Quit rate, (natural), 15, 16
200, 202
capacity, 15, 22, 27, 32, 51 Rate of credit for shareholders,
column, 8                                26
costs, 51, 84 Reallocation, 75-77, 82, 84, 90,
frontier, 6 91, 99, 107, 109, 112
function, 1, 3, 15, 24, 33, 45, Recession, 19
49, 50, 127, 149 Recruiting rate, 17
intensity, 14 Recruitment of labour, 24
level of, 14, 31, 60, 61, 127 Redemption, 43, 48, 54, 60, 62,
mode of, 53, 57, 104, 112 80, 82, 84, 85, 90, 92, 109,
(policy), 1, 3, 4, 11, 33, 35, 44, 113, 169
49, 87, 110-112 rate, 36, 43
possibility, 49, 50 Region, feasible, 80, 126, 129,
(process), 1, 3, 7, 14, 15, 29-31, 132
47, 49, 58, 63, 71, 74, 107, Regional expansion, 8
113, 148 Reinvestments, 34, 68
stationary level of, 61 Relationship (dynamic), 11, 49
structure, 30, 44 Rent payment, 80
theory, 98 Replacement value theory, 27
Productivity decay, rate of, 14 Research,
Profit, and development, 6
distributed, 26 effort, 21
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Restriction, see: condition and Social parameters, 4, 49, 110
constraint Solution,
Return function, 45, 156 analytical, 6, 110
Returns to scale, 31, 45, 50, 51, 63, feasible, 118, 126, 132, 133,
66, 68, 72, 75, 80, 91 141
Revenue (flow), see also: return, Solution procedure,
15, 29-31, 33, 34, 58, 70, 79 iterative, 2-4, 29, 35, 49,
Risk, 18, 21, 59 134, 136, 143-146, 151, 156,
class, 22, 55, 107, 108 162, 176, 177, 208
profile, 22                            tryal and error, 143
Staff, 14, 15
Sales, Stage, (of an optimal trajectory),
advantage, 74, 112 see: path
decay (parameter), 18, 20 State,
discounted, 13, 14, 33 actual/present, 119, 128, 129
equation, dynamic, 20 condition, initial, 4, 34, 42,
force, 17 44, 47, 63, 65, 70, 71, 77,
(output) function, 52, 111, 113 118, 119, 139, 144-146, 152,
potential, maximum, 20 153, 184, 203-205, 207, 208
promotion, 17 condition, stationary, 65
response model, 17-19 constraint, 2, 3, 117, 118,
response parameter, 18 133-136, 138, 139, 142, 146,
return on, 13, 37, 107 147, 165, 176, 178, 208
stationary level of, 61 equation, 118, 138, 160
stimulating activities, 8 final, 98
(volume), 16-20, 30, 51, 54, 61, initial, 39, 71, 85, 90, 118,
72, 74, 87, 92, 119 119, 125, 139, 165, 170
Salvage value, see: (final value of marginal value of the, 123,
the) firm 124, 130, 136
Saturation effect, 18 of bliss, 40, 43, 48, 69
Scarcity, 3 rate of change, 118, 119
Selection procedure for preceding stationary, 41, 43, 62, 74,
paths, 201-207 150, 152, 155, 170, 199
Shareholder, 2, 11-14, 26, 34, 37, trajectory, 118, 125, 129, 131,
41, 43, 55, 68, 70, 79, 82, 92, 140
93, 112 variable, 42, 57, 80, 85, 118,
Shares, 12, 35, 63 121-123, 125, 129, 130, 136,
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145, 165, 178, 208 Technical,
Statics, 5, 102 constraint, 33
comparative, 5 deterioration rate, 22, 24
Stochastics, 114 progress, 22-24, 114
Stocks, (value of), 27 Technique, 24
of final products, 51 Technology, fixed, 50, 51
Strategic policy, 8 Thresholds, theory of critical, 74
Strategy, 7 Time, 4, 5, 12, 30, 51, 119, 124,
String, see: pattern 127, 139, 143
Study, see: analysis Time preference rate,
Subsidies, 67 of employees, 16
Substitution, 44, 74, 90, 95-97, 99, of management, 13, 24, 26
100, 113, 175, 176 of shareholders, 12, 26, 27,
rate of technical, 96 30, 34, 39, 67, 68, 87, 90,
System, 5, 118 97, 99, 105-110, 112, 113, 162
System equation, see: state equation Trajectory,
Switching costs, 113 basic, 65, 69
(master), 4, 62, 63, 65, 66,
Take-over, 13 68-73, 77, 78, 82-85, 87, 90,
Tax, 91, 94, 95, 98-101, 103, 106,
corporate/corporation profit, 1, 3, 108, 110, 112
24, 37, 44, 46, 49, 54, 67, 78, (optimal), 29, 31, 37, 39-42,
99, 104, 111 44, 46-49, 57, 60, 62, 63,
deduction, 101 65, 70-72, 76, 84, 90, 91,
payment, 101 100, 106, 111-113, 160, 170,
personal, 26 172, 174, 185, 203-205, 207,
Tax rate, 208
corporation profit, 25, 26, 44, 47, sub-, 42
54, 63, 87, 88, 92, 93, 97, 99, Transaction costs, 54
101, 102, 104-107, 110, 112, 113
for capital gains, 26 Uncertainty, 21, 55
marginal income, 26 Unions, 15
of personal wealth, marginal, 26 Utility function, 14
Tax systems, 24-27, 114
neutrality of, 24, 25, 28 Vintage, 24, 113





rate, 13, 16, 17, 30, 53, 67, 87,
88, 91-93, 97, 99, 109, 110,
112, 113
Wages, 52, 54, 66, 67, 83
marginal saving on, 83, 84
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INHOUD
Dit boek behandelt het verband tussen het produktie-, financierings- en
investeringsbeleid  van de  onderneming met  behulp van een dynamisch
micro-economisch model waarvan de oplossing bepaald wordt met behulp van
het zogenaamde Maximum Principle. Dit door de Russische wiskundige
Pontryagin ontworpen Principe maakt het mogelijk om analytische oplos-
singen voor dynamische modellen (de zgn.: optimal control modellen) te
bepalen.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de lezer vertrouwd gemaakt met de wijze waarop in
optimal control modellen de verschillende aspecten van het ondernemings-
gedrag in wiskundige verbanden kunnen worden weergegeven.  Dit wordt
gedaan aan de hand van publicaties over het gedrag van de verschillende
groeperingen die verbonden zijn met de onderneming, zoals: werknemers,
aandeelhouders, leveranciers en overheid.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond hoe de formulering van het model samen-
hangt met het uit het model voortvloeiende optimale ondernemingsbeleid.
Dit gebeurt aan de hand van een viertal integraal beschreven onderne-
mingsmodellen, door verschillende auteurs gepubliceerd tussen 1967 en
1978 en die een geschikte aanloop vormen naar het ondernemingsmodel dat
in de hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 6 wordt gebouwd en geanalyseerd.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een optimal control model ontwikkeld dat het ver-
band tussen het produktie-, financierings-, en investeringsbeleid van de
onderneming beschrijft. Belangrijke verbeteringen ten opzichte van de
voorafgaande modellen zijn de introductie van activiteitsanalyse ter
beschrijving van de (beperkte) produktiemogelijkheden voor de onderne-
ming en de invoering van investeringssubsidie naast winstbelasting om de
invloed van de overheid op het ondernemingsbeleid te beschrijven.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de kenmerken van de optimale oplossing van het
model beschreven. Deze oplossing is in appendix 3 met behulp van de in
appendix 2 beschreven algemene procedure geconstrueerd. Het blijkt dat
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er vier verschillende typen van ontwikkelingspatronen van de onderneming
zijn. Welk patroon van toepassing is, hangt af van de specifieke omstan-
digheden waarin de onderneming verkeert: is arbeidsintensief produceren
duurder of goedkoper dan kapitaalintensief produceren en: is geld lenen
duurder of goedkoper dan het aantrekken van eigen vermogen. In de ont-
wikkelingspatronen  zien  we  bekende  verschijnselen  zoals:  groei-  en
stationaire fasen, diepte-investeringen en uitstoot van vreemd vermogen
als de onderneming een bepaalde omvang heeft bereikt (consolidatie). In
dit hoofdstuk worden ook verbanden gelegd tussen de traditionele, sta-
tische ondernemingstheorie en het onderhavige dynamische model.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt dieper ingegaan op wat de verschillende ontwikke-
lingspatronen aan gemeenschappelijke kenmerken hebben. Zij blijken alle
te verklaren te zijn met behulp van drie beslissingsregels, ieder be-
trekking hebbend op een van de drie facetten van het ondernemingsbeleid:
produktie, financiering, investerings-  en dividendpolitiek. Verder
worden een zestal karakteristieken van ontwikkelingspatronen onderschei-
den aan de hand waarvan de invloed op de optimale oplossing wordt nage-
gaan van: winstbelasting, investeringssubsidie, het door de aandeelhou-
ders minimaal gewenste rendement, de leencapaciteit van de onderneming,
het interestpercentage en de salariskosten.  Tenslotte wordt voor een
drietal soorten grootheden (een financi5le groep, een overheidsgroep en
de loonvoet) nagegaan welke invloed zij hebben op een patroon waarbij de
onderneming zowel diepte-investeringen uitvoert als gaat consolideren
binnen de gegeven planningsperiode.
In de literatuur blijkt bijna iedere auteur een andere methode te volgen
om met behulp van het Maximum Principle de oplossing van zijn model te
bepalen. Vaak zijn deze methodes heuristisch van aard en veelal is de              i
gevolgde procedure niet gepubliceerd. In de appendices van dit boek is
een meer algemene procedure ontworpen, gebaseerd op de formulering van
het Maximum Principle door Russak, 1970. Deze procedure is gebruikt om,
naast de oplossing van het model in hoofdstuk 4, ook de oplossingen van
een drietal voorlopers, behandeld in hoofdstuk 3, te bepalen.
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
17 000 00829082
